BY LUKA BIONG DENG
Since the resumption of the Tumaini Peace Talks on December 4, the Government and the Opposition have unfortunately failed to reach even an agreement on the agendas within the half of the two weeks that the people of South Sudan expect to celebrate peace as a Christmas Gift of this year. While the government insists on discussing first its concerns and observations of the agreed eight protocols, the opposition prioritizes resolving the outstanding issues from the first rounds of peace talks, particularly the responsibility sharing.
The mediators provided a middle pathway to discuss the two issues concurrently. However, the parties failed even to agree on the mediators’ proposal and subsequently put the peace talks to a stalemate and deadlock. The arguments advanced by the Government to prioritize the discussion of its concerns about the eight protocols may be indefensible. In fact, the Government does not deny that the eight protocols were agreed by its delegation in the first rounds of Tumaini Talks but argued that the leadership of the Government has concerns about the eight protocols. This is a valid argument as the buying-in of the leadership is essential for the implementation of these protocols.
However, there is an unclarity of whether the President of South Sudan raised such concerns and observations during the visit of President William Ruto to Juba on November 6 to resuscitate the Tumaini Peace Talks. It seems the first delegation of the Government led by Amb. Albino and Minister Michael Makuei did not have a chance to brief the President of South Sudan about the eight protocols and the outstanding issues. On the other hand, President William Ruto was well-informed about the eight protocols and the outstanding issues in the Tumaini Peace Talks before he visited Juba. The Joint Communique of the meeting of the two heads of state, President Salva Kiir and President William Ruto largely reflects the informed position of President William Ruto about the status of the Tumaini Talks. Apparently, one member of the new delegation of the Government who attended the meeting of the two heads of state in Juba was alleged to argue during the negotiation of the agenda that the concerns of the Government about the eight protocols were raised during the meeting of the two heads of state and both agreed to resolve them in this round of Tumaini Talks. However, such a claim was alleged to be refuted by one of the mediators who attended the joint meeting of the two heads of state in Juba.
The pertinent question is even who drafted the Joint Communique of November 6? Certainly, it was largely drafted by the Government of South Sudan but there was no reference to the concerns about the eight protocols in the joint communique that appreciates instead the eight protocols. The argument that the eight protocols are largely a repetition of the provisions of the R-ARCSS could even affirm that the eight protocols are informed and guided by the R-ARCSS and such repetition is important to ensure the buying-in of the Opposition to the R-ARCSS by agreeing on the provisions of the R-ARCSS that are critical to expedite its implementation.
Even the relationship between the R-ARCSS and the eight protocols was discussed and agreed upon with the first delegation of the Government and captured well in the preamble of the eight protocols. However, the Government has the right to raise concerns about the eight protocols to ensure complementarity and avoid overlapping, but such concerns may not take prominence over the outstanding issues.
On the other hand, the Opposition argued that the joint communique truly reflects the status of the Tumaini Peace Talks, as it prioritizes the resolution of the outstanding issues. The Opposition also maintained that the agreed eight protocols came as the outcome of the resolution of a series of concerns raised by the Government. The Opposition even claimed that they had almost agreed on the responsibility sharing with the first delegation of the Government. However, the outright rejection of the Opposition of the new concerns raised by the Government is indefensible and will be contrary to the spirit of dialogue and flexibility in any peace negotiation. The Government has the right to raise new concerns about the eight protocols but in the spirit of enriching and ensuring their complementarity with the R-ARCSS rather than renegotiating them.
One would argue that the deadlock in the current Tumaini Peace Talks is a manifestation of the transactional behavior of the political elites rooted in personal and interpersonal political calculus around the throne of power earned through the elites power-sharing as rightly echoed by Vice President Wani Igga. However, this deadlock presets the following three scenarios:
New diplomatic shuttling
To unlock this deadlock, President William Ruto and the mediation team may need to visit Juba again to ensure clear directives to the delegation of the Government about the joint communique and to urge the delegation to accept the parallel discussion of the concerns raised by the Government about the eight protocols and responsibility sharing advanced by the Opposition.
President William Ruto and friends of South Sudan may need to put pressure on the Opposition to accept the parallel discussion of the two contentious issues. The risk of this scenario is that Kenya may run out of patience in continuing to invest in such a futile mediation with no hope for a credible peace deal to be implemented. Also, the dominant elements of the Anti-Tumaini Initiative in the delegation of the Government may continue to advance their narrow political agenda to frustrate any diplomatic shuttling to unlock the deadlock.
Postponement of talks
The second scenario is to postpone talks and to allow the parties to have more consultation among themselves. The success of this scenario depends on the first scenario of the diplomatic shuttling. The risk of this scenario is that Kenya may be reluctant to resume any peace talks if the parties are unwilling to compromise on their positions. This might lead to the total collapse of the Tumaini Peace Talks. The other risk is that the Opposition might use this opportunity to reorganize themselves into a unified military alliance to challenge the Government in Juba.
Breakdown of talks
Given its other pressing national priorities, Kenya might consider putting an end to the Tumaini Peace Talks. Although this scenario is unlikely and depends on the first scenario, this scenario cannot be ruled out. The Opposition might make their own political assessment and opt out of any further negotiations with the Government and pursue the armed struggle. This option will be costly for the Opposition as the option of violence is abhorred by the people of South Sudan and the countries of the region.
The question is then who will be the losers and winners of this deadlock and possible collapse of the Tumaini Peace Talks? Certainly, the people of South Sudan will be the losers as well as the members of the Opposition who have been in exile for so long. However, the main loser will be the Government, particularly the SPLM as the leading political party in the RTGoNU. The unpopular extension of the lifespan of the Government by 24 months could have been legitimized by the successful outcomes of the Tumaini Peace Talks as well as garnering the much-needed international support. Without peace from the Tumaini Peace Talks, the Government will be unable to deliver basic services to the people as well as create conditions for the conduct of elections in 2026.
Unlike the first delegation of the Government that returned to Juba with the hope of peace after agreeing on the eight protocols, the new delegation of the Government dominated by the elements of the Anti-Tumaini Initiative will return to Juba without anything amid high expectations attached to this round of talks. The main winners of this deadlock will be the elements of the anti-Tumaini Initiative in the Government, particularly the opposition groups in the RTGoNU, as they will continue to enjoy their unelected political positions in the R-ARCSS. However, these political gains are short-lived and unsustainable as the country will be susceptible to the risk of imminent collapse and economic meltdown without a new peace agreement that will resuscitate the R-ARCSS which is currently inept at delivering peace and services to the people of South Sudan.
The Tumaini Initiative is the only mechanism that would restore peace with win-win peace outcomes for all. Unlocking the current deadlock by accepting the parallel discussion of the contentious issues will be the only way of moving the negotiations toward the path of restoring peace with win-win outcomes for all rather than the shortsighted zero-sum outcomes pursued by the elements of the anti-Tumaini Initiative.
Luka Biong Deng, PhD, is the Managing Director of the Sudd Institute, a national think tank in South Sudan; an adjunct professor at the Institute of Peace, Development and Security Studies at the University of Juba, South Sudan; and an adjunct distinguished professor at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) at the National Defense University, Washington, DC.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.