In paragraphs eight through fourteen of his article, Professor Biong accelerates rapidly—almost fancifully—toward 22 September 2026, the date on which the power-sharing arrangements are expected to lapse, ushering in what he anticipates as a democratic transition. Yet almost immediately, he acknowledges the repugnance of this prospect to the very parties that subsist on the R-ARCSS power-sharing architecture. He concedes that these actors may connive and invoke Section 8.4 of the agreement to postpone elections—possibly for an even longer period.
How I wish the Professor had named them. Is the Incumbent Government (IG) among those he alludes to? My curiosity is not malicious; it is analytical. Professor Biong continues:
“Despite the noted waning of the people’s demand for elections due to repetitive postponements, the recent perception survey reveals strong public support for elections, despite fears of violence.”
This assertion presents yet another extended enigma. On one hand, we are told of a “waning” popular demand for elections; on the other, a “strong public support” for the same elections is reported. How can these two positions coexist without contradiction? I struggle to reconcile them. Might the Professor kindly disclose the source, methodology, and dependency framework of this perception survey that so confidently proclaims overwhelming public support?
I laboured to extract a direct response to the article’s central question—“Will elections be held in December 2026?”—only to encounter clarity after nine long paragraphs. At that point, the Professor’s opinion becomes discernible. He acknowledges that missed deadlines, structural challenges, and the absence of political will—particularly the failure to finance elections and election-related institutions such as the National Elections Commission (NEC), the Political Parties Council (PPC), and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)—all point to the improbability of elections being held in December 2026.
He warns that citizens’ frustration may deepen and that the confidence of the international community may erode. Within this milieu, Professor Biong advises the parties to engage in what he terms “genuine dialogue” in order to agree on a credible national agenda for elections.
Should such engagement receive the blessing of stakeholders, Dr. Biong recommends deferring the delineation and allocation of new constituencies, proposing instead adherence to the existing 102 geographical constituencies used during the 2010 elections.
He further urges the parties to agree on a new hybrid political infrastructure—one consisting of the President (or the current presidency) and a cabinet of technocrats, preferably drawn from existing undersecretaries, headed by a Prime Minister—preferably the current Secretary General of the government—and supported by senior civil servants extending down to the state level.
From this reasoning, I am compelled to ask: Is the Professor attempting to rescue President Kiir’s dwindling regime? Why else would deferring popular anger toward the regime’s performance or safeguarding international confidence be of such concern? Why must the delineation and allocation of new constituencies be postponed? On what compelling or enthralling grounds? Must this government remain in power after repeated fiascos and profound public disappointment?
I am genuinely interested in knowing whether the Professor perceives any danger in allowing the people to opt for regime change. Why does the potential downfall of the regime alarm him? I leave that judgment to the readership.
Furthermore, how does the Professor reconcile the proposition of elections in December 2026 when the fundamental prerequisites remain unmet and no conducive environment has been established? Democracy demands ethical and value-based foundations: Fundamental rights and freedoms, trust and accountability, civic competence, an informed civil society, inclusive participation, rule of law, political pluralism, independent institutions, social cohesion, civic space, and socio-economic stability. None of these benchmarks has been meaningfully realized.
Today, the Republic of South Sudan grapples with extreme economic inequality, lack of opportunity, and severe deficits in basic services—all preconditions for sustainable democracy. Genuine political choice can only emerge in an environment characterized by liberty and freedom from deprivation. What credible electoral institutions, then, has the R-ARCSS established to justify the holding of elections?
Elections, I submit, are a means to democracy—not its end. I presume the Professor would agree that democratic governance necessitates strong and separate powers: An independent judiciary, a free media, and institutional watchdogs capable of enforcing accountability. What plausible legal environment exists in the Republic of South Sudan to ensure that no individual—including those at the highest echelons of power—is above the law? Our challenges are foundational and demand a radical, well-thought-out paradigm shift. Compromised solutions, therefore, are unacceptable.
How, then, does the Professor endorse the idea of partial—or sham—elections in a country ravaged by societal polarization and tribal fragmentation, where social bonds essential for democratic deliberation are daily eroded? Democracy cannot survive in a vacuum. It requires open civic space, vibrant civil society participation, and the meaningful inclusion of women and youth at all levels. Why must the fate of an entire nation be surrendered to political elites alone? Must partial elections be imposed as a bitter pill to swallow?
Professor Biong proposes partial elections for reasons known only to him; none are explicitly articulated in his article. Yet partial elections, by their very nature, disenfranchise significant segments of the electorate and pose a clear threat to national stability and democratic legitimacy. Democratic scholars and human rights organizations have repeatedly warned that partial elections do not serve as a bridge to full democracy. Instead, they caution against legitimacy deficits, authoritarian capture, heightened risks of violence, and systemic failure.
Partial polls—such as executive elections conducted without a fully constituted and representative parliament—enable incumbents to claim a “popular mandate” while evading essential checks and balances. One can easily imagine a scenario in which elite bargains are theatrically presented as the will of the people. This would amount to a coup of the intelligentsia executed through the ballot box.
Yet the Professor maintains that partial elections could restore the confidence of the international community. On the contrary, they erode credibility and expose the regime’s long-standing deficit in democratic commitment. In volatile and divided states such as the Republic of South Sudan, partial elections often serve as flashpoints that exacerbate injustice, provoke mass discontent, and fuel violent contestation. Comparative literature from Africa, Asia, and Latin America documents numerous instances where partial elections increased the likelihood of post-election violence once stakeholders delegitimized outcomes.
This is an untimely invitation to further chaos—more social discord, deeper political instability, and worsening economic collapse. I earnestly hope the Professor foresees this trajectory. As Martin Luther King Jr. once warned:
“Our lives begin to end the day we become silent about things that matter.”
It is time—indeed long overdue—that we speak louder and clearer.
The writer holds a A.A. in Psychology; B.A. Education—English Language & Literature; M.A. Curriculum & Instruction; and is a PhD Candidate, Curriculum & Instruction. He can be reached via yienchol472@gmail.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.
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