In the aftermath of a protracted civil war, South Sudan stands at a critical juncture where the path to sustainable peace and democratic consolidation hinges on careful navigation of its political processes. The decision to proceed with premature elections, as advocated by President Salva Kiir’s administration, without fully implementing the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), risks jeopardizing hard-earned gains toward reconciliation and stability. This critique contends that conducting elections before instituting crucial reforms not only undermines the foundational peace processes but also threatens to perpetuate exclusionary governance practices, thus potentially reigniting violence and deepening societal divisions.
It is imperative to keep in mind that South Sudan is emerging from the trauma of a destructive civil war. The R-ARCSS, signed in September 2018, aimed to end years of violence and establish a framework for governance and reconciliation. Central to this agreement was a phased approach that included reforming institutions, integrating opposition forces and armed groups into the national army, improving the national security sector, and promoting political inclusivity. At this point, the phased approach has not been concluded, nor have we witnessed any specific benefits from it. Given the current political climate, safe and fair elections cannot be conducted. Thus, to proceed with elections now disregards and endangers any serious commitment to achieving sustainable peace and democratic consolidation; instead, it signifies abandoning peace implementation. Regrettably, it now appears that President Kiir is doing just that.
Elections serve different purposes given the existing structure of governance in which they are held. For example, elections in a functioning democratic country aim to advance democratic processes through the virtues of fairness and individual dignity. In governments striving for full and fair democracy, elections can symbolize the transition from a volatile situation to stability and democratic governance. Unfortunately, elections can also function as a way of legitimizing and bolstering existing dictatorships. Thus, when examining our present state of affairs in South Sudan, we should be wary of the potential risks of conducting premature elections, particularly on the grounds that they could potentially undermine the foundational peace processes if they are not properly performed. The revitalized pact requires parties to the agreement to reform national institutions, security sectors, electoral processes, and governance structures, among others. These reforms are essential for creating an environment conducive to free and fair elections. Without adequate reforms, institutions remain weak and susceptible to manipulation, potentially delegitimizing the outcomes of elections. Dictators tend to embrace premature elections when they are confident of their control over the finance, security, and military sectors. Furthermore, it should concern us when we learn of the decision made by South Sudan’s National Elections Commission (NEC), which announced the election date to be December 22, 2024. This declaration violated the peace agreement because the election process is driven by Kiir’s ruling party, while the opposition parties in protest vow nonparticipation in elections if the peace deal is not fully implemented.
I should remind readers that the revitalized peace agreement stipulates that all parties to the agreement must conduct their official duties on a consensus basis and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) refused to abide by this rule. Kiir and the NEC should know that incomplete implementation of the treaty could perpetuate exclusionary practices. Kiir and the NEC should also know that opposition parties, or armed groups that feel marginalized in the process, may resort to renewed violence or boycotts. This would destabilize the electoral process and further complicate the already fractured national unity.
South Sudan’s political system currently operates in a post-conflict environment, rendering its political system fragile. Underlying tensions and growing mistrust exist between political leaders and South Sudanese communities. South Sudan’s Presidency should know that conducting an election without full execution of the peace deal can lead to security threats during elections, jeopardize voter turnout, and reignite nationwide violence. A peace agreement, such as the revitalized accord, aims to foster economic stability through infrastructure development and resource management reforms, which is what the South Sudanese desire. Premature elections are not good for the country’s future and can divert attention and resources away from these critical tasks. This will exacerbate economic challenges and hinder long-term recovery.
If we reflect on the documented actions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Government (SPLM-IG or SPLM), which leads the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), it seems clear that their long-term goal is not a search for a lasting peace in this beautiful but war-torn country, but a desperate attempt to prevent peace from being implemented. These SPLM tactics present political and social instability, which manifests in security challenges and persistent economic disintegration for the country. If President Kiir desires a united and prosperous South Sudan, he must refrain from delaying reforms or shortcuts to proceed with elections before fully executing the agreement.
President Kiir and his party are not in favour of democratic governance but of reinforcing dictatorship and preventing the country from thriving. How can we come to any other conclusion, when time after time we see that Kiir’s main goal is to consistently and systematically impede peace implementation processes by deliberately refusing institutional reforms; in turn, embracing the December 2024 premature elections?
Some of our fellow citizens hope that President Kiir will do better if given another term in office. But this hope is highly implausible, given the fact that Kiir has been at the helm of power even before South Sudan became an independent state, where he has been in power for a total of nearly 19 years (6 years as the leader of then-Southern Sudan and 13 years as the President of the Republic of South Sudan). However, Kiir has not shown political maturity in all these years; this fact raises questions about whether he has the leadership qualities the country needs because he seems to have lost his moral compass and become a victim of a misguided political or ethnic agenda.
Given the continued intransigence against any meaningful reform by the current government in South Sudan, it is impossible to ignore or deny the willful deceit that is continually generated by official policy. President Kiir believes that implementing the accord, based on his preferences rather than strictly adhering to its stipulations, is the optimal path to achieving lasting peace. This is one of the reasons why he deliberately denied necessary funding to institutions tasked to monitor and enforce the implementation of the agreement. I should point out that leaders with dictatorial tendencies often use rubber-stamp parliamentarians to enact laws that would allow them to cement their existing powers. This is exactly what President Kiir resorts to; claiming that South Sudan’s political problems can only be resolved through the ballot box, even though he has intentionally refused to follow peace implementation stipulations. Readers should know that South Sudan’s opposition parties, including the main opposition party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), have already objected to conducting elections this year, citing President Kiir’s lack of political will to implement the agreement. Therefore, President Kiir should not attempt to legitimize the existing tyrannical political system through hasty elections. The notion that conducting elections would resolve the ongoing political crisis in the country, while the execution of transitional security arrangements has not been fulfilled, is nothing short of a farce.
Despite opposition, President Kiir has implemented anti-peace strategies aimed at weakening the efforts of the rival political parties and maintaining the current political system. These tactics are designed to distance Kiir from direct involvement. For example, the South Sudan Political Parties Council (PPC) has repeatedly denied the SPLM-IO participation in the voter registration drive, citing the opposition’s separate forces that have not yet integrated into the national army. This claim lacks logical grounding since Kiir himself is the one who must first approve the list of opposition forces for integration. He can sign the list that contains the names of opposition soldiers at any time if he wants them to be integrated since the list is currently sitting on his desk.
It is a deeply concerning fact that Kiir always employs deceitful tactics when dealing with his political rivals. For example, in February of 2024, President Kiir and the First Vice President Dr. Machar agreed to reform the National Security Service (NSS), especially the notorious NSS’s internal branch, the Internal Security Bureau (ISB), by ordering the scrapping of sections 54 and 55 from the National Security Act of 2014. At the time, the people of South Sudan thought Kiir and Machar had taken the right steps in the right direction. The deal between the two main peace principles was also confirmed by Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro, who is the Cabinet Affairs Minister in the Presidency. Dr. Lomuro announced, in a news conference after the Kiir-Machar agreement, that “The national security law, where there was disagreement on sections 54 and 55 regarding arrest with or without a warrant, has now been agreed upon by the president and first vice president, and those sections will be scrapped.” Sections 54 and 55 give security the absolute power to detain or arrest anyone, whenever they want. Predictably, the agreement between Kiir and Machar to remove the two sections appears to be no longer the case. This is because Kiir plans to use the NSS to target those he perceives as political adversaries.
Another tactic employed by Kiir is the Reconstituted Transitional National Legislative Assembly (R-TNLA). On July 3, 2024, the SPLM-dominated parliament passed the National Security Act 2014 (Amendment Bill 2024), although the President and First Vice President agreed to remove sections 54 and 55 from the bill more than four months ago. This new bill is both anti-peace and oppressive because it empowers the NSS, particularly the ISB branch, to monitor communications and conduct search and seizure. The new security bill is designed to intimidate, threaten, detain, arrest, torture, or even kill those who question election outcomes or hold dissenting views. The purpose of this repressive amended bill is to instil fear in South Sudanese hearts and cement Kiir’s dictatorial rule, which has been in existence for more than a decade.
Furthermore, President Kiir exerts influence through South Sudan’s NEC. On July 5, 2024, NEC Chair Prof. Abednego Akok Kacuol notified all political parties and South Sudanese citizens of the December 22, 2024, election date, dismissing opposition concerns as “null and void.” Meanwhile, Dr. Machar effectively remains under house arrest, denied the ability to tour the country or visit areas under SPLM-IO control, let alone travel internationally.
These actions are part of Kiir’s broader strategy to ensure control over the electoral process and its outcome. Consequently, many argue that political space in South Sudan is severely restricted, and the results of the December 2024 election are unlikely to be free and fair. There is no doubt that the politics in South Sudan are unstable. Issues such as delayed integration of armed groups into national forces, slow progress on constitutional reforms, and unresolved intercommunal violence highlight the fragility of the peace process. This context raises concerns about the legitimacy of the upcoming elections and their potential to intensify existing divisions between the people of South Sudan.
Achieving sustainable peace and democratic governance in post-conflict South Sudan is beset with challenges. Conducting elections prematurely, without ensuring full implementation of the revitalized peace agreement, risks undermining the progress made toward reconciliation and stability. Instead of marking the culmination of peace efforts, premature elections can prolong conflict dynamics, erode trust in democratic processes, and deepen societal divisions. An effective peacebuilding process requires patience, commitment, and a comprehensive approach to reforming institutions, fostering inclusive political dialogue, and addressing underlying grievances before advancing to electoral processes. Only through comprehensive execution of the accord can elections truly serve as a mechanism for lasting peace rather than a catalyst for renewed conflict. Therefore, local stakeholders, policymakers, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), and the international community must prioritize thorough implementation of the peace agreement before advancing toward electoral processes in a post-conflict society like South Sudan. Sustainable peace and democratic governance require full execution of the agreement. The people of South Sudan must embrace lasting peace by rejecting Kiir’s anti-peace strategies and self-serving elections.
Duop Chak Wuol is an analyst, critical writer, and editor-in-chief of the South Sudan News Agency. He is a graduate of the University of Colorado, and he can be reached at duop282@gmail.com.
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