By LUKA BIONG DENG
Since its independence in 2011, South Sudan has never had an election. Elections were meant to be held in December of this year, but they were postponed in September after growing warnings that the country was not adequately prepared. This perpetuated a seemingly endless cycle of election postponements. The resulting deferral of democracy has eroded the trust of citizens in the post-independence government of South Sudan and damaged its credibility in the eyes of regional and international decision-makers.
This repeated postponement raises several questions. What is driving these postponements? Will elections be held in December 2026? And what could be done now to avoid another postponement?
What’s driving the cycle of postponements?
The latest election postponement is the fourth in the past decade. The 2015 peace agreement ending the country’s first civil war included a commitment to conduct elections 60 days before the end of the 30-month transitional period. Yet this agreement was prematurely ended by the eruption of the second civil war in 2016. The 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) ending the second civil war provided for elections 60 days before the end of a 36-month transitional period. Again, this commitment was not honored, as the signatory parties decided in August 2022 to postpone elections for another 24 months to December 2024. Now, the signatory parties have again delayed elections for 24 months.
These repeated election delays run contrary to what the overwhelming majority of South Sudanese want: elections to be conducted as scheduled in December 2024 (71 percent), even with the risk of election violence. Citizens are tired of the persistent postponement and expect better governance after elections. Instead, the delays have been orchestrated by ruling elites who lack the political will to implement the R-ARCSS. As in previous years, the government was not ready to conduct elections this year simply because it was unable and unwilling to create the necessary conditions. While there are numerous technical and operational barriers to elections, the biggest barriers are structural. Four structural factors in particular have driven the cycle of postponement.
The first factor is the fallacy of power-sharing arrangements. Power-sharing has been the formula for ending both of South Sudan’s civil wars in 2015 and 2018. Yet this formula has become a source of instability rather than peace. These arrangements have created “a dominant gun class” and militarized the country’s political institutions. They have also given rise to a political marketplace that personalizes governance while undermining institutions and the rule of law.
Second, the R-ARCSS has built-in incentives against elections. The agreement has created a bloated Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) consisting of 5 vice presidents, 45 ministers, and 650 members of the national legislature. All these constitutional post-holders are appointed per the power-sharing formula of the R-ARCSS. This makes South Sudan the country with the highest per capita number of unelected constitutional post-holders in Africa. The decision to postpone elections and extend the lifespan of the R-ARCSS rests with these very post-holders, requiring the support of two-thirds of both the council of ministers (which includes the vice presidents and the president) and the national legislature. These post-holders have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and postponing elections, as elections could endanger their return to their current positions.
The third factor is the coercive nature of the mediation processes leading to the R-ARCSS. The process of negotiating a peace agreement can be more important than the peace agreement itself, as it can determine the fate of its implementation. Some observers consider the mediation process led by the governments of former President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda that resulted in the signing of the R-ARCSS to be flawed, exclusive, coercive, unrealistic and destined not to be implemented. For example, the Sudanese-led mediation team coerced some members of South Sudanese opposition groups to sign some protocols against their will. Some have thus described the R-ARCSS as a hollow peace agreement as it fails to address the root causes of the civil war.
Finally, the R-ARCSS has no mechanisms to penalize and sanction signatory parties that obstruct or derail its implementation. It also has no mechanism to put an end to the agreement if the parties fail to implement it. This makes the costs of non-implementation lower than the costs of implementation and further incentivizes this endless cycle of postponed elections.
What will determine if the December 2026 elections take place?
The decision by the RTGoNU to postpone elections to December 2026 is a clear violation of the 2011 Transitional Constitution of South Sudan. Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS states that the agreement may be amended by a vote of at least two-thirds of both the Council of Ministers and the Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC), followed by ratification by the Transitional National Legislature, according to the constitutional amendment procedures set out in the transitional constitution. Article 199 of the transitional constitution states that it “shall not be amended unless the proposed amendment is approved by two-thirds of all members of each House of the National Legislature sitting separately and only after the introduction of the draft amendment at least one month prior to the deliberations.”
Contrary to Article 199, the national legislature amended the election timeline within one day to extend its tenure by 24 months. This puts into question the constitutionality and the legitimacy of the RTGoNU’s decision to extend its lifespan and postpone elections. Some South Sudanese lawyers have challenged this decision in the Supreme Court of South Sudan. This will be a litmus test of the credibility of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law and constitutionalism. If the Supreme Court rules in favor of the RTGoNU, this decision may also be challenged in the East African Court of Justice.
Besides this legal challenge, the question is whether the RTGoNU will be able to create the conditions to hold the elections in December 2026. There are several reasons why this is unlikely. First, the parties in the RTGoNU are likely to continue with the same “game of thrones” mindset around the power-sharing arrangements rather than seeking legitimacy through the ballot box.
Second, the technical prerequisites for holding the elections are unlikely to be met even with an additional two years. One of those prerequisites is the ratification of a permanent constitution. However, the chairperson of the National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC) recently said that the permanent constitution–making process will require 18 months, on the condition that the NCRC has the necessary resources, which is unlikely. That would leave only six months before the elections in December 2026. Similarly, South Sudan needs to complete a population census before the elections, which the chairperson of the National Bureau of Statistics has estimated will take 16 months. With almost one-third of the population either internally displaced or taking refuge in neighboring countries, coupled with a weak national statistical system, the census will be a challenging undertaking. Even if the National Bureau of Statistics has the resources to overcome these logistical challenges, there are risks of political interference to falsify and manipulate the census results to benefit certain ethnic groups, which could create serious political and ethnic divisions.
Third, even if resources are provided to elections-related institutions such as the NCRC and National Election Commission, these institutions are unlikely to deliver and perform their duties professionally. Although these institutions are meant to be independent and depoliticized as per the provisions of the R-ARCSS, the leaders of these institutions were appointed based on power-sharing arrangements rather than professionalism and expertise. This has not only politicized and paralyzed these institutions but has also made them a battleground for political rivalry and division.
What can be done now to avoid another postponement?
If the conditions for the conduct of elections in 2026 are not met, the RTGoNU will again pursue the same process of extending its tenure and postponing elections. This path would represent the utter failure of the RTGoNU to implement the R-ARCSS, rendering it not only very unpopular but also indefensible. It would perpetuate and accentuate the fragility trap facing South Sudan under the RTGoNU.
Now is the time to set South Sudan on a different path toward democratic transition. South Sudan can only escape from the “state capability trap” and political deadlock by creating a new political infrastructure for conducting regionally and internationally monitored free and fair elections. On September 18th, the RJMEC “commit[ed] to the people of South Sudan that this will be the last and final extension of the Transitional Period of the R-ARCSS.” This commitment provides an opportunity to proactively plan for the conduct of elections as scheduled. The RJMEC, which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the R-ARCSS, consists of 10 members representing the parties to the agreement, 13 members representing other South Sudanese stakeholders and adherents, 13 members representing regional guarantors, and 7 members representing international partners and friends of South Sudan. The 13 members representing other South Sudanese stakeholders, with support from the 13 representing regional guarantors and 7 representing international partners, could initiate a “National Elections Campaign” to advance a national agenda for ending this cycle of postponement of elections.
The campaign could recommit the RTGoNU to the peace initiative recently launched by President Salva Kiir, culminating in the Tumaini Peace Initiative, a Kenyan-led peace mediation process between the RTGoNU and opposition groups that have not signed onto the R-ARCSS. The Tumaini Initiative has the potential to resuscitate the implementation of the R-ARCSS and garner the much-needed support of the people of South Sudan and the international community.
The campaign could also prepare and support the adoption of legislation to prevent the postponement of elections by the RTGoNU in 2026. One option suggested by the South Sudan National Dialogue in 2020 would be a provision to dissolve the RTGoNU three months before the elections in 2026. Before its dissolution, the national legislature would select a prominent national personality to take charge of the country until an elected government takes office.
Another option could be a bill to amend sections 16 (2) and 16 (4) of the 2012 National Elections Act so that if elections are not held in December 2026, the president could dissolve the national legislature, state legislative assemblies, national council of ministers, and state and administrative area governments and replace them with a small, inclusive, technocratic caretaker government at the national, state, and administrative levels. The main task of this government would be ensuring the implementation of the R-ARCSS and the conduct of elections. Based on the experience of the caretaker state governors during the pre-interim period of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the caretaker state governors and caretaker chief administrators should not come from the state or administrative area they are appointed to. The members of the caretaker government would not be eligible to contest the elections. Such a provision would make it more costly for current post holders to further election delays.
In appointing the caretaker governments, the president would consult the former 13 members of the RJMEC representing other South Sudanese stakeholders, as well as eminent personalities and community leaders. Civil society organizations, think tanks, and academics will also have critical roles to play in advancing a national agenda of ending this vicious cycle of postponing elections by providing informed views, analysis, and options to assist in the development and implementation of the “National Elections Campaign” and gaining the buy-in of the citizens and the international community.
Despite the reluctance of the international community to work with the RTGoNU, the donor community should prioritize the conduct of elections in 2026 by providing United Nations (UN) agencies and the UN Mission in South Sudan the resources they need to support elections-related institutions such as the National Elections Commission, National Constitution Review Commission, National Bureau of Statistics, and Political Parties Council. In addition, the regional and international members of the JMEC should start engaging the RTGoNU to agree on a new political infrastructure for conducting elections if the conditions for elections are not met by 2026.
Luka Biong Deng, PhD, is the Managing Director of the Sudd Institute, a national think tank in South Sudan; an adjunct professor at the Institute of Peace, Development and Security Studies at the University of Juba, South Sudan; and an adjunct distinguished professor at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) at the National Defense University, Washington, DC.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.