The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCISS) was dead on arrival. The reason is simple: the leaders of the parties that signed this accord have consistently failed to master the art of implementing peace agreements, including but not limited to the interim constitution of South Sudan.
In other words, they remain incompatible and unaccountable to their impoverished citizenry and the international community at large. In both private and public conversations, I have often dismissed this peace agreement as a waste of time for various reasons.
Those familiar with my work and words will agree that I have been pessimistic about this peace deal from the very beginning. My skepticism is rooted in facts and a deep understanding of South Sudan’s political history, which has been marred by a lack of political will and a culture of self-aggrandizement.
I am confident that keen listeners and avid readers will recognize that my primary critique of this agreement and its implementation revolves around three key themes: it is defunct, dysfunctional, and dead. I am not alone in this pessimism. Time has proven the naysayers correct, as the leaders’ actions—or inactions—have repeatedly undermined the agreement.
My pessimism is often accompanied by profound regret and sympathy for the people of South Sudan, who continue to suffer and perish amid relentless violence and human rights violations.
Six years after the signing of the R-ARCISS, South Sudan remains at square one in its quest for national stability, justice, development, and democratic reforms. The agreement was designed to be implemented immediately, without delay. Yet, delays and non-implementation have become its defining features.
The central argument here is straightforward: while a peace agreement exists on paper, it remains far from reality due to the leaders’ antagonism and the absence of tangible peace on the ground, particularly in Greater Upper Nile and Unity State.
Three Events in Three States
Three consecutive events in three states illustrate this point. Unfortunately, all point in the same direction: the systematic targeting of political opponents. The unlawful arrest of influential SPLM-IO leaders and civil servants in the Ministry of Petroleum did not come as a surprise. It was only a matter of time.
As the SPLM-IG carried out its maneuvers in Western Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria, it became clear that they were laying the groundwork to accuse SPLM-IO officials of wrongdoing, with the ultimate goal of detaining them ahead of a planned onslaught. This was not a mere test of the waters, as some might assume.
Conflict in Nasir and Ulang Counties
On 15 January 2025, the SSPDF—the military wing of the SPLM-IG—alongside allied forces such as the Agwelek and Aboshuk militias, marched on Nasir and Ulang counties under the pretext of replacing SSPDF soldiers stationed in Nasir. This armed incursion was an unnecessary and dangerous provocation, undermining the fragile peace.
The operation was abruptly launched by General Johnson Olony Thubo, the recently appointed commander of disarmament, without public participation or scrutiny—both of which are prerequisites for such operations. If this were a routine troop rotation, it could have been conducted discreetly, without media fanfare or the involvement of General Olony.
His involvement signaled a more sinister intent: the disarmament of the people of Nasir and Ulang counties. Compounding the issue was the participation of the Abushok and Agwelek militias, which have a notorious record of human rights violations in Upper Nile State.
From the outset, the argument on the ground has been clear: if there was a genuine need to replace government forces in Nasir, it should have been done with the Unified Forces—trained soldiers drawn from all parties constituting the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU).
Western Equatoria State Governor’s Removal
On 10 February 2025, President Salva Kiir dismissed Western Equatoria State Governor General Alfred Futuyo without consulting or seeking the consent of the SPLM-IO, which had nominated him. Worse still, Governor Futuyo’s removal was followed by gunfire, endangering not only his life but also the lives of his family members.
This incident was a direct blow to the R-ARCISS. In fact, it echoed the events of 8 July 2016, when First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar was purged and forced to flee to the Democratic Republic of Congo after 40 days on the run.
Random Arrests of SPLM-IO Officials
The reckless and arbitrary arrests of SPLM-IO officials, including Minister of Petroleum Puot Kang Chuol and Camilo Gatmai Kel, constitute a blatant attack on the R-ARCISS and the Interim Constitution of South Sudan. The constitution explicitly states that accused persons must not be detained without being brought before a competent court of law. Yet, as of this writing, neither individual has been presented before a court.
Surrounding of Riek Machar’s Residence
On 5 March 2025, during a press conference in Juba, Information Minister Michael Makuei was asked by a journalist to confirm whether the residence of First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar had been surrounded by SSPDF soldiers.
Rather than providing a straightforward answer, Makuei evaded the question, telling the journalist to see for themselves. This evasion was telling, as reports of the siege had already been widely circulated by local and international media outlets, including Radio Tamazuj, Standard Media, and Al Jazeera.
It is common knowledge that the surrounding of Machar’s residence was coordinated with the arrest of SPLM-IO Chief of Staff Gabriel Duop Lam. By dodging the question, Minister Makuei sought to avoid the political fallout that could arise from confirming the incident.
Makuei hails from a county in Jonglei State that borders areas considered strongholds of Riek Machar. Admitting in broad daylight that Machar’s residence was surrounded by SSPDF soldiers could have sparked significant unrest.
The Way Forward
President Salva Kiir must exercise restraint and avoid targeting key peace partners, such as First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar. Any attempt to arrest Machar would be a recipe for chaos and conflict. Such actions could also instill fear among opposition leaders participating in the Tumaini Initiative negotiations in Nairobi. After all, no one is willing to make peace with a partner known for brutality and betrayal.
The truth must be told as it is. As evidenced by Machar’s letter to the African Union and IGAD leaders dated 27 February 2025, the SPLM-IO has consistently demonstrated compromise and cooperation in its partnership with the SPLM-IG. It is now incumbent upon the SPLM-IG to reciprocate by acting in the best interests of the nation.
The writer, Dak Buoth Riek-Gaak, is the National Chairperson for Legal and Constitutional Affairs of the South Sudan People’s Movement (SSPM). He can be reached for comments at eligodakb@yahoo.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.