Autocratic regimes often collapse from within due to internal revolt or are overthrown by a united opposition or popular uprising. Internal rebellion remains unlikely in South Sudan because family ties and a small, insular leadership circle dominate the government. Though occasional internal wrangling and hustling occur, they are often motivated by an ill-informed pursuit of wealth or narrow community interests rather than a broader political vision. Coupled with limited political literacy within leadership and the absence of strong institutions such as the military, these conditions help keep the current regime in control. A popular uprising is possible but would require more than state failure, intercommunal conflict, and sporadic violence. South Sudanese have never experienced a functional state, so its absence does not immediately drive mass protests. The only viable alternative to military action is a strong opposition capable of building national consciousness and mobilizing the people, but this remains largely absent.
In autocratic regimes, real political change often hinges on a credible, unified opposition, especially when an internal revolt is improbable and a popular uprising demands extraordinary conditions. In South Sudan, however, opposition groups have largely failed to play this role. Instead of presenting a clear national vision and mobilizing citizens, they remain fragmented, many driven by personal ambitions and easily co-opted by the ruling elite. Their inability to build cohesion and articulate a national agenda weakens their credibility and ensures the regime remains unchallenged.
President Kiir, his family members, and close associates rely on tactics involving force, money, or political positions to coerce, divide, buy, or destroy their rivals, thereby retaining their grip on power. Yet, many opposition parties in South Sudan seem to be created as clients of the regime, designed to exploit and benefit from its tactics rather than build the resilience needed to counter them. Many South Sudan opposition groups split over personal ambitions, struggle to form a united front, and lack a credible and viable plan to address the root causes of conflict.
Many South Sudan opposition groups emerge as fleeting entities, often surfacing around peace negotiations only to crumble under the slightest pressure. Their existence is tied more to political bargaining than to long-term nation-building. Rather than offering a structured and strategic alternative, they fixate on personalities and local grievances, mirroring the very flaws of the government they oppose.
Lingering rivalries from the liberation era continue to shape their internal dynamics, fuelling power struggles and prioritizing individual gain over the public good. Their reliance on militarized tactics further weakens public and international trust, deepening instability. Many of these groups exist only on paper, lacking genuine grassroots support or meaningful engagement with the communities they claim to represent. Instead of building inclusive dialogue, they remain disconnected from the everyday concerns of ordinary citizens, and their engagement with regional and international allies is often driven by personal ambition rather than a coherent national vision.
Their track record reflects a pattern of cutting deals that quickly collapse, leading to further fragmentation and eroding their credibility. While claiming to offer an alternative to the regime, they mimic many of its worst practices—operating through patronage, opportunism, and shifting alliances rather than principled leadership. Despite their rhetoric, they have yet to demonstrate the capacity to build institutions that support peaceful governance. More critically, they have failed to present a convincing formula for sustainable peace, national cohesion, and creating a functional, capable, and developmental state.
Opposition groups in South Sudan can still gather their strengths into a single, resolute front. They can look beyond the echoes of old grievances and the narrow ambitions of individual leaders, instead summoning a grand, uplifting vision of what their country could become. Rather than reciting tired narratives of struggle and blame, they can choose to paint a bold future: a land of stability, dignity, and shared prosperity. By weaving together the hopes of all communities—young and old, urban and rural, marginalized and empowered—they transcend factional squabbles and kindle a sense of national purpose.
Forging such an opposition demands a nationalistic, patriotic, bold, and visionary leadership that looks beyond past hurts and local loyalties. Such leaders must connect with the grassroots, build bridges across ethnic lines, and offer a powerful, unifying vision around Muskilat al Junub. By refusing to indulge in narrow interests or bend to outside meddling, they can shatter the self-serving agendas of regional neighbours and capture international attention. They can guide South Sudan toward a more united, stable, and hopeful tomorrow with that support.
The authoritarian regime in Juba will continue to flourish as long as divisions linger among those who claim to seek change. Will the opposition groups persist in bickering while the people endure hardship, or will they rise above old grudges to unite around a common cause for the nation? Can they shed personal ambitions to forge a true alternative, or will they let the opportunity slip away? As an African proverb says, “When spider webs unite, they can tie up a lion.”
History offers a clear lesson: when opposition groups overcome divisions and build strong political movements, they become credible forces for change. Across the world, armed struggles have transitioned into effective political parties, turning conflict into democratic competition. However, this transformation cannot happen without significant investment from the international community in political party development and democratic institution-building.
From Mozambique to El Salvador, the importance of political parties in transitional societies has been convincingly demonstrated. Former combatant groups, such as RENAMO in Mozambique and FMLN in El Salvador, transformed into political parties, signalling a commitment to peaceful political engagement and helping to heal divisions left by war. Similarly, from Sierra Leone to Nicaragua, the international community’s investment in political party development has fostered lasting democratic stability. In Sierra Leone, East Timor, Nepal, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Guatemala, international actors played a pivotal role in strengthening political movements, supporting faction transitions into political parties, and sponsoring civic education. These efforts have helped embed a culture of peaceful competition, ensuring that elections, rather than violence, become the primary means of contesting power.
South Sudan has a long history of political parties, with political parties like the Black Block and Liberty Party emerging as early as the 19th century. However, decades of systematic de-partization under Sudanese rule, followed by the prioritization of military resistance over political party development, have left the country without a strong political foundation for democratic transition. While many African liberation movements received structured international support in developing political wings, South Sudan’s political movements, particularly the SPLM, received only ad hoc and short-lived assistance. The result has been a turbulent transition marked by weak political institutions, factionalism, and a lack of cohesive, issue-based political competition. Unlike military groups, political parties provide a structured framework for channelling grievances into policy debates and national consensus-building—an essential element South Sudan sorely lacks.
Supporting political parties and civic movements such as the People’s Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA) is critical for South Sudan’s transition. While it is often complex to support the political wings of armed resistance movements as they evolve into legitimate parties, the presence of civic movements offers alternative avenues for fostering democratic competition. In Sudan and other countries, similar movements have received significant international backing, helping to shape viable political alternatives and push for democratic reforms. However, in South Sudan, external support has primarily been directed at service delivery, advocacy CSOs, and NGOs, with little investment in fostering a pluralistic political landscape. Without such support, the country risks perpetuating a cycle where military elites dominate governance while citizens remain politically disempowered. A deliberate investment in political party development—alongside strengthening civil movements—can provide the missing foundation for a peaceful and democratic transition.
The writer, Dr. Remember Miamingi, is a South Sudanese expert in governance and human rights, as well as a political commentator. He can be contacted via email at remember.miamingi@gmail.com
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.