To understand a national budget solely as a financial document, is a fallacy. In reality, a national budget is a binding legal mandate—the law of the land that ensures the existence and basic functioning of the state.
Under the principle of the Power of the Purse, the executive branch of government possesses no power to spend a penny without appropriation by the legislature. The appropriation mandate, defines specific purposes, spending limits, and the timeframes for public expenditure. Therefore, any spending outside these defined legal constraints is simply illegal and can lead to prosecution.
Beyond the law, the budget serves as a social contract between the people and their government. It is a legal manifestation of a government’s responsibility for the provision of social goods and welfare packages. For instance, if the constitution guarantees the right to education or healthcare, the budget is the legal mechanism that ensures the delivery of those responsibilities. Furthermore, governments have statutory obligations to prioritize the first-order payment: public sector salaries and public debts servicing, before any other spending. When a national budget violates the principles of distributive justice—by neglecting specific region or marginalized classes, it can, and should, be challenged in the judiciary. At last, the mandate requires that Auditor General to verify whether or not the budget followed the Appropriation Act in spending.
The authority to spend lapses on the last day of the fiscal year (say June 30 in the context of South Sudan). Unless a new mandate is provided through the successive national budget, the government (executive) essentially loses its legal authority to spend a penny from the public funds, logically leading to a shutdown of government.
South Sudan National Budget processes are governed by the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan, 2011 as amended, and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act (PFMAA), 2011. Traditionally, South Sudan used a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) model. However, the latest National Budget of FY 2025/2026 and the recent Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms revealed a shift towards Program-Based Budget (PBB) model. However, its adherence to legal timelines remains elusive.
In South Sudan, a fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30. The Minister of Finance and Planning is required, by law to, present fiscal national budget to Parliament by May 15 (approximately 45 days prior to the end of the fiscal year) in order to allow the legislatures ample time to deliberate and pass the budget by June 30, and then goes for assent into law by the President before July 1. However, South Sudan has normalized a firefighting approach to handling budgets:
- FY 2023/2024: presented only 10 days before the deadline (legislative scrutiny in 20-days).
- FY 2024/2025: delayed for approximately five months.
- FY 2025/2026: presented on February 3, 2026 – nearly seven months late.
While the law of South Sudan provides emergency windows under which the government can continue to spend, such as the Provisional Spending and Spending through Presidential Powers, these are often used as self-serving tools, rather than for sound financial management. Provisional Spending allows the Minister of Finance and Planning to authorize spending of 1/12th per month, based on the previous fiscal year’s budget for the period not exceeding four months, or the Presidential decrees. Generally, excessive budget delay, for any reason rather than political unrest or a coup, leads to a motion of no confidence or severe administrative sanction, for it suggests administrative incompetence. Nevertheless, the reality in South Sudan portrays a grim picture of the state of the economy and governance that it would be unfair to squarely blame the Minister for such delays.
Teddy Roosevelt once said, “comparison is the thief of joy”. No doubt, a typical Jinubi will cry foul over my comparison of South Sudan with its regional peers: Uganda and Rwanda. However, managing a budget prudently is not a function of a nation’s age, but of its discipline and governance. While the three East African nations share the same regional budget cycle, which runs from July 1 to June 30, their adherence to the deadline and outcomes diverges significantly:
| Metric | Rwanda | Uganda | South Sudan |
| Deadline Adherence | Consistent compliance | Consistent compliance | Chronic delay |
| Fiscal deficit | 5.5% of GDP | 7.6% of GDP | 46% (high risk) |
| Debt status | Consolidating | Vulnerable | Debt Distressed |
| Source of Revenue | Domestic revenues | Domestic/Loan | Oil & Foreign Aid |
South Sudan depends heavily on oil revenue and foreign aid, despite the proclaimed shift towards non-oil revenue, which was still insufficient due to the narrow tax base and administrative loopholes. The problem of dependence on oil for budget financing is obvious: the volatilities associated with the prices and disruption of exports through the Sudanese pipelines, just like it happened recently.
Like a massive gears-and-cogs system where one jam halts the entire machine, a budget delay ripples through the economy. In South Sudan, the delay of FY 2024/2025 budget contributed to the depreciation of SSP by over 400% and delay of the public sector employees’ salaries for 11 months.
Normally, a budget delay creates contractionary pressure in the economy. However, South Sudan portrays a pathetic anomaly: the government continues spending off budget. While civil servants and soldiers go unpaid for several months, rent-seeking contractors often receive payments. This practice does not stimulate the economy; it merely exacerbates inequalities and inefficiencies, leading to the erosion of social cohesion. Without certain fiscal roadmap, there is no planning for all the economic agents, turning the economy into a crisis-management economy with a large informal sector.
In a nutshell, a budget delay is essentially an uncertainty tax on the economy. The productivity lost to this vacuum is non-recoverable, transforming a developing economy into a begging bowl economy, trapped in a vicious cycle of crisis management.
To break free from the cycle of crisis management to a stable and production-based economy, the following reforms are essential:
- Strict adherence to the May 15 deadline: the Ministry of Finance and Planning must treat the statutory submission date as a non-negotiable legal requirement. Failure to meet this deadline should prompt parliamentary inquiries or administrative sanction.
- Expansion of the domestic tax base: to mitigate the oil dependence trap, the government should expedite Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms that boost non-oil revenue collection. It can reduce the need to seek emergency loans or foreign aid whenever oil production or export is disrupted.
- Statutory obligation must be prioritized: the government must stick to its legal mandate to pay public servants salaries before any discretionary spending on contractors. This is crucial for restoring the social contract between the people of South Sudan and their government.
- Strengthening of oversight institutions: The Legislature, the Judiciary and the Auditor General must be empowered to hold the executive accountable for spending that occurs outside the legal mandate or the approved Appropriation Act.
- Phasing out spending provisions: While the Public Financial Management Act, 2011 grants provisional twelfths (1/12th) spending, this should be an exception of extreme emergency, not a standard operating procedure, as has been the case.
The national budget of South Sudan is more than a financial spreadsheet; it is a law of the land and a mechanism through which the government fulfils its constitutional responsibilities. As long as the budget delay is normalized, the country will continue to pay an uncertainty tax that hinders growth and erodes public trust. By reclaiming the Power of the Purse and recognizing the budget as a binding legal mandate, South Sudan can begin its journey toward regional performance standards set by its East African peers.
The writer, Isaac K. Geka, is an economist and resides in Juba. He can be reached via email isaackiir3@gmail.com
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.