The assertion that the “Nasir Declaration,” which took place on 28 August 1991, gave birth to the call for the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan is another major fallacy in Mr. Kim Deng’s article. To bring such a claim before the public in broad daylight is nothing but a deliberate distortion of history. As a result, it has become unaffordable to sit idly by while contemptuous efforts to twist the course of our rich history are proliferating. Deng’s claim has reminded me of what the former governor of New York commented on the intricacy of politicians once he said, “The propensity of politicians to campaign is in poetry, but to govern is in prose.” This is exactly what some South Sudanese intellectuals and high-ranking profile political figures are attempting to do. But, since history is a chronology of events and the statement of facts, it is my deeply held belief that it cannot be easily retired.
It is with this conviction that I will repudiate Mr. Kim Deng’s claim on this issue by revisiting the political history of South Sudan concisely to find out if the quest for the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan started in 1991. I think history will be able to judge for itself.
In essence, it is public knowledge that the struggle for the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan did not emerge in 1991. Rather, it dates back to the late 1930s, when Southerners formed what later came to be known as the “Southern Officials Welfare Committee” (SOWC). The prime objective of the SOWC was to protest against different working conditions that existed between Northern and Southern Sudanese under the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. In conjunction with this grievance were also issues of citizenship and the unequal conditions in education. Unfortunately, the authorities at that time did not pay close attention to these demands.
After the call for better working conditions, fair education policy, and equal citizenship fell on deaf ears, the quest for the right to self-determination for the South became more pronounced. In 1947, Sir James Robertson, who had become civil secretary following the demise of Newbold in 1944, called for a conference in Juba to discuss the future status of the South, particularly its role in the upcoming legislative assembly. A seventeen-member delegation (mostly chiefs and clerks) was drawn from different parts of Southern Sudan to attend the conference. During the consultative session, the first issue those gentlemen raised was the demand for the right to self-determination for impoverished communities of Southern Sudan. Surprisingly, some of these delegates changed their position afterward. For example, when asked by the chairperson of the conference why they compromised the demand for self-rule, Mr. James Tambura, a Southern delegate, was quoted to have replied, “Judge Shingeiti has convinced me that the only way to influence the future Government of Sudan is to accept unity.” Judge Shingeiti was a Northern delegate to the conference. A similar account was also attributed to delegate Clement Mboro, who said, “I think we in the South are not sufficiently advanced to participate in the legislative assembly immediately, but we can attend as observers.” Subsequently, the report emerged that Southerners agreed to participate in the legislative assembly, but the question of a separate administration was deferred.
Elections for the Legislative Assembly took place in November 1948, but they were only conducted in the North. The thirteen Southern representatives were nominated to the Assembly by the colonial secretary. While in the Legislative Assembly, discussions about the future of the country raged, mostly on two issues: self-determination for Sudan and a federal constitution for the whole of Sudan. Eager to take over power from the colonial authority, in December 1950, the Umma Party tabled a motion about granting Sudan self-government. However, Southern politicians challenged this proposal, citing disparities in socio-economic development between the North and the South. Hon. Buth Diu, a representative from Upper Nile Province, for example, strongly argued, “Self-determination for Sudan should be postponed until the South has reached the same degree of development as the North.” His argument and subsequent personal boycott compelled the Constitutional Review Commission to finally accept to safeguard a ‘due consideration’ for the South should Sudan gain independence. Sadly, that promise went unfulfilled after independence. Even before independence1956, Isma’il Al Azhari, a Northern politician, reacted, “The South is important for the economic development of the North. Granting it autonomy at this time or in the future is practically impossible.”
Six years later, the parliamentary election was conducted, and the first Sudanese government was formed in 1954. However, the new government of Prime Minister Isma’il Al Azhari failed to make the unity of pre-independent Sudan attractive. It was dominated by Northern Arab politicians and civil servants. The Northernization and the Arabization of the government naturally meant an increase in the Southerners’ discontent. Consequently, a group of disgruntled Southern soldiers who were stationed in Torit Military Garrison staged a mutiny on 18 August 1955, just six months before the formal declaration of Sudan’s independence. The Torit Mutiny was primarily stirred by the need for self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan.
Immediately after Sudan’s political independence in 1956, Southern grievances accrued. These were exacerbated by the systemic exclusion of Southerners from the bureaucracy and the security sector. Racial and religious persecution by the state institutions also took different dimensions, and gross differences in social and economic development widened significantly. Although the armed resistance started in 1955, it was not until 19 August 1963 that Southerners, mostly exiled Southern politicians and military officers, transformed the “Anya-Anya” Movement. The core objective of the Anya-Anya Movement was the separation of the South. The fighters raised their banner high in the South.
Due to internal disorganization and geopolitical pressure, Anya-Nya and, later, the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) was unable to achieve its primary objective. The separatists’ political miscalculations and mixed feelings, for example, have been well documented in Mathew Arnold/Mathew LeRiche’s book titled SOUTH SUDAN: FROM REVOLUTION TO INDEPENDENCE. The first section of chapter one of this book narrates the story of how the Anya-Anya Movement/SSLM fought for the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan and ended up in unity. The version of this story went like this:
“For both sides, military stalemate was apparent; only a negotiated settlement would break the impasse. Through the mediation of the Ethiopian monarch, Emperor Haile Selassie, negotiations to end the war began in Addis Ababa in February 1972. Given Haile Selassie’s stewardship and Pan-African sentiments against secessionism, it was clear that Southern separation was not an option; instead, a form of regional autonomy was. Lagu determined to focus on the ‘power’ that the South would have within a ‘one Sudan context.’ Despite strong feelings within the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) in favor of secession, the pragmatic Lagu stacked his negotiating party with individuals sympathetic to the possibility of Southern regional autonomy and/or secession. When challenged, after the Addis Ababa Agreement, on his apparent shift in position regarding secession, Lagu was reported to have said, ‘I never was a secessionist. Never did I believe in the secession of the South from the North. I still hold that belief’.”
It was from Anya-Anya/SSLM’s experience that Dr. John Garang de Mabior and his comrades in arms drew great lessons when forming the SPLM/SPLA in 1983.
Having given the concise historical account, it is now fair to conclude that the genesis of the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan did not start in 1991 but a long time ago. Attributing its evolution to the Nasir Declaration is a serious fallacy. Apart from other events that took place in 1991, the intentions and actions of the Nasir faction can alone disqualify it. For example, the announcement made by the three SPLM/SPLA zonal commanders (Riek Machar, Lam Akol & Gordon Kong) on 28 August 1991 had less to do with the destiny of the South. WHY GARANG MUST GO paper accused Chairman John Garang of three main issues: the one-man dictatorship style of leadership, human rights abuses, the assumed domination of the Dinka tribe within the SPLM/SPLA; Dinka from the Upper Nile region, in particular those surrounding the district of Bor, and then the issue of the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan. Interestingly, if one were to examine these charges critically, one would realize that the letter was brought in just to cover up the treacherous move.
There are sufficient indications that can underpin this statement. First and foremost, the three commanders did not hold any convention, nor did they conduct free, fair, and credible elections in the aftermath of the coup d’état to justify their call for a democratic movement. Instead, the trio automatically maintained the same hierarchy they inherited from the SPLM of Dr. John Garang de Mabior. Secondly, the human rights abuses and child soldier conscription they accused Chairman John Garang of became orders of the day in their camps, justified by horrific events that took place in Bor (Bor massacre). Thirdly, the leadership crisis submerged them, leading to Dr. Lam Akol’s dismissal from the group by Dr. Riek Machar Teny. Fourthly, the faction ended up in the wallet of the Khartoum government, thereby committing a serious political suicide. How can an enemy who feeds you grant you independence? The deal between the Nasir group and the Khartoum government became more exposed in 1994, and it has been perfectly summarized by Mr. Oystein H. Rolandsen. In his celebrated book titled GUERRILLA GOVERNMENT, Mr. Rolandsen wrote, “During the autumn of 1991, open hostilities broke out between the SPLM and Nasir faction. The latter has been blamed for starting the fighting, which continued for several years with varied intensity. In fact, it was soon clear that the Nasir faction had a tactical alliance with the Khartoum government.” The events I described had left not only Southerners to question the authenticity of the Nasir faction but also the international community and good friends of Southern Sudan by then, proving it beyond reasonable doubt that the Nasir faction had more to do with power but not the destiny of the South.
The author, Amaju Ubur Yalamoi Ayani, is a student of Political Science at the School of Social and Economic Studies, University of Juba. He can be reached via amajuayani@gmail.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the author’s responsibility, not Radio Tamazuj’s.