Political authority is never self-justifying. It derives legitimacy not from intention, but from accountable action and tangible results. When regional institutions claim the power to mediate conflict and guarantee peace, they assume more than procedural roles—they assume moral responsibility for enforcement. The crisis in South Sudan now raises a stark question: has the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) lost the moral authority and credibility it once claimed when it guaranteed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)?
IGAD’s Mandate and Historical Context
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development is one of the region’s most consequential organizations. Its mandate, according to its website, spans conflict prevention and resolution, democracy and human rights promotion, transnational security management, post-conflict reconstruction, and humanitarian support. On paper, this vision is both plausible and urgently needed. Yet in practice, IGAD often favors performative gestures over decisive action. South Sudan has been mired in conflict for over twelve years, a stark testament to the bloc’s failure to translate its mandates into results. Even more troubling, other member states have largely remained silent, effectively allowing Uganda to support actors in South Sudan who actively undermine the revitalized peace deal. Without accountability and decisive intervention, IGAD risks turning its lofty ideals into empty rhetoric while the region continues to suffer.
Despite its ambitious mandate, IGAD’s record is mixed. While IGAD achieved a landmark success in facilitating the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the decades-long civil war between Southern Sudan and Khartoum, its subsequent interventions have struggled to produce lasting peace or stability. That accord ultimately paved the way for South Sudan’s independence in July 2011. In Somalia, for instance, the bloc’s efforts have largely focused on managing outbreaks of violence rather than addressing the root causes of protracted conflict. The bloc appears trapped in conflict containment, prioritizing short-term management over long-term solutions.
Mediation vs. Guarantee
Mediation and guarantee are not interchangeable. A facilitator convenes dialogue; a guarantor assumes obligation. By serving as the guarantor of South Sudan’s peace agreement, IGAD bound its credibility to implementation. A guarantee without enforcement is not diplomacy; it is performance in name only.
This distinction matters because peace agreements redistribute risk. They ask opposition leaders to return from exile, armed actors to disarm, and civilians to trust political rivals. Such acts are not symbolic; they are existential. When a regional body promises protection and compliance, it assumes full liability for failure.
Selective Enforcement and the Crisis of Credibility
A guarantor’s credibility rests on consistency. Yet when Yoweri Museveni deployed Ugandan forces into South Sudan and facilitated military support during a period governed by a United Nations arms embargo, IGAD remained silent, taking no public censure, sanctions, or formal investigations. While legal enforcement of UN sanctions rests with the Security Council, political accountability within a regional bloc is IGAD’s responsibility. Silence in such circumstances is not neutrality; it is acquiescence.
Reports by successive United Nations Panels of Experts on South Sudan—particularly following the imposition of the United Nations Security Council arms embargo in 2018—documented, in November 2018, March 2025, and December 2025, the continued flow of military assistance and patterns of regional security cooperation that generated serious and recurring compliance concerns. Although enforcement authority formally rests with the Security Council, the consistency, specificity, and temporal persistence of these findings created a compelling institutional expectation that IGAD, as a guarantor of the peace process, would, at a minimum, undertake a formal inquiry, issue a public clarification, or initiate a structured review mechanism.
The absence of any documented investigation, communiqué, or follow-up procedure strengthens the inference that institutional restraint—or deliberate political calculation—rather than administrative oversight, defined IGAD’s posture.
Defenders may argue that IGAD lacks coercive power over sovereign member states. That is precisely the point. An authority that cannot check power becomes dependent on it. If an institution lacks either the capacity or the will to discipline its most dominant members, its guarantees are structurally hollow. The deeper dilemma is that regional organizations are composed of sovereign states, some of which may be direct or indirect parties to the conflicts they mediate. In such contexts, absolute neutrality may be unattainable, and the question shifts from whether bias exists to whether institutional safeguards are sufficient to mitigate it.
Many multilateral bodies address similar conflicts of interest through recusal norms, rotating mediation leadership, or independent verification panels. The absence of comparable, robust safeguards within IGAD raises legitimate concerns about whether its guarantor authority can remain insulated from the strategic interests of member states.
Even if Uganda’s involvement is framed as stabilizing rather than partisan, the perception of partiality alone can be corrosive. In peace processes, perceived bias may be as destabilizing as actual interference, particularly when armed opposition groups evaluate the risks of disarmament or political reintegration.
Erosion of authority becomes moral bankruptcy when credibility, trust, and enforcement collapse to the point that commitments exist in form only. Guarantees may be signed, procedures may be outlined, but asymmetrical enforcement and unaddressed violations render the institution incapable of fulfilling its core obligations. When trust erodes and guarantees go unenforced, authority becomes symbolic, marking the point where erosion crosses into moral bankruptcy.
If neutrality is structurally constrained, moral authority must be reinforced through procedural transparency and consistent enforcement. Without such safeguards, guarantor status risks becoming indistinguishable from strategic alignment.
Lessons from the East African Community
A similar dynamic is evident in the East African region. The East African Community (EAC), a bloc focused primarily on economic integration, demonstrated this pattern in November 2023 when it elected South Sudanese President Salva Kiir as its chair. Kiir’s election was controversial, as member states were angered by South Sudan’s persistent failure to pay its monthly fees. Nevertheless, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni lobbied on Kiir’s behalf and secured his election despite the objections.
Article 146 of the EAC treaty allows for the suspension of member states that fail to meet financial or governance obligations. Yet South Sudan defaulted on its dues for years without consequence, reportedly shielded by Ugandan lobbying. Rules existed, but enforcement did not. The result was not institutional breakdown, but institutional accommodation. Where power intervenes, principle recedes.
The moral contradiction deepens within South Sudan itself. President Salva Kiir has repeatedly delayed or obstructed key provisions of the peace agreement, including security sector reforms. Most strikingly, the suspended First Vice President Riek Machar—whose political participation was explicitly safeguarded under the agreement—has faced severe restrictions even prior to his March 2025 house arrest, including confinement that violates the spirit, if not the letter, of guaranteed political inclusion. Public statements by opposition officials, civil society groups, and monitoring bodies tasked with overseeing the implementation of the R-ARCSS have repeatedly highlighted delays in security sector reform, the integration and graduation of unified forces, and persistent constraints on political mobility. These reports provide measurable indicators of implementation failure that go beyond mere rhetorical accusation.
These developments are not technical delays; they are stress tests of IGAD’s authority. A guarantor’s legitimacy is measured not during ceremonial signings, but during violations.
Institutional Constraint Is Not Moral Neutrality
Regional organizations often operate under political constraints. Factors such as power asymmetry, economic interdependence, and security alliances complicate enforcement. Critics may argue that overt censure of powerful member states can create institutional paralysis rather than promote compliance. Yet enforcement need not involve maximal confrontation. Institutional discipline exists along a spectrum: formal review mechanisms, fact-finding missions, public compliance benchmarks, and time-bound implementation schedules can exert pressure without undermining dialogue. The choice is not between silence and expulsion, but between calibrated accountability and reputational erosion.
Indeed, the long-term survival of a regional body may depend less on avoiding short-term tensions and more on preserving institutional credibility. An organization that sacrifices principle to maintain unity risks undermining the very authority that legitimizes its existence. However, structural or political constraints do not justify selective application of principles. When weaker actors are pressed to comply while stronger actors face no public accountability, guarantees cease to function as instruments of justice and become tools of political convenience.
The core issue is not whether IGAD commands coercive force. It is whether it uses the tools it already possesses: public condemnation, suspension mechanisms, formal investigations, emergency summits, and coordinated diplomatic pressure. The absence of visible, consistent action communicates tacit tolerance.
This pattern is mirrored in the EAC. The EAC’s experience underscores a clear warning. In the weeks before South Sudan assumed the EAC chairmanship in 2023, it renegotiated arrears exceeding $36 million—more than half were forgiven, and the remainder repaid after years of default. This settlement, which effectively erased years of non-compliance in exchange for political alignment, is documented in official EAC financial reports and summit communiqués. Forgiving a substantial portion of these arrears despite prolonged treaty violations illustrates a case in which political accommodation took precedence over institutional enforcement. At that time, the EAC appeared more concerned with South Sudan’s unpaid fees than with addressing the country’s ongoing conflict. Episodes like this reinforce the perception that regional discipline bends to power rather than principle—a path IGAD must avoid.
By following this pattern, IGAD risks institutionalizing impunity in the same way the EAC did. Stability is invoked to justify silence; regional solidarity is invoked to shield leaders from scrutiny. But peace sustained by selective enforcement is inherently unstable. It breeds cynicism among citizens and erodes confidence among international partners.
Acknowledging Limitations and Structural Challenges
Building on the examples of selective enforcement and institutional compromise, it is important to address potential critiques and structural challenges facing IGAD. First, some may argue that IGAD’s failures stem from the structural constraints already highlighted, including political asymmetry, economic interdependence, and the sovereignty of member states. Yet these constraints raise a crucial moral question. IGAD operates within a framework where enforcement is challenging, but it still possesses tools—public condemnations, emergency summits, formal investigations, and diplomatic leverage—that it largely fails to deploy. The selective or inconsistent use of these tools shows that inaction is not merely structural; it reflects a conscious choice. Comparative examples from other regional bodies, such as the African Union’s interventions in Sudan or Burundi, illustrate that even limited coercive power can be leveraged effectively when institutions act decisively. This reality underscores that structural limits do not absolve IGAD of moral responsibility.
Second, some may argue that assigning moral responsibility to IGAD overlooks the agency of South Sudan, Uganda, and other member states. However, this perspective underestimates the unique obligations of a guarantor. IGAD voluntarily assumed the role of guarantor for the peace agreement, and moral authority does not stem from controlling every actor but from consistently upholding norms and enforcing compliance. Silence in the face of violations, especially by states with vested interests, signals a de facto acceptance and undermines both the peace process and IGAD’s legitimacy.
Finally, the characterization of IGAD as “morally bankrupt” may appear absolute to critics who prefer to frame its shortcomings as mere ineffectiveness. It is important to clarify that “moral bankruptcy” here is an evaluative judgment, reflecting the erosion of institutional credibility and trust when guarantees are selectively enforced. Moral authority exists on a continuum—IGAD may achieve partial success in mediation while simultaneously still failing in its obligations as a guarantor. By citing concrete, measurable failures—such as the obstruction of security sector reforms and restrictions on political participation in South Sudan—the critique is grounded in tangible evidence rather than rhetorical flourish. Acknowledging these points does not weaken the argument; rather, it strengthens it by demonstrating that IGAD’s moral and political authority is compromised not only by structural limitations it could navigate, but also by deliberate choices it has made.
The International and Regional Consequences
IGAD’s credibility does not exist in isolation. International financial institutions, humanitarian agencies, and bilateral donors rely on regional guarantors to uphold political settlements. If guarantees are perceived as rhetorical rather than binding, external actors will recalibrate engagement accordingly.
For the people of South Sudan and the wider Horn and East African region, the stakes are profound. If a regional body cannot enforce the commitments it sponsors, can future agreements be trusted? Can opposition movements safely disarm? Can civilians rely on promised protections? Trust, once fractured, is not easily restored.
Moreover, the problem extends beyond IGAD itself. When regional blocs proclaim commitments to democracy, rule of law, and good governance while simultaneously elevating or shielding leaders who obstruct peace implementation, the damage becomes systemic rather than episodic. The issue is no longer institutional capacity; it is institutional will.
As the immediate consequences of selective enforcement ripple across South Sudan and the wider East African region, the crisis extends beyond regional borders, compelling reflection on the very architecture of African authority, the normative legitimacy of guarantors, and the responsibilities of continental bodies like the African Union in recalibrating or supplementing faltering regional mechanisms.
The Broader Consequences of Inaction
IGAD’s persistent inaction in South Sudan echoes far beyond the immediate crisis, threatening to corrode the very foundations of regional cooperation. When member states observe that guarantees can be selectively enforced—or ignored altogether—they internalize a calculus of caution and self-interest, undermining trust in any future multilateral commitments. This dynamic risks transforming IGAD from a guarantor of peace into a cautionary model of institutional fragility, where states hedge against both internal obligations and collective security arrangements.
The consequences extend continentally: if East African regional bodies are perceived as incapable of enforcing norms equitably, the African Union’s broader ambitions of supranational governance, conflict mediation, and coordinated security may be compromised, leaving strategic vacuums that opportunistic actors could exploit. Globally, external partners, including donors, mediators, and peacekeeping actors, may recalibrate engagement, recognizing that agreements brokered under IGAD auspices carry only contingent credibility. In essence, selective enforcement or deliberate silence imperils not only South Sudan’s fragile peace but sets in motion a cascade of mistrust and institutional weakening that could constrain East Africa’s capacity to manage future conflicts, erode continental cohesion, and diminish Africa’s authority in global diplomacy.
The Continental and Normative Dimension of IGAD’s Authority
At this juncture, where regional credibility, continental responsibility, and the architecture of shared sovereignty converge in visible tension, it becomes not merely appropriate but necessary to pose a question that confronts the very foundations of authority.
When a regional organization that voluntarily assumes the role of guarantor of peace declines to investigate documented violations, refrains from censuring its most influential members, and allows political expediency to override equal enforcement—while still invoking the language of stability, unity, and sovereignty to demand compliance from weaker actors—does it retain the normative legitimacy that distinguishes authority from influence, or does it devolve into a procedural façade that stabilizes power while undermining its obligations?
And if such erosion signals not merely institutional weakness but structural incapacity, does the supposedly supranational mandate of the African Union—acting through its Peace and Security Council and, more pointedly, through the African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan (the C5: South Africa, Rwanda, Algeria, Nigeria, and Chad)—confer upon it not only the legal competence but also the affirmative responsibility to recalibrate, discipline, or, if necessary, override regional guarantor failure to rescue a disintegrating peace?
Or would such intervention expose a deeper paradox of continental governance, in which sovereignty is simultaneously defended, delegated, and suspended—revealing that the crisis lies not merely in enforcement, but in the very architecture of layered African authority itself? And in this moment of uncertainty, what assessment do key external peace partners—particularly the Troika (Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States)—hold regarding the present condition and credibility of the R-ARCSS they helped midwife?
These questions are not posed to prescribe a verdict, but to demand critical reflection. Whether one concludes that the failure lies in regional will, continental design, or the structural contradictions of pooled sovereignty, the answer ultimately rests with the reader—and with the future moral coherence of African institutional authority itself.
As the machinery of regional and continental authority falters, the question lingers: if guarantees are honored only when convenient and enforcement bends to power rather than principle, what future awaits the people whose lives depend on these institutions? The answer is not written in treaties, reports, or speeches—it resides in the fragile trust between citizens and the bodies that claim to safeguard their peace. If enforcement bends to power and promises endure only when convenient, then the real question is not whether peace can survive, but whether IGAD’s authority itself can ever be trusted again.
Moral Bankruptcy or Moral Reckoning?
To describe IGAD as “morally bankrupt” is not rhetorical excess; it is an evaluative judgment grounded in performance. Moral authority requires consistent application of obligation. Where guarantees are issued without enforcement, authority persists in form but collapses in substance.
Yet bankruptcy need not mean burial. Institutions can recover legitimacy through decisive correction: transparent investigation of violations, equal standards for all member states—including Uganda, clear enforcement benchmarks, and public accountability mechanisms.
Without such measures, history, rather than critics, will render the verdict. Regional institutions exist to prevent conflict, not normalize its managed persistence. If guarantees function only when politically convenient, then they are not guarantees at all.
The question is no longer abstract; it is urgent and practical: can IGAD still be trusted as a guardian of peace, or has it reduced mediation to a mere ceremony? And if guarantees are reduced to rhetoric and enforcement bends to power, can IGAD still claim authority—or has it already become morally irrelevant?
South Sudan has become the defining test of East African regional legitimacy—and the test has exposed a fatal contradiction. A bloc that includes Uganda, a principal military actor in the conflict, cannot credibly claim neutrality as a guarantor of peace. Until that contradiction is resolved, regional unity remains an illusion, not a governing principle. Within the East African Community, Ugandan influence reportedly prevented meaningful disciplinary action despite prolonged treaty violations. How IGAD responds or fails to respond will determine not only the fate of South Sudan, but also shape the legitimacy and moral authority of regional institutions throughout East Africa.
The writer, Duop Chak Wuol, is an analyst, critical writer, and former editor-in-chief of the South Sudan News Agency. He is a graduate of the University of Colorado, focusing on geopolitics, security, and social issues in South Sudan and the broader East African region. His work has appeared in leading regional and international outlets, including AllAfrica, Radio Tamazuj, The Independent (Uganda), The Arab Weekly, The Standard (Kenya), The Chronicle (Ghana), Addis Standard (Ethiopia), and Sudan Tribune. In 2017, the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC) highlighted his article on Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s role in Ethiopia’s economic transformation. He can be reached at duop282@gmail.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.