Recent battlefield gains from violent incursions into opposition controlled areas do little to suggest a brighter future for the SPLM and its armed affiliate, the SSPDF.
Instead, these operations portray the SSPDF as an invading force in the eyes of displaced civilians, people who have been killed, maimed, or driven from lands reduced to rubble. Capturing territory is one thing, but holding and stabilizing it is another. Convincing civilians of good intentions remains an even steeper challenge.
Such trust cannot be built through rhetoric alone. It requires concrete steps, particularly the delivery of essential social services that the SPLM either failed to provide before the 2013 conflict or continues to neglect today. The current military presence in newly captured opposition strongholds appears more symbolic than substantive, lacking meaningful translation into governance or public service.
This temporary military success is overshadowed by multiple risks, likely to test the strategies of First Lt. Gen. Paul Nang, the SSPDF Chief of General Staff, as he attempts to sustain fragile front lines.
One immediate concern is troop morale. It will be difficult to keep poorly fed and neglected soldiers deployed in areas where they are not welcomed. A durable presence requires soft power, especially renewed political dialogue and peace agreements with both armed and civilian opposition groups. Without this, homesickness, social isolation, and harsh living conditions could trigger desertions and defections.
Environmental conditions further compound the problem. Troops deployed to the Greater Upper Nile region face unfamiliar and harsh terrain, including disease carrying mosquitoes, snakes, scorpions, dense vegetation, and muddy landscapes, conditions that may severely affect those from other regions.
On the domestic front, both core SPLM supporters and the broader population are increasingly disillusioned. The government’s failures, widely seen as irreversible under President Salva Kiir, are evident across nearly all sectors.
The economy is in deep crisis. The government lacks both the will and the resources to reverse the decline. Civil servants have gone unpaid for nearly four years. In urban centers, survival increasingly depends on informal support networks and patronage systems that benefit only the well connected. How long such fragile systems can sustain livelihoods remains uncertain.
Ordinary South Sudanese, long reliant on international humanitarian aid, are now facing a diminishing safety net. Donor fatigue has set in after decades of assistance, dating back to the 1989 launch of Operation Lifeline Sudan. At the same time, global priorities are shifting, with resources redirected toward emerging geopolitical tensions and military preparedness elsewhere. As a result, less funding is available for humanitarian assistance in South Sudan, leaving vulnerable populations increasingly exposed.
President Kiir’s regional allies are also growing frustrated. South Sudan’s economic collapse has reduced the incentives that once underpinned their support. Reviving the economy will require a renewed and credible peace agreement, one that brings both the SPLM and opposition groups into a functional transitional government. Without such a framework, any stability will remain fragile.
The SPLM also faces a deeper, long term political threat, declining relevance among the electorate. Its reliance on military deployment in opposition areas, particularly ahead of anticipated elections, risks backfiring.
Older voters, once the party’s backbone, are gradually diminishing due to age and increasing political disengagement. Their numbers alone will not be sufficient to secure future electoral victories.
Meanwhile, a new generation, those born after 2005, has little direct connection to the SPLM’s liberation history. Their political outlook is shaped instead by lived experiences of economic hardship, insecurity, and governance failures. For these born frees, daily survival outweighs historical narratives. As this group grows into a dominant voting bloc over the next 15 years, the SPLM’s traditional messaging may lose further traction.
The next election, if held, may not simply be about re-electing President Kiir. It could instead trigger a succession struggle within the SPLM. Competing factions are likely to emerge, positioning themselves for influence in a post Kiir era. Such internal rivalries could prove destabilizing and may fracture the party.
Without cohesion, the SPLM risks the fate of earlier political movements that faded into irrelevance or disappeared entirely.
In the end, the SPLM’s recent military gains may project strength, but they mask deeper structural weaknesses, military, political, and economic. Without meaningful reforms, credible peace efforts, and a shift toward governance that prioritizes citizens’ welfare, these victories risk being short lived and ultimately unsustainable.
The writer, Deng Vanang, is the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief United Democratic Revolutionary Movement (UDRM), a holdout rebel movement.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.
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