Opinion | Kiir’s High-Stakes Power Move

President Kiir’s latest cabinet reshuffle marks a pivotal moment in South Sudan’s political trajectory—one that could either pave the way for a stable transition or push the country toward deeper turmoil.

On the evening of Monday, February 10, 2025, the people of South Sudan were stunned by President Kiir’s high-stakes cabinet reshuffle. In this shake-up, two vice presidents were dismissed, along with a governor, a minister, the ruling party’s secretary-general, and the head of the National Security Service, among others. According to the South Sudan Transitional Constitution, a cabinet reshuffle is the President’s prerogative. However, Monday night’s move was not just a routine exercise of executive power—it was a legacy-defining decision with serious political ramifications for both the country and the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).

I view this decision as a high-risk and consequential political maneuver, comparable to the cabinet reshuffle of July 23, 2013. This decision carries significant risks for national stability, the future of the SPLM, and political succession, potentially igniting a power struggle. Let’s look at each of these individually, starting with the threats of instability.

Political Instability: A Recurring Pattern

President Kiir’s high-stakes cabinet reshuffle has the potential to trigger significant political instability. Since assuming power in 2005 following the tragic death of SPLM leader Dr. John Garang, Kiir has navigated high-risk political waters using a strategy of purging rivals and co-opting potential threats to consolidate control over the ruling party.

Early in his tenure, he clashed with the so-called Garang Boys, a group he perceived as a challenge to his authority. By 2013, he had successfully eliminated them from power, while those who remained were subdued and coerced into pledging loyalty. To survive these high-risk maneuvers, Kiir strategically used his executive authority to forge temporary alliances of convenience. In 2006, for instance, he signed the Juba Declaration with Paulino Matip and Abdelbagi Ayii, securing their support as he methodically dismantled the Garang Boys while keeping a close watch on Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. Lam Akol.

At the 2008 SPLM National Convention, Kiir attempted to sideline both Riek and the Garang Boys, but the political weight was too much to bear. Instead, he opted for a temporary alliance with Riek, promising him the vice presidency in the 2010 elections. Kiir also deepened his influence within the SPLM by aligning with members of the defunct SPLM/SPLA Political-Military High Command, luring them with assurances of preserving the SPLA/M historical command structure and hierarchy. This strategy appealed to senior military and political figures, eliciting their allegiance.

During the 2013 purge of the Garang Boys, Kiir relied on this same tactic to prevent top SPLM leaders from defecting. Instead, blame was placed on junior party members for their perceived audacity in challenging the hierarchy—reinforcing the idea that leadership succession must follow the established order. Additionally, Kiir secured a new alliance with Tuk Gatluak Manime, Dr. Joseph Monytuil, and the Wichjangs to counter Riek Machar. When the time was right, with a single stroke of a pen, he simultaneously ousted both Riek and the Garang Boys, while momentarily aligning himself with Dr. Lam Akol and a militia leader from his home area, Johnson Olony.

Despite Kiir’s intent to consolidate power and neutralize political threats, the 2013 cabinet reshuffle proved to be a gamble too far. It plunged South Sudan into severe political instability, derailing the country’s political transition. The ongoing political, security, economic, and social crises stem directly from that fateful decision. This latest reshuffle bears striking similarities to the events of 2013 and carries the same risk of plunging the country into a major political crisis. Specifically, this decision has significantly raised the stakes in the ruling party, the SPLM.

The Future of the SPLM: The End of an Era

We have said it time and again, but few believed us—the SPLM is dead. Through a series of high-risk maneuvers, President Kiir has rendered the SPLM irrelevant, both as an institution and as an ideological political movement. Instead, he has become the institution himself, making decisions that the party is then forced to justify, even when they contradict its principles.

Since the 2013 purge, Kiir has systematically sidelined his allies in the Political-Military High Command Council, gradually pushing them into retirement. I recall February 2020, during the formation of the RTGoNU, when General Kuol Manyang was left out. There were concerns that his exclusion could pose a problem, so a symbolic “parking lot” role was created for him—a vague advisory position with the word “senior” added to placate him. The President had little interest in keeping him, but his junior staff insisted he still had some use. The same staff, however, were convinced that Awendit and Mark Nyipuoch had outlived their political utility, and Kiir had no hesitation in discarding them.

Monday night’s reshuffle marks the end of an era—the final dismantling of the SPLA/M Political-Military High Command. Kiir tested the waters in 2023 when he bypassed Gen. Kuol Manyang Juuk, the favored choice of the Political Bureau, and instead appointed Peter Lam Both as SPLM Secretary General. When this move met no resistance, he doubled down, promoting Benjamin Bol Mel to Deputy SPLM Secretary General and making him a member of the Political Bureau. For months, speculation ran wild in South Sudan that Dr. Benjamin Bol Mel was Kiir’s chosen successor. On Monday, that speculation was confirmed when Kiir demoted Gen. James Wani Igga, removing him as Vice President and appointing him as SPLM Secretary General while elevating Benjamin Bol Mel to Vice President. Before Monday’s reshuffle, Igga held both the Vice Presidency and the position of 1st Deputy Chairman of the SPLM. It remains unclear whether Benjamin Bol now holds both titles.

This move accomplishes two things at once. First, it confirms that President Kiir has a succession plan and a chosen successor. Second, the SPLM now faces a stark choice—either endorse Kiir’s pick and his transition plan or face political extinction. At this point, Kiir could abandon the SPLM entirely, form a new party, and still maintain his grip on power. However, whether the SPLM can survive without Kiir remains uncertain.

This cabinet reshuffle is a harsh wake-up call for SPLM members who have long refused to accept the reality that President Kiir never prioritized the party—his only concern has been consolidating and maintaining power. Everything else, including the SPLA and SPLM, has been secondary and ultimately expendable. He has shown a willingness to go to great lengths—even sacrificing close friends and allies—if it serves to strengthen his grip on authority.

The Succession Plan and the Successor

Now that President Kiir’s succession plan is clear and his chosen successor identified, it is only fair to evaluate both. As with many of Kiir’s political maneuvers, the idea itself—establishing a succession plan—is important, but the process and methods used to achieve it matter even more. Instead of fostering a transparent, consultative process, Kiir has relied on deception, coercion, bribery, and outright intimidation to engineer a succession plan that he alone controls. This approach is a recipe for instability and potential failure.

A credible succession process should be institutionalized within the ruling party. The President should have formally communicated his intentions to the upper ranks of the SPLM and secured their support before making any decisions. Once party consensus was established, the next step should have been to legitimize the process through a party convention, ensuring that both the leadership and grassroots members endorsed the transition. Bypassing these steps risks igniting factional disputes, violent power struggles, and prolonged political instability.

The Successor: Dr. Benjamin Bol Mel

Dr. Benjamin Bol Mel is a South Sudanese, a member of the Red Army, and, by virtue of his citizenship, he has the right to be considered as a potential successor to President Kiir. However, the more critical question is whether he possesses the temperament, moral fortitude, intellectual capacity, and leadership experience to govern a politically fractured, socially divided, and economically fragile nation.

I welcome President Kiir’s decision to initiate a succession plan, though I strongly oppose the opaque and unilateral manner in which it was executed. The intent is commendable—South Sudan desperately needs fresh leadership, youthful energy, and a vision that transcends the entrenched ethnic and regional divisions plaguing the country. Whether Benjamin Bol Mel is the right person for this role remains an open question. The immediate priority, however, is for Kiir to announce a structured 90-day transition plan and step down, allowing South Sudan the chance to experience a peaceful democratic transition—even if this means Benjamin Bol temporarily assuming the presidency.

The Challenges Ahead

Dr. Benjamin Bol Mel faces formidable obstacles as he embarks on his succession journey:

  1. Lack of Legitimacy Within SPLM – His selection process remains unclear, unapproved by the party, and lacks consensus. He must work swiftly to unify the SPLM behind him or risk the succession plan collapsing before it materializes.
  2. Absence of Political Alliances – In clearing the path for his chosen successor, President Kiir has dismantled the intricate web of political alliances that kept him in power. As a result, Benjamin Bol will inherit no meaningful coalition but instead will face strong resistance from those who have been sidelined in his favor.
  3. Association with Corruption and State Capture – Having long operated within the corridors of power as both a business partner and now a son-in-law to President Kiir, Benjamin Bol is deeply entangled in the very system that many blame for South Sudan’s economic downfall. He lacks the advantage of being seen as an outsider capable of reform. Instead, he will have to prove himself as an independent leader rather than merely an extension of Kiir’s rule.
  4. Militarization of Politics – The current strategy of restructuring the security apparatus to bolster his rise risks further entrenching military influence in politics. A politicized military could provoke violent political contestation, exacerbating tensions rather than stabilizing the transition.
  5. A Divided and Fragile Nation – South Sudan remains deeply fragmented, ethnically, politically, and militarily. Dr. Mel will inherit a government operating under the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan, with numerous armed groups, both in and outside the Agreement, still threatening violence. Additionally, South Sudan’s international standing remains poor, further complicating efforts to secure external support for his leadership.

Navigating these challenges while holding the country together will be the ultimate test of whether Benjamin Bol Mel is truly capable of leading South Sudan—or if he is merely a placeholder in yet another chapter of political crisis.

The Status of the R-ARCSS and the Tumaini Initiative

Any discussion of President Kiir’s latest political maneuvers would be incomplete without considering their impact on the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and the Tumaini Initiative. While the succession plan may seem to concern only one faction within the Transitional Government, its implications extend to the entire political framework established by the 2018 peace agreement.

Recent rapprochement between President Kiir and Gen. Gatwich Dual raises the possibility that Kiir could abruptly dissolve the political arrangement, effectively unraveling the peace agreement. His systematic efforts to weaken and isolate the SPLM-IO from its traditional support base suggest a broader strategy to consolidate power. Monday’s reshuffle included Kiir’s unilateral dismissal of the national Minister of Health and the state governor of Western Equatoria; both were members of the SPLM-IO, whose dismissal required consent of their party. Should President Kiir choose to abrogate the R-ARCSS, it remains unclear how much resistance the SPLM-IO, SSOA, and OPP could muster to defend the agreement.

As for the Tumaini Initiative, its credibility was effectively nullified the moment President Kiir withdrew his support. Without his backing, the process lacks legitimacy and is unlikely to yield any meaningful progress. If its purpose was merely to sideline influential figures who might challenge Kiir’s chosen successor, then the recent reshuffle has all but eliminated any remaining prospects for peace through this initiative—unless the new successor sees value in reviving it for their own political gain.

Conclusion

President Kiir’s latest cabinet reshuffle marks a pivotal moment in South Sudan’s political trajectory—one that could either pave the way for a stable transition or push the country toward deeper turmoil. By dismantling key political alliances and reshaping the power structure, he has taken a high-stakes gamble that risks further destabilization. His consolidation of power within the SPLM and the selection of Dr. Benjamin Bol Mel as his successor indicate a deliberate move to control South Sudan’s future beyond his tenure. However, the opaque and unilateral manner in which this succession plan has been engineered raises serious concerns about its legitimacy and long-term viability.

Dr. Mel now faces the enormous challenge of proving himself as a unifying leader in a deeply fractured nation. His ability to navigate political divisions, restore public trust, and assert himself as an independent leader—rather than merely an extension of Kiir’s rule—will determine whether South Sudan experiences a peaceful transition or spirals into further instability. Furthermore, the broader implications of this reshuffle extend beyond the SPLM. Given Kiir’s evolving political alliances, including his rapprochement with Gen. Gatwich Dual, there is a real possibility that the very foundation of the R-ARCSS could be at risk. If Kiir opts to dismantle the agreement, it remains uncertain how much resistance SPLM-IO, SSOA, and OPP can mount in response.

Meanwhile, the Tumaini Initiative has effectively lost any credibility. Kiir’s withdrawal from the process suggests that it was never a genuine peace effort but rather a tool to sideline potential challengers to his chosen successor. With this reshuffle, any remaining hope for Tumaini’s success is now dependent on whether Dr. Mel sees strategic value in reviving it.

Ultimately, this reshuffle signals the end of the SPLM as a meaningful political institution and the beginning of an uncertain chapter in South Sudan’s history. Whether Kiir’s power play solidifies his legacy or unravels into another cycle of political conflict remains to be seen. The coming months will be decisive in determining the country’s path—either toward a controlled transition or renewed instability. The stakes could not be higher.

The most responsible course of action for President Kiir now would be to declare his intention to step down, allowing Dr. Mel the chance to gain legitimacy through a democratic transition. Clinging to power despite clear signs of ineffectiveness and mounting failures will only deepen the country’s troubles, further burdening a nation already overwhelmed by crises resulting from failed leadership. An even more meaningful and transformative step would be for Dr. Riek Machar to also relinquish power and designate Puot Kang as his successor. Only then could South Sudan begin to move toward a genuine political and democratic transition. As long as both Kiir and Machar remain at the helm, the appointment of Dr. Mel as Vice President will do little to bring about real change.

The writer, Abraham A. Awolich, is a member of the People’s Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA) and a PhD student in Sustainable Development Policy, Economics, and Governance at the University of Vermont. He is a Gund and L4E Fellow. He can be reached at aawolich@uvm.edu.

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