Since its inception, the New Sudan Vision has been castigated for advocating for the vision of “a United Secular Sudan.” The criticism has sparked a storm of debates concerning the ideological direction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) since the time of the liberation struggle and after achieving the right to “self-determination” for the people of South Sudan in 2011. The difficulty in finding a common ideology has caused not only the SPLM to fragment and wander like a ship without a rudder but has also inflicted protracted agonies on ordinary South Sudanese citizens. Due to this ideological challenge, an anonymous political commentator once observed, “Attempts to come up with a common ideology fell flat on their faces, because the various leaders within the SPLA/SPLM had their own ‘doctrines’ and ‘visions,’ so disseminating a common one was simply impossible in the vastness of South Sudan during the most active time of war and in post-independence South Sudan.”
The persisting controversy about the New Sudan Vision in post-independent South Sudan, or the specific direction of the SPLM for that matter, has been circling around the fallacy of “self-determination”—a political argument that asserts the New Sudan Vision did not indeed uphold the banner of the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan. Therefore, its basic assumptions/propositions are inconsistent with the political, social, and economic realities of the Republic of South Sudan. This impression emanates from a small group of South Sudanese politicians as well as scholars, mostly those who fell out with Dr. John Garang de Mabior during the liberation struggle.
Among the South Sudanese who persistently disseminate this version of the story is Mr. Kim Deng. In his opinion article published on the Sudan Tribune website titled, “The ‘New Sudan’ Vision and Its Effects on South Sudanese Unification,” Deng stated that there had been many separatists in the Movement {SPLA/SPLM} since 1983 who believed that Garang’s “New Sudan” must be challenged until their strategy yielded a signal towards Garang’s “New Sudan” in 1991 due to what he (Kim Deng) christened, “the Nasir Move,” which he also dubbed as “the very blessing day for Southern Sudanese.” Nevertheless, Kim Deng accused Garang’s New Sudan Vision of prompting the internal fracture. He wrote, “Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ vision did not bring anything, but setbacks, chaos, death, subjugation by terror, and epic conflicts. It was Garang’s ambition in war that compelled the Nasir faction to take immediate military countermeasures.” In addition, Mr. Kim professed that the New Sudan Vision did not at all fight for the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan. Instead, according to him, the “Nasir Declaration,” which took place in August 1991, gave birth to the idea of the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan. Although the New Sudan Vision had been disparaged immediately after the political independence of South Sudan, in this article, I will only controvert Kim Deng’s points of view. I am confining myself to his discourse purposely to observe precision and conciseness. More importantly, the fallacies of Deng’s arguments are so obvious to notice.
Kim Deng’s assertion that the New Sudan Vision did not fight for the right to self-determination for Southern Sudan is a major fallacy. First and foremost, he failed to identify, let alone elucidate, the factors that compelled Dr. John Garang de Mabior to go against the agenda of separatism. Instead, his assessment was only based on the SPLM/SPLA manifesto of 1983, which states “…the principal objective of the SPLA/SPLM is not separation for the South.” However, the picture of the New Sudan Vision is much bigger than that. For example, if one were to analyze it critically, they would find that the New Sudan Vision advocated for both the total transformation of the Old Sudan and the right to self-determination for the marginalized regions of Sudan, including Southern Sudan. When examining whether or not the New Sudan Vision contains an element of self-determination, we ought not to limit our investigation to the manifesto and the objective of the SPLM/SPLA of 1983. We need to go deeper than that, for example, by identifying factors that influenced the SPLM/SPLA’s direction since 1983. It is for this reason that I will refute Kim Deng’s account on this subject by revisiting the underlying trends of the New Sudan to find out whether or not it involved the aspect of self-determination.
Of course, it is public knowledge that initially, the clause for the secession of the South was not explicitly expressed in the SPLM/SPLA manifesto of 1983. The reasons for not making it a top agenda, or slashing it off completely, were because both domestic and geopolitical circumstances were, by then, so sensitive to the issue of separatism. Dr. John Garang would later admit, “…the strength of passion is not the same as the practicality of the proposition at the time.” As a result, the leadership (John Garang in particular) of the SPLM/SPLA was left with no option but to adopt a political strategy that would persuade the marginalized regions of Sudan and neighboring countries (Ethiopia in particular) to support the Movement, by proclaiming that the principal objective of the SPLA/SPLM was not the separation of the South but to create “a United Socialist and Secular Sudan.”
Domestically, the SPLM/SPLA manifesto of 1983 aimed at avoiding both political and military backlash from Anya Nya I and II, during which the Sudanese people, mainly from the marginalized regions of Kordofan/Nubia Mountains, Darfur, and the Southern Blue Nile, were mobilized against the South in the false image of defending Islamic practices and the unity of the country. The experience of Anya Nya I and II served well as the laboratory for the SPLM/SPLA. At the regional level, the Ethiopian Government of Mengistu Haile Mariam, which became the staunch friend and stalwart ally of the SPLM/SPLA by then, was also battling with several rebel groups that wanted to break away from Ethiopia. In such a situation, there would never have been a way for the government—which was fighting to save its own country from disintegration—to throw in its lot with another separatist movement. On the same footing, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a continental umbrella of independent African nation-states, was working towards the complete eradication of imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism in Africa. Article III of the OAU Charter states, “The Member States, in pursuit of the purpose stated in Article II, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to… absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.” To achieve the total liberation or decolonization of Africa, the OAU must discourage any secessionist agenda on the continent.
These domestic and geopolitical realities swayed Dr. John Garang and his comrades in arms by contextualizing the New Sudan Vision in a multifaceted manner: to serve as a vision for the Movement, an objective to be achieved, and a strategy for mobilizing all the marginalized rural people of Sudan, irrespective of their race, ethnicity, language, religion, or gender. Throughout the second Sudanese civil war, the New Sudan Vision was applied tripartitely, and central to this operationalization was political strategy. Dr. John Garang strategically argued that Sudan belonged to all Sudanese whether they were black or brown, Arabs or Africans, Muslims or Christians. This strategy opened doors to every Sudanese to join the liberation struggle, and it deprived the successive oppressive Khartoum-based governments of valid counterarguments.
The details of Garang’s explanation of the New Sudan as a political strategy have been well documented in Steven Wondu’s book titled From Bush to Bush. While addressing his comrades after the two doctors (Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. Lam Akol) declared a coup d’état against him in August 1991, Garang’s speech went like this:
“The objective of the Movement has been used as the excuse for the Nasir betrayal. I know as much as they do that the South feels strongly about its quest for independence. There are valid reasons for their wish, but the strength of passion is not the same as the practicality of the proposition at this time. We must base our approach on the objective realities facing us. The National Islamic Front (NIF) has dropped the hint that they would be ready to let the South break away if the Nasir group removed John Garang… A little thinking could have made our brothers realize that the NIF was being as typically deceptive as their predecessors. When Southerners demanded a federal system as their condition for supporting the independence of Sudan, the Arabs promised them ‘due consideration.’ That promise was contemptuously disregarded after independence. Do we have to repeat the same mistake in 1991? Why would the government cede territory to them after the successful destruction of the SPLA? The very fact that the NIF detests the concept of New Sudan confirms that we have touched the right button. They prefer theocracy, which by definition is dictatorial. But without secularism and democracy in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-so-many things Sudan, unity is impossible. The Nasir announcement has more to do with power than the destiny of the South. Power struggle is not the same as liberation struggle. Let us liberate ourselves first. The rest will follow…”
The core message of this speech is that the quest for the self-rule of the South was not lacking in the New Sudan Vision. The unity or disintegration of Sudan would depend on the spirit of “voluntarism.” The voluntary unity of Sudan, in the language of the New Sudan, means the right and exercise of self-determination for all the marginalized people of Sudan, including the people of Southern Sudan.
As a result, the clause for the right to self-determination for the marginalized regions of Sudan was finally made explicit in the SPLM’s documents following the SPLM National Convention in 1994. At the convention in Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria, several resolutions were endorsed. These ranged from the vision and objectives of the Movement to the separation of the military command from the civilian administration. The convention proclaimed the “New Sudan” as the SPLM/SPLA’s vision with the ideology of a mixed economic system. The SPLM manifesto of 1983 was revised by adopting the clause of the “right to self-determination” for the marginalized people of the New Sudan. Resolution seven (7), article 7.2.2 of the 1994 Convention clearly states, “The SPLM is committed to fight and achieve the right and exercise of self-determination for the oppressed people of the New Sudan following the demise of the regime of the Old Sudan, or in any peace talks with the Government of the day in Khartoum.” Elections for the new leadership at various levels of the New Sudan were also held. The National Liberation Council (legislative organ), National Executive Council (executive organ), the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (humanitarian wing), and the Civil Authority of the New Sudan, alongside many secretariats, were established. The resolutions of the 1994 Convention became the cornerstone for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ten years later.
The adoption of the right to self-determination for the marginalized rural people of Sudan in 1994 did not happen as a result of the pressure mounted by the 1991 coup attempt, as some observers claim. Rather, the move was in line with the SPLM/SPLA mainstream political calculations. With much bias at the conclusion of his article, Kim Deng repeatedly claims, “And of course, as a result of the Nasir Move, Garang divorced and abandoned his alliance, called SPLA/SPLM 1st National Convention in 1994, and the first time ever, the self-determination for South Sudan was the first agenda in that convention. Garang put self-determination to be the first agenda/priority whenever there is peace talks with the tyranny government in Khartoum and in CPA Garang himself signed for it {self-determination for South Sudan}.”
What Mr. Kim Deng failed to notice is that the struggle for “a United Secular Sudan” was just one of the dimensions of the New Sudan, and it was based on a condition that the voluntary unity of the country would be made attractive for all Sudanese. The SPLM manifesto of 2008 openly reiterated it, putting the test on the condition of creating a political and socio-economic commonality that brings all Sudanese together as equal citizens in rights and obligations. It affirms, “There are two, and only two, choices: either the country breaks up into several independent states, or we agree to establish the New Sudan, a new Sudanese socio-political entity to which we pledge our undivided loyalty and allegiance irrespective of race, tribe, religion, or gender…” This test was justified by an internationally supervised referendum which determined the final destiny of South Sudan in 2011. Therefore, putting this objective reality of the New Sudan Vision under question is a serious fallacy and a misrepresentation of the facts.
The author, Amaju Ubur Yalamoi Ayani, is a student of Political Science at the School of Social and Economic Studies, University of Juba. He can be reached via: amajuayani@gmail.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.