BY DR AYINE NIGO (PhD/FHEA)
If only 30 percent of its proposed objectives were realized, the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) would have implemented crucial reforms to stabilize South Sudan, foster peace, and establish a framework for democratic governance. These reforms encompass several pivotal areas, including the reconstitution of the transitional government, the formulation of a permanent constitution through an inclusive review process, and the facilitation of free and fair elections. Additionally, the Security Sector Reforms would encompass the establishment of a unified national army, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as implementing a ceasefire and demilitarization and Legal Reforms, Economic and Financial Reforms, Institutional and Administrative Reforms, Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction are integral to the comprehensive reform agenda.
What is more worrying is the conspicuous absence of a response from the opposition regarding the state of the extension. This absence also reflects the silence and our concerns about the growing limitations on fundamental rights such as freedom of assembly and press. Alongside existing economic upheaval and market instabilities, palpable uncertainty surrounds the commitment to continue working for RTGONU without remuneration despite prevailing injustices, corruption, misappropriation of public funds, extortion, displacement, and distress in refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. Additionally, the dearth of viable means of subsistence, incidents of road attacks, extortion, and excessive taxation contribute to this unease. The prevalent insecurity in our streets and neighborhoods, marked by anonymous perpetrators, homicides, land seizures, diseases, inter-community conflicts, and recurrent vendettas, we believe does not warrant another extension.
Why did the President start the Tumaini process when they could potentially extend their term before its conclusion? Two simple reasons come to light. Firstly, the RTGONU failed to implement the R-ARCSS to retain power, and secondly, to gain time by deferring elections because they are not electable. Consequently, we believe that seeking extensions is the most effective approach for postponing elections despite raising several other fundamental concerns discussed in this paper.
Unfortunately, the postponement of elections in South Sudan, as stipulated in the R-ARCSS, presents significant political and legal implications. The R-ARCSS, endorsed in 2018, provided a framework for terminating the conflict and establishing a transitional government to facilitate elections and formulate a permanent constitution. The agreement delineated specific timelines for the transitional government to prepare for elections, with the understanding that elections were to be conducted after a 36-month transitional period commencing in February 2020. However, the deferral of the polls beyond the originally agreed-upon period raises apprehensions regarding the government’s dedication to conducting elections and upholding the essential provisions of the agreement.
R-ARCSS necessitates the establishment of independent institutions, such as the National Election Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Council. The decision to postpone indicates that these bodies may still require full operationalization, potentially due to financial, logistical, or political challenges. The imperative for functional institutions raises substantial apprehensions about ensuring free, fair, and transparent elections. The stipulations for power-sharing among the agreement’s parties, encompassing the President, Vice President, and other opposition groups, are intended to endure only until elections can be convened. Nevertheless, the indefinite postponement of elections implies an extension of the transitional period by incumbent parties to retain their positions, contravening the agreement’s ethos. Regrettably, a primary aim of the R-ARCSS is the restoration of the legitimacy of the South Sudanese government through democratic elections. Protraction of election timelines may erode the legitimacy of the transitional government, especially if the causes of the delay remain ambiguous or politically motivated. Prolonged postponement risks further estranging citizens and opposition factions, potentially reigniting conflict.
The series of election postponements has amplified public discontent and skepticism regarding the peace process. The delays are perceived as a method to evade accountability through voting, thereby undermining public confidence in the transitional government and its commitment to upholding the agreements outlined in the R-ARCSS. Inevitably, citizens will eventually discern the government’s unsuccessful efforts to steer the country back to stability and quell the longstanding civil conflict in South Sudan. The repeated extensions and postponements of elections without transparent justification have exacerbated political instability, as opposing factions and dissenting groups interpret the delays as infringements upon citizens’ rights. This trend will escalate the risk of renewed conflict, particularly if marginalized opposition groups perceive neglect of their interests.
We contend that extending R-ARCSS spells two outcomes as determinants of the Tumaini. First, it does not indicate an end to Tumaini but a tactical delay. R-TGONU will return to Nairobi with a stronger team and attempt to frustrate opposition delegates by demanding the renegotiation of every agreed protocol.
Juba must decide whether to support Tumaini or opt out. The government in Juba also faces the critical decision of aligning with Tumaini or disengaging. At this juncture, decisive choices and strong leadership are essential in shaping our character and capabilities. Tumaini must include all the holdout groups in a thorough and thoughtful discernment beyond mere political affiliations. RTGONU’s overconfidence in their intelligence, assuming superiority while undermining the hospitality of St Egidio and the Kenyan government, is unwarranted. The complexity of this extension should dissuade them from believing they have successfully misled the populace. Instead, they have attracted time to make decisions and show strong leadership that will determine the people’s character and capabilities. Regrettably, RJMEC and the West are perpetuating double standards, misleading the Southern Sudanese. While the EU pledged commitment and support yesterday, they advocate for accountability today. And just like the previous statements, they will continue their life in Juba, be well insured and paid, and have all the protections that will come. Hypocrisy and happiness in disguise.
Second, it will solicit a definite reaction from neighboring countries, particularly the Kenyan government. The decision to extend RTGONU until 2026 holds potential implications for neighboring countries, notably Kenya. The response from Kenya may be intricate as it deliberates the possible impact on the long-term stability and peace in South Sudan. Should Kenya align with its interest in having a stable neighbor, it may support the extension, positively impacting regional security and economic cooperation. Kenya may perceive the extended period as an opportunity for South Sudan to fulfill the outstanding provisions of the 2018 peace agreement, including drafting a permanent constitution, conducting a census, and registering political parties. Drawing upon its mediation expertise, Kenya may extend its offer to continue facilitating the Tumaini and supporting the peace process to ensure tangible progress during the extension. Nonetheless, emerging apprehensions regarding the legitimacy of the extension could arise in Kenya if it is perceived to undermine the Tumaini Peace Initiative or the democratic processes or serve as a strategic maneuver to perpetuate power. Underlining the significance of regional collaboration, Kenya could advocate for unified efforts from East African nations to bolster support for Tumaini during the prolonged transitional period or call it off, ending the peace process from Rome and the Kenya government mediation efforts.
Dr Ayine Nigo is an author and lecturer at the University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom. He can be reached via nigoayine@gmail.com.
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