Opinion | Kiir’s decrees: A soft coup with major implications

On the evening of February 10, 2025, the public was taken by surprise as President Salva Kiir announced sweeping changes in government. These presidential decrees reshaped the government, security apparatus, and the ruling party structure, leaving the political scene in a state of shock. This sudden development led many observers to rethink the trajectory of South Sudan’s political landscape.

A close examination of South Sudan’s political developments reveals that Kiir’s administration, for a long time, has been characterized by constant shifts, seemingly in pursuit of a specific transformation known only to him. Over time, changes within the government structure have become dictated solely by Kiir’s own perspectives, ambitions, and political direction, rather than by the official policies and the ideological framework of the ruling party. This has made it difficult to predict the future.

Every move by any party member is now scrutinized in relation to the leader, who operates with a strong grip on both the party and state affairs, prioritizing personal interests over collective decision-making. This approach aligns with patterns in many developing countries, where governance is heavily influenced by a single ruler, and political socialization fosters blind loyalty among members. This, in my opinion, is a natural outcome given the origins of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) as a military organization with a strict hierarchical structure. As a revolutionary movement, the SPLM has remained bound by this mode of thinking and will continue to do so unless it undergoes dissolution. Otherwise, its governance style will be perceived as a rebranded dictatorship, a stark contrast to the aspirations of the South Sudanese, who yearn for complete freedom and prosperity to erase the painful memories of their turbulent history.

The February 2025 decisions, in my view, resemble a soft coup that erodes the historical foundations of the SPLM, diverging from the party’s previously smooth political transitions, such as the one following the death of founder Dr. John Garang in 2005, when Kiir assumed leadership based on the party’s hierarchy. These recent changes represent an unprecedented shift in governance, defying traditional interpretations and resisting analysis through conventional political lenses. The strategic nature of these decisions, reinforced by a firm grip on power, signals a new era that demands critical reflection on the role of the historical party figures.

While these changes may not be irreversible, I anticipate challenges in achieving their intended goals. Their success will heavily depend on the capabilities of the anticipated new leadership.

More significantly, these changes raise fundamental questions about their legitimacy and their ability to impose an unsettling political reality. This is particularly concerning given that the restructuring appears to be based on an unequivocal, unilateral reconfiguration of power within the state and the ruling party. One of the most striking decisions was the removal of veteran political figures, such as Dr. James Wani Igga, who was initially reassigned from Vice President of the party to Secretary-General, only to later be dismissed from his vice-presidential role altogether. A new generation leader was appointed in his place, a move that I find astonishing.

Another notable aspect of the February 2025 decisions was the demotion of the Vice President for the Service Cluster, who was reassigned as a national minister—possibly to avoid political confrontations linked to absolute submission to the head of state. Some analysts view these changes as a precursor to political instability with potentially catastrophic consequences for nation-building and internal and external dynamics. The appointment of Dr. Benjamin Bol Mel as Vice President for the Economic Cluster introduces a new chapter in South Sudan’s political landscape and could pave the way for his eventual presidency, despite his ascension circumventing the traditional party norms.

Nevertheless, the February 2025 decisions mark a profound transformation in South Sudan’s political decision-making, with regional and ethnic balancing continuing to play a crucial role. A clear example of this was the exclusion of Dr. Lam Akol from the vice presidency once again, suggesting that these decisions were driven by political considerations that did not necessarily reflect the principles of justice and political equality. Instead, they were based on a traditional approach that prioritizes ethnic balance and political rivalry over competence and effectiveness. These changes also raise concerns about whether the new political school of thought can achieve sustainable peace, especially considering the Revitalized Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS), which has just completed its third phase and is now moving into the fourth phase of challenging implementation, with the near-collapsed peace negotiations in Nairobi (Tumaini Initiative)—especially following an unofficial announcement of the government’s withdrawal.

Achieving lasting peace in South Sudan requires a comprehensive reassessment of the political transition, detached from the personal ambitions of the leaders. The February 2025 decisions reflect a soft coup aimed at restructuring the political landscape to serve specific interests, raising concerns about whether the new leadership can effectively manage the contradictions inherent in nation-building or if this phase will prove to be more turbulent.

The author, Bathumi Ayul, is a South Sudanese journalist and a researcher. He can be reached via email: bathum44@yahoo.com

The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.