For the first time in years, South Sudan’s long-stalled transition has shown signs of progress. Recent decisions to decouple outstanding peace-agreement and proceed with preparations for national elections in December 2026, mark a significant shift away from the paralysis that has characterized the implementation of the 2018 peace deal.
These steps do not yet guarantee credible elections. But they do reopen a pathway that deserves a recognition and support, including from the international stakeholders. At the heart of this shift lies a pragmatic recalibration of sequencing. Key transitional processes – constitution-making, the unification of the armed forces, a national census, and administrative boundary delimitation – have repeatedly served as justifications for delay.
The recognition that elections can proceed under the Transitional Constitution, confirmed by the Presidency in their meeting on December 10, reflects a political realism. In a context where perfection has long been the enemy of progress, this matters.
A further politically consequential step has been taken by the National Elections Commission (NEC) through its confirmation that the geographical constituencies used in the 2010 elections will also form the basis for the 2026 vote. In the absence of a national census and boundary delimitation, this decision is both legally defensible and procedurally necessary.
Electoral law does not permit constituency changes within 12 months to the poll, and without a census there is no credible alternative framework. Reverting to the 2010 constituencies therefore constitutes a feasible workaround, allowing the electoral preparations to continue.
At the same time, this choice carries immediate implications: It requires a corresponding reduction of the National Legislative Assembly to the number of seats attached to those constituencies. Given that the 2010 constituencies also do not fully reflect the population distribution 15 years later, the decision must be treated explicitly as a transitional solution, not as a template for future elections.
More fundamentally, the use of legacy constituencies raises unresolved questions about voter eligibility and electoral participation in a country shaped by decades of displacement.
Where, precisely, are citizens entitled to vote? Does eligibility hinge on ancestral “home” constituencies, place of birth, or long-term residence? How should the system accommodate those born in exile, the internally displaced persons living far from their areas of origin, or refugees who may wish to participate from abroad?
These questions are not peripheral; they go to the heart of electoral legitimacy. Without clear, realistic procedures that acknowledge population mobility as a structural feature of the South Sudanese society, voter registration risks exclusion and post-election dispute potential. Addressing these issues does not require a census, but it does require honesty and openness to pragmatic approaches, administrative clarity, and targeted technical support to ensure that the electoral process reflects social reality rather than an idealized territorial order.
Even in light of the vast remaining challenges, the steps undertaken now are substantial. The momentum did not emerge from the Executive alone. It has been pushed by the peace-agreement stakeholder signatories, who have argued consistently that elections must not remain indefinitely hostage to unfinished reforms.
This process shows remarkable domestic agency. The stakeholder engagement has triggered decision-making at the Presidency and opened the door to a structured process: dialogue between stakeholders and party signatories, agreement on specific amendments, and, eventually, tabling of these changes through the formal peace-agreement machinery.
These are not trivial developments. They suggest that South Sudan’s political actors are beginning, however cautiously, to prioritize exit from an open-ended transitional arrangement. Yet this moment also carries real risks, and international partners are well-advised to support steps to minimize them as best as possible. Three issues, in particular, will determine whether this pathway leads to credible elections.
First, the integrity and legitimacy of the peace agreement must not be undermined. Proposals to repeal Articles 8.2 and 8.3 of the Revitalized Agreement – provisions that anchor its constitutional and legal status – raise legitimate concern.
Decoupling elections from constitution-making or a census does not imply that these processes are optional or dispensable. On the contrary, their continued inclusion as post-election commitments is essential to maintaining the agreement’s authority and preventing selective interpretation. The danger is not technical but political: weakening the peace agreement risks reopening fundamental disputes over the rules of the game.
Secondly, significant technical and legal steps remain unavoidable if elections are to be more than aspirational. Amendments to the National Elections Act are required to align it with the Transitional Constitution. Limited constitutional adjustments are still necessary to clarify electoral procedures and timelines. Above all, financing remains the decisive bottleneck. Without early and credible funding – for voter registration, logistics, training, and electoral security – deadlines will again slip and confidence will erode.
Thirdly, political inclusivity is not optional. All signatories must be brought on board in a credible and politically meaningful way. This is especially true for the SPLM-IO, whose position has been weakened and embittered by the ongoing trial of First Vice-President Riek Machar. Proceeding without addressing this grievance risks reproducing the very exclusion dynamics that have undermined past transitions. Open, honest political dialogue is required to secure buy-in and prevent the peace agreement from being instrumentalized as a tool for delay or leverage.
For international partners, the challenge is calibration rather than endorsement. Acknowledging political movement does not mean lowering standards. Technical support – to the NEC, for security arrangements and legal harmonization – is urgently needed if timelines are to be met. Financial support should also be considered, in ways that reinforce transparency, inclusivity, and institutional capacity.
Conditionality should focus on process credibility, not on re-imposing sequencing requirements that have already proven unworkable.
Crucially, international actors should resist the temptation to frame this moment as either a breakthrough or a betrayal. It is a narrow political opening, created by domestic actors under pressure of time and legitimacy. Whether it leads to credible elections depends on choices still to be made. These are choices by South Sudanese leaders, first and foremost, but also by those who have long insisted on elections while hesitating to support their practical foundations.
South Sudan’s transition has been extended repeatedly in the name of preparation. That justification is now wearing thin. If elections are to take place in December 2026, they will do so under imperfect conditions. The question is not whether those conditions meet an abstract ideal, but whether they are sufficiently credible, inclusive, and supported to mark a genuine step out of permanent transition. Such an outcome is still possible. But it will not happen by default.
The writer, Edmund Yakani, is the Executive Director of the Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO), that works on peacebuilding, human rights, and democratic governance. He can be reached via email:ceposouthsudan@gmail.com
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.