The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed with the aim of steering the country from transitional power-sharing to democratic governance. Central to this vision was the commitment to hold elections at the end of the transitional period. These elections should establish a government chosen by and responsible to the people.
Originally planned for 2023, these elections have since been postponed, with December 26, 2026, now set as the new date. Yet, as the deadline approaches, it is increasingly clear that unless fundamental changes are made to the implementation agenda, South Sudan risks stumbling into yet another extension – and with it, deeper political stagnation.
Elections matter for South Sudan. They are not only a democratic milestone as they will be the first in the history of the country, but also promise a way out of the current political deadlock. The R-ARCSS transitional government has grown increasingly fragile, paralyzed by mistrust between the main political actors. Key provisions of the peace agreement – from the unification of forces to the permanent constitution-making – remain only partially implemented or stalled altogether. Instead of serving as a roadmap toward stability, the agreement’s implementation has too often been instrumentalized by the parties for tactical delay. By keeping processes incomplete, leaders protect their current positions while postponing the uncertainty that elections would bring.
But the South Sudanese public is not indifferent. National surveys consistently show that citizens want elections, despite fears of violence and insecurity. A majority repeatedly state they are ready to cast their ballots, even if they expect violence at the polls. This resilience underscores that South Sudanese see elections as both necessary and overdue.
The problem, however, lies in the expectations set out in the peace agreement. The R-ARCSS mandate is sweeping: a permanent constitution must be completed, a national population census conducted, a unified army established, and transitional justice institutions operationalized – all before elections are held. These are ambitious and, in principle, important state-building tasks. But given the time and resources available, it is doubtful whether these tasks are feasible in just over a year before December 2026.
The National Constitutional Review Commission has admitted it requires at least 18 months to finalize the constitution. The head of the National Bureau of Statistics has already declared that a census cannot be completed before elections. The establishment of the Hybrid Court and Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing remains stalled, largely for political reasons and because of underfunded state institutions. The unification of forces is also currently stalled.
To insist that all these preconditions must be fulfilled before elections amounts to arguing for another postponement. This would play directly into the hands of those actors who prefer an endless transition over the uncertainties of democratic competition. The challenge, therefore, is not whether elections should take place, but how to adjust the implementation agenda so that elections can be held credibly within the existing constraints.
Lessons can be drawn from countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the DR Congo, or, more recently, India, which conducted elections without an up-to-date census, relying instead on voter registration or mobile registration units. Others have managed elections in the absence of a new constitution, provided that a clear political and legal framework was agreed upon in advance.
South Sudan could adopt similar pragmatic solutions: Elections could be staggered rather than held simultaneously, with presidential and national legislative polls prioritized, followed by state and local contests later. Current constituency boundaries could be used instead of drafting new ones. This would reduce financial and logistical burdens while still ensuring that the democratic process moves forward.
But who can legitimately suggest such adjustments? Bilateral and multilateral partners cannot dictate changes to the implementation agenda. International involvement is necessary, but suggestions from donors or external mediators would likely be rejected as interference. Ultimately, the parties themselves must agree. Yet these very parties are locked in deep distrust, with little incentive to break the cycle of delay.
This is where the original 15 stakeholder signatories of the peace agreement come in. Unlike the parties now locked in government, these stakeholders – civil society representatives, faith-based leaders, and eminent personalities – carry the moral and political weight of having endorsed R-ARCSS in 2018 without being consumed by the daily struggle for power. They represent the political and civic voices that first made the agreement possible. Precisely because they are not in control of the machinery of the state, they are best placed to act as an honest forum to revisit the election agenda. Their engagement could give the process both moral legitimacy and technical direction at a time when official mechanisms are paralyzed.
The stakeholder group already met on September 9-10, 2025, to discuss how to revive the peace process and steer the country toward successful elections. The focus must be on pragmatic solutions to protracted problems. The unification of forces, the drafting of a new permanent constitution, and conducting a reliable population census are all tasks that are unrealistic to complete successfully by December 2026. How to approach these challenges through possible amendments to R-ARCSS is the subject of continuous debate.
Another important task is the preparation of elections, particularly in terms of pragmatic amendments to the National Election Act and firm steps toward reliable electoral security. One critical element is the delineation of constituencies for the first-past-the-post element of the parliamentary elections. The National Election Act of 2012 provides clear guidance: if the delineation cannot be completed 12 months before the scheduled elections, the existing constituencies should be used instead (Article 41(1)(e)).
The 2010 elections were held based on 102 constituencies, which were demarcated in a year-long consultative process that considered several objections. While these constituencies are not sufficient to guarantee a 50% first-past-the-post quota, they are the best pragmatic pathway to maintaining the spirit of the current electoral system while still enabling broadly timely elections. Additional seats can be exceptionally shifted to the party and women lists, with the 5% presidential prerogative – which should be clarified in concrete numbers – factored into the calculation as well.
Such a process would not be easy. However, amendments to both R-ARCSS and the National Elections Act are indispensable to enable a legitimate electoral process. It would require all stakeholders to focus on what South Sudan needs to cross the electoral finish line in 2026. It would also require active support from civil society, academia, and the wider public to hold political elites accountable for delivering on commitments. Without such an initiative, there is a considerable risk that South Sudanese elections will remain postponed forever.
If South Sudanese leaders, with the support of their people and partners, can seize this moment, December 2026 could mark the beginning of a new chapter – one where political legitimacy rests not on negotiated quotas and an unhealthy continuity of top-down dismissals and appointments of office holders, but on the ballot box.
The writer, Edmund Yakani, is a civil society leader and the Executive Director of the Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO).