Opinion| September, the entry point for Tumaini

BY DR AYINE NIGO (PhD/FHEA)

“…. He who has ears to hear, let him hear.” Christ uses this phrase to emphasize the importance of paying attention to his message. It is a way of speaking that Christ used to convey important matters that require attentiveness and may not be easily understood. It is now September, six years after the signing of the 2018 peace agreement, and we are still discussing extensions or elections shamelessly while the citizens are feeling insecure.

As responsible citizens, it is claimant for us to confront our political challenges with sincerity openly. The enduring presence of the 2018 peace agreement is inextricably linked to the suffering and devastation experienced by South Sudan and its people. The power-sharing arrangement, known as R-ARCSS, has proven ineffective and is expected to remain so. Moreover, the 2018 agreement has given rise to a heavy administrative structure, territorial disputes, factional violence, and the resurgence of armed conflict in the country, echoing the situation in neighboring Sudan. R-ARCSS fails to address the requirements for post-transition stability sufficiently, and including alleged offenders in the shared Government has compromised transitional justice and accountability provisions.

The short-term stability of South Sudan is likely to confront significant challenges due to some aspects of the approach established in the R-ARCSS. The inability of the agreements to integrate the army has resulted in military top structures and command divisions away from the South Sudan Peoples Defence Force (SSPDF), impeding the military’s functional capacity in terms of its organizational structure and chain of command. Any extension of the present situation will lead to mutiny or fractionalization, as parallel hierarchies are now well established, and allegiance remains with former rebel commanders.

In this paper, we claim that formalizing the extension of RTGONU and conducting elections can potentially provoke significant conflict, leading to widespread and entrenched civil war across the nation.

We recall that during the 2010 elections in Sudan, relative unity was observed among the people of South Sudan. Yet, following the announcement of the election results, tensions emerged across the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) in the ten states. The capital city, Juba, and other prominent towns, such as Bor, Bentiu, and Malakal, experienced heightened tension in the lead-up to the results. Despite an increased police presence in Juba, residents remained anxious, viewing the mass deployment of officers at roundabouts and in markets as an indication of potential trouble. In response, the GoSS and the United Nations imposed curfews to restrict residents from entering the streets immediately after the announcement. The prevalent sentiment of disappointment among many supporters of the candidate contributed to the ongoing tension, with allegations of election rigging or bias in favor of an unpopular southern Sudanese politician.

The feasibility of holding an election on December 22, 2024, considering the announcement by the National Elections Commission, should be re-examined. Against the backdrop of increasing disunity among the people of South Sudan, the announcement fails to address the essential prerequisites necessary to ensure a peaceful, transparent, inclusive, free, fair, and credible election. Measures such as finalizing security arrangements for Phase I and Phase II, conducting the National Population Census, establishing the Permanent Constitution, implementing Judicial Reform, addressing the Repatriation and Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, conducting Transitional Justice processes, and safeguarding political and civic space remain inadequately resolved.

Similarly, extending the sitting RTGONU will only worsen the already dire situation in our country, potentially leading to a state of warfare that will harm our people. Given that the citizens are already suffering due to hunger and the collapse of the salary and economic system, there is a sense that they have nothing to lose. The many previous extensions have caused severe damage to the local economy, productivity, and the land, as well as preceding corruption and the suffering of our families, children, and women. As a result, people live in a persistent state of worry and uncertainty. It seems inevitable that widespread conflict will erupt, potentially leading to the collapse of South Sudan as a functioning sovereign entity if RTGONU extends or holds elections.

Unfortunately, external factors such as the Troika states, the European Union, the African Union, IGAD, and other regional actors have remained neutral regarding the issues surrounding elections or the extension. The lies and double standards these entities exhibit often reflect their interests as they apply different measures to the same situation. They have provided the people of South Sudan and RTGONU with misleading information in favor of their developmental and humanitarian presence, leaving the people of South Sudan in a circle of perpetual instability.

The High-Level Mediation for South Sudan’s peace process aims to tackle the country’s inability to conduct peace agreements. The 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) fell apart in 2016, while the implementation of the Revitalized version (R-ARCSS) has been slow and has not achieved all its goals. Six years after the signing of the R-ARCSS, the political, security, economic, and humanitarian situations have deteriorated.

In response to the failures in peace implementation, the Tumaini Initiative proposes various novel solutions, including the professionalization of South Sudan’s security sector and the establishment of an independent Security Sector Reform and Oversight Commission to ensure fair unification of the security sector without interference from political interests.

A National Leadership Council, consisting of political and independent civil society leaders, will serve as an internal guarantor, while external regional and international partners will oversee the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus. The establishment of joint technical institutions, including the National Implementation and Oversight Committee and Governance Oversight Committee, will support the effectiveness of the Consensus. The consensus agreement includes a comprehensive matrix covering tasks in the Tumaini and stalled provisions from the R-ARCSS.

We maintain that the Tumaini Peace Initiative represents the sole opportunity for establishing a permanent and constitutional consociationalism democracy following the transitional period, provided there is a robust political will to enact the consensus agreement. The protocols unequivocally endorse adherence to the principles of power-sharing based on proportionality at the state and local levels, as well as the mutual veto across executive levels of power. Conversely, the formalization of the extension of RTGONU and the conduct of elections may incite significant conflict, potentially resulting in widespread and entrenched civil unrest throughout the nation. The Tumaini provisions are intended to safeguard the stability of the country. Let those who are ears take heed!

Dr Ayine Nigo is an author and lecturer at the University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom. He can be reached via nigoayine@gmail.com.

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