The escalating violence in Darfur and Southern Kordofan are alarming indicators of state fragility and an eroding legitimacy. Globally, state fragility is problematic as it constitutes an emerging complex situation of bad government and poverty. Within developing countries, fragile states challenge state legitimacy by impacting on state-society relations by manifesting deficiencies in capabilities and failure to institute representative, responsive and non-repressive policies. For three decades Sudan is classified as a fragile – low – income country under stress (LINCUS) based on high institutional and social fragility indicators. The deposed regime epitomized institutional and social fragility with plausible deficiencies in governance, wide-scale malfeasance and a biased and weakened rule of law system (police, judiciary and overall security sector). Sudan’s social fragility on the other hand is a result of prolonged conflict manifested in the lack of national consensus, polarization, inequality and fragmentation. This continues to date especially when we examine the surging level of ethnic-based violence in Eastern Sudan, Darfur and Southern Kordofan.

Sudan’s fragility; however, should not be considered exogenous and therefore does not constitute destiny. It is due to deliberate policy designs and options that define Sudanese political and economic history of inequality and divided society. The good news is that the ‘December revolution’ raises hopes for change. Popular protests are, to a certain extent, antithesis to Sudan's violent and exclusive state that thrives on predation and extractive economies. The Turco-Egyptian economy in Sudan under Mohamed Ali Pasha was dependent on the extraction of gold, slavery and ivory; this generated social inequalities along racial, religious and ethnic lines. It impacted on Sudanese social, cultural and demographic realities. Successive economies based on agriculture and unorganized labor impacted on changing demography through internal migration and land inequalities. A more recent rentier system that is dependent on extractive industries turned resource-endowed regions into war zones and targets of state pillage and atrocities.

In comparative terms, Sudan’s government policies under Ali Pasha's extractive economy are not different from policies adopted by the Mahdist. The Anglo-Egyptian condominium made a slight transformation banning slavery and closing areas targeted by slave-raiders and ended up generating geographies of inequality and different levels of development. Nationalist regimes became highly dependent on agriculture while Nimeri’s high dependency on loans and financial returns from migrant Sudanese professionals to the Gulf States generated political budgets that maintained a kleptocracy. The deposed regime of al Bashir adopted rentierism based on an extractive economy and ended up entrenching violent institutions based on pillage and oligopoly. al Bashir regime is one government that gave rise to decentralized despotism allowing warlords and militiamen to monopolize extraction of natural resources and curving extractive fiefdoms of their own.

It is unfortunate to note that after a whole year since the fall of Sudan's most despotic, unjust and longest-serving government no milestone policy changes took place. Old political, economic and security regimes are intact. Optimists who only see the big picture in terms of the fall of al Bashir's reign are satisfied by such development. Unfortunately many Sudanese are doubtful that the fall of al Bashir could be a panacea for Sudan’s ills. The institutionalized violent state with conflictual state-society relations, exclusive and extractive policies remain intact for two hundred years. Two popular uprisings, four transitional periods and three democratic regimes could not change Sudan into an inclusive polity. Atta al Batthani (2019) of the University of Khartoum provided a rich and succinct scholarship on Sudan’s four transitions (1954- 56; 1964-65, 1985-86 and 2005-2011) which, in his view, achieved limited success. It is interesting to note that Sudan's past transitional periods witnessed serious efforts in frustrating the attainment of peace. Meanwhile, democratic regimes that followed such transitions have records of heinous atrocities committed against the Sudanese people.  

It is not pessimism, but the surge in violence with thousands of civilians displaced and scores killed in inter-ethnic conflicts without any meaningful response from state authorities suggests that the current transition is not different as well. The growing dissent in a number of Sudanese states with sit-ins in Fataburno, Nyertitti, Soba and Abu Jubeiha among others are real challenges to state legitimacy. The recent protests rejecting the appointments of certain governors raise questions on whether the current government is commanding popular sovereignty as claimed or is promoting decentralized despotism as practiced throughout Sudanese history.

I admit that attaining consensus on such matters is not easy but after growing dissent, the government could have understood the signal and should have dropped governors who lack popular support. Instead, these rejections are received with unprecedented arrogance which goes against principles of rights and justice. How is the government sure that the protestors do not represent majority views in the meant states, or the issues cited are of no significance. I am dismayed to see how an apolitical technical government is engaging in partisan politics and getting more engaged in political side talks with different political groups and building alliances. Are Dr. Hamdouk and his cohort intending to run for the upcoming elections? If anything to go by, this suggests that the government is either trading-off legitimacy by forging a decentralized despotism or patronage or the whole transition is securitized.

Without a doubt, Sudan’s ongoing transition is securitized – which suggests that all processes are framed within security dimensions. Securitization as an emerging term is a speech-act concept which suggests that any issue that is framed as an existential threat is removed from normal political processes. It could be an economic concern that leads those in power to designate certain issues as posing threats to markets, resources and economic sectors. It can also take a social dimension by designating and projecting certain issues as a threat to pronounced national identity and societal values (religion, culture and ethnic/racial hegemony) or it may adopt a political dimension by defining certain issues as existential threats to the sovereign authority, ideology, and social order. A securitized issue is therefore removed from the public domain and placed under the security domain and treated with urgency.

In the Sudanese case, it is interesting to observe that for six decades the state is anchored on exclusionary policies leading the elites to construct strategic alliances based on the intersection of security, economic and political interests. This has led to costly and violent confrontations to sustain such exclusionary polity.  Consequently, these exclusionary policies led to the emergence of alternative sources of power such as the church, the tribe and later on the rebel movement that symbolize a counterforce especially to those who are outside state power. These alternative power forces are perceived as countering the historic elites by calling for inclusivity against the deliberate concentration of political, economic and military powers.

A major question here is whether these trends are weaning with growing levels of national consciousness after the popular revolution. In my view, and although good intentions are present, there are certain interests that feel threatened and consequently are demanding a ‘guarded transition’. The growing voices are pushing for a mild level of securitization to counter a backlash and a come-back of the deposed regime. This view although appealing but is mythical – on two grounds. First Sudan’s political problem cannot be entirely attributed to the deposed regime, previous regimes worked in sustaining policies of exclusion and ended up maintaining a violent state and an extractive oligopoly. Second, previous transitions were securitized not to deter an eventual comeback of previous regimes but to guard against desirable changes that impact on the historic interest of the elites with regards to instituting an inclusive and just state.  It is therefore sensible to conclude that for years Sudan's transformation and changes are securitized by certain forces that muddled in processes aiming at genuine peace and genuine transitional processes as a way to obstruct meaningful changes.

This explains why the deposed regime had to trade-off between the secession of Southern Sudan with an easier and practical option of instituting an inclusive Sudanese state that respects ethnic and religious diversity. The equation is simple: trading an inclusive state and good governance with the secession of a third of Sudan’s people and territory, there is no other justification. The same applies to previous democratic regimes that opted to ‘hand over’ power to the military than accept the demands of Southern Sudanese for either an inclusive state or federalism. The same situation is repeating itself today and it is unfortunate that Sudanese elites can resort to the army to guard against what is considered the values and principles of an exclusive state.

How would the Sudan transitional government achieve prudent economic growth when 650 companies dealing in mining, oil, services, industries, public contracts, construction, general holdings and external trade are run by the security sector. Although the military role in business goes back to the era of president Nimeri’s; the practice got shape during the deposed regime. Under the watchful eyes independent political, military and commercial interests were sponsored by the state to reward allies and buy loyalties. de Waal narrates how these privileges helped in the formation of patronage networks that benefited para-military groups such as the Popular Defence Forces, Border Guards and the Rapid Support Forces that run fiefdoms in the mining and other export sectors. With a deliberate process of securitizing economic activities by the old regime that placed strategic economic activities in the hands of the military, it is difficult if not impossible to introduce desirable reforms.

Sudan’s third transition is not spared and is highly securitized. Apart from entrusting the military component with vetting government appointment in crucial institutions such as the judiciary, the military today are leading the peace negotiations, engaging in mediating grass-root peace (although some of its members are causes of inter-ethnic fighting in Kadugli and part of Darfur) and leading in the economic sector. The imposition of certain unpopular governors to states that are considered ‘conflict hot-spots’ is a blow to the principle of justice and an obstacle to building social cohesion. The incompatible interests in the appointment of governors strengthen practices of decentralized despotism by which governors and rulers do not care whether they command the support of their constituencies as long as they continue giving allegiance to their principal in the center.

The deposed regime excelled in such political dispensation compelling constituencies to accept handpicked rulers by the ruling elites to avoid problems with the central government and to win unfettered flow of resources. This form of decentralized despotism as inherited from the colonial powers was further developed by central elites in a way that contributed to ethnic and sectoral polarisation. One bad example of decentralized despotism is how the 2011 complementary elections in Southern Kordofan state were turned into a show of power and influence drawing in the whole president and central government to support one candidate and using polarised language that ignited violence and extrajudicial killings based on political and ethnic identities.

In conclusion, the securitization of the transitional process has successfully limited grass-root participation. The peace forum in Juba remains elitists per excellence. Consequently, the forum would end up instituting another form of political accommodation while substantial issues of inequality would be reduced to mere statistics with no concrete policy solution. The forum allowed the elites and authorities to have a monologue speaking to themselves instead of taking notes from the grassroots. This reminds me of the Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake who once said ‘like development, democratization is not something that one people does for another … people must do it for themselves or it does not happen’.

The social peace agenda in rural Sudan cannot be limited to the peace talks and their consequent tracks. A healthy and de-securitized transition should rethink inclusivity by diversifying Sudan's political base to help Sudan recover from half a century of deliberate inequality.  I should admit that the revolutionary government has made efforts and it should be encouraged to continue on the same path and work vehemently to reverse institutional inequality. However, such isolated efforts without an honest nation-wide conversation or dialogue to break the silence on inequality would be futile. Such debate would discuss social justice, distributive justice, affirmative action and how these pillars would consequently build an equitable and sustainable state. Continuous denial of Sudan’s realities by dubbing such issues as racist, or cheap ethnic politics would not help especially when desired change is securitized and guarded by the historic forces. Sudan lost a third of its land and population because of racial, religious and other social intolerance. It is time to say no to a securitized transition whose main objective is to safeguard and sustain historic inequalities.

Stephen Arrno is the co-author of “Revolution is Female: Reconstructing African Women's Agency in Political Regime Change Lessons from Sudan's Revolution” in Beyond History: African Agency in Diplomacy, Development and Conflict Resolution by Munyi, E., Mwambari. D and Ylönen, A., 153-174, London:  Rowman and Littlefield International, 2020.

The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made are the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.