The recent reflections by Dr. Sunday de John on the controversy surrounding his defense of Salva Kiir Mayardit raise important questions about political culture, moral consistency, and the boundaries between criticism and dehumanization. His argument is framed as a defense of principle against what he terms a “moral marketplace,” where every act of conscience is presumed to be purchased. Yet, while eloquent in tone, his position overlooks a deeper sociological reality: the structural stage at which South Sudanese communities currently exist. Without situating public reaction within that sociological context, the analysis risks misdiagnosing anger as moral decay rather than understanding it as a function of collective social organization.
- The stage of solidarity: Durkheim’s analytical lens
In The Division of Labour in Society (1893), Émile Durkheim distinguishes between two types of social cohesion: mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity characterizes traditional, kinship-based societies where cohesion arises from similarity, shared beliefs, customs, religion, and collective identity. The collective conscience is intense, absolute, and often religious in tone. A perceived wrongdoing by one member is interpreted as an offense against the entire moral community. Law in such societies is predominantly repressive. Organic solidarity, by contrast, characterizes modern, industrial societies. Here, cohesion emerges from specialization and interdependence. Individuals perform different roles but rely on one another. The collective conscience is less intense and more abstract. Law becomes restitutive rather than punitive, seeking restoration rather than retribution. South Sudan today does not fully embody either form. It exists in a transitional, hybrid condition, a mixed stage where elements of mechanical solidarity remain dominant, even as pockets of organic differentiation emerge among educated elites and urban professionals.
- Collective attribution and political perception
Within societies shaped by mechanical solidarity, identity is inseparable from communal perception. Moral responsibility is collective. When citizens endure prolonged suffering, economic collapse, insecurity, corruption, and humanitarian crisis, the symbolic figure of the head of state becomes inseparable from that suffering. The office is not abstract; it is personalized. The president is not merely an elder deserving cultural reverence; he is the constitutional head of a system perceived to be the source of material hardship.
South Sudan has consistently ranked at or near the bottom of global corruption indices. Public discourse often references its position at 179 out of 180 countries on corruption perception scales, alongside severe poverty rates affecting over three-quarters of the population. Oil revenues that were expected to finance development have largely failed to translate into tangible public services.
Hunger, inflation, and institutional fragility shape everyday experience. In such a context, defending the head of state is not interpreted as a neutral philosophical exercise. It is interpreted through the moral logic of mechanical solidarity: If the leader is perceived as responsible for collective suffering, and you publicly defend him, you are symbolically aligned with the source of suffering. This is not necessarily an accusation of bribery. It is a sociological reflex grounded in communal moral reasoning.
- The limits of abstract individualism
Dr. Sunday de John invokes conscience as an individual possession, “unpurchased, unrented, and untouchable.” That assertion resonates within organic solidarity, where individual autonomy is paramount. However, within mechanical solidarity, the individual conscience is not fully autonomous; it is submerged within the collective conscience. Moral identity is socially embedded. A public intellectual cannot detach himself from communal expectations simply by asserting personal independence. To state, therefore, that criticism of his defense reflects moral degeneration misses the structural point. The reaction is not primarily about his integrity; it is about communal survival logic. In a society where public resources are scarce and suffering is acute, neutrality toward power is rarely interpreted as innocence.
- Legitimacy of criticism versus dehumanization
Dr. de John correctly distinguishes legitimate criticism from dehumanization. That distinction must indeed be preserved. No political disagreement should devolve into personal insult or degradation. However, the criticism of a sitting president, particularly in conditions of economic and institutional crisis, is constitutionally protected and morally defensible. The presidency is not a private identity; it is a public office. Respect for elders in traditional settings does not immunize state officials from scrutiny in constitutional governance. A head of state is accountable not to kinship ties but to law, institutions, and citizens. The right to criticize is not cruelty; it is civic participation.
- Anger as social symptom, not moral failure
Durkheim himself argued that during transitions between forms of solidarity, societies experience crisis and anomie, a breakdown of normative clarity. South Sudan’s current turbulence reflects precisely such a transition. The anger directed toward defenders of the political system is not simply hostility. It is a symptom of structural strain: high poverty rates, perceived elite impunity, weak public financial management, and limited social mobility. In such an environment, public trust erodes. When trust collapses, suspicion flourishes. The presumption of financial incentive becomes a coping mechanism within a context where corruption is widely experienced as systemic. This does not justify personal defamation. But it explains the sociology of suspicion.
- The transitional imperative
The fundamental issue, therefore, is not whether Dr. Sunday de John was paid. The deeper question is whether South Sudan has yet developed the institutional maturity associated with organic solidarity, where political disagreement does not automatically translate into moral suspicion. Until institutions become transparent, corruption declines, and citizens perceive equitable governance, mechanical patterns of collective attribution will persist. In such societies, the mistake of one is the mistake of all, the defense of one is the defense of all. Public perception operates through communal logic rather than individualized moral abstraction.
Conclusion: Understanding before judging
To characterize public reaction as evidence of moral decay oversimplifies a complex sociological reality. South Sudanese communities operate within a hybrid social structure where traditional moral frameworks coexist with modern political institutions. Defending the dignity of any individual, including the president, is legitimate. Equally legitimate, however, is the public’s right to question power when systemic suffering persists. The challenge is not to silence criticism, nor to romanticize indignation.
The challenge is to transition from mechanical solidarity driven by collective moral reflex to organic solidarity sustained by institutional trust, accountability, and functional interdependence. Until that transition is realized, perception will remain inseparable from communal experience. And in a society where suffering is widely attributed to those at the helm of power, defending the helm will inevitably be interpreted as standing with the ship’s direction. The solution, therefore, is not rhetorical clarification; it is structural reform.
The writer, Juol Nhomngek Daniel, is a lawyer, politician, lecturer, and member of the SPLM-IO. His area of interest is constitutional, administrative, and human rights law. He can be reached via email: nhomngekjuol@gmail.com.
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