The author of this article, a writer and political observer who has requested anonymity, argues that South Sudan's parliament should not extend the government's constitutional tenure until after a peace agreement is concluded in Addis Ababa.

Avoiding further chaos by postponing the date of polls in South Sudan was a necessary decision. But in welcoming electoral postponement, another problem has been underestimated: the already difficult prospect of an imminent, peaceful political settlement is weakened by the government’s unilateral decisions to amend the constitution and extend the term of the incumbent administration by two years, and not as a mutually-agreed decision of the peace process in Addis Ababa.

Clearly, neither politically, nor technically, would elections have been sensible or feasible in 2015. Had elections proceeded, the open wounds across a country already afflicted by civil war would have been dramatically deepened. The 2010 elections caused widespread turmoil and disruption; elections held now would have been qualitatively worse and destabilized the country further.

But the solution proposed by the government, to begin the process of amending the constitution before the agreed 5 March deadline to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement, only exacerbates South Sudan’s political problems.

Given the impossibility of holding elections, constitutional amendments will indeed be necessary before July 2015 to avert a constitutional crisis. But for the government to unilaterally announce its intent to amend the constitution now, as a pre-emptive move on the eve of the resumption of peace talks, and not as an agreed outcome of the peace process, is wrong.

The implications of this decision are enormous.

If the constitutional term of office of the Government is changed before a peace agreement is reached, then the necessity of a transitional government soon assuming power – the 1 February Agreement commits the parties to form such a government no later than 9 July 2015 – evaporates.

The existing, inadequate governance arrangements instead persist. Government negotiators have no incentive to reach a deal in the upcoming round of talks, which the IGAD mediation had previously announced as the final round of negotiations.

Proponents of the government's action might argue that if it did not act now, then a constitutional crisis would be inevitable. But it is precisely because urgent action is required that the parties agreed to the 5 March deadline for a comprehensive agreement. If the parties honour that commitment and complete a deal by 5 March, then there will still be plenty of time to appropriately amend the constitution. Despite its incompleteness, the logic of the 1 February Agreement was to ensure any unilateral action could be avoided.

Why would a sitting government that has just extended its term in office agree to share power more equitably with the armed and civilian opposition? Or to a comprehensive and ambitious reform agenda that forces difficult decisions and challenges entrenched interests? Why would an existing constitutionally legitimate government, which is not nearing the end of its mandate but instead two years away from it, feel any reason to compromise?

Luka Biong Deng, in his 16 February article, correctly observes that the government has acted constitutionally in its move to initiate the process of amending the constitution. Legally, nothing untoward has yet happened.

But Luka is incorrect to subscribe to the government narrative that ‘such a decision will not only give peace talks a chance...’ On the contrary, the implication is that any urgency in the negotiations will now dissipate, and, assured that it will continue in office, the government will have little reason to make meaningful concessions. The government has said as much. Minister Michael Makuei told AFP on 13 February that the extension ‘would give us a chance to negotiate without pressure.’

Further, Luka seems to forget that the peace talks in Addis Ababa have discussed at length the mandate of the transitional government, and that if the assembly acted now ‘to define the mandate of the caretaker government at national and state level,’ as he suggests, then, again, there would be little reason for the government to renegotiate in Addis Ababa the mandate and responsibilities of the transitional government.

The obvious conclusion to draw is that the implementation of a transitional government risks being deferred indefinitely, the 1 February Agreement is nullified, and there is little urgency to achieve a comprehensive settlement or meaningful programme of reform in the near future.

Luka cites four factors that lead the government to seek peace now: economic conditions, the report of the AU Commission of Inquiry (AU COI), the Arusha SPLM Reunification Agreement and the IGAD-mediated peace talks in Addis Ababa.

Of these four, only worsening economic conditions encourage the government to seek peace. The AU COI has been neutralised. Arusha has complicated rather than clarified the peace process. And the Addis Ababa talks are not in themselves a reason to work for peace; they are merely the forum in which peace can be negotiated.

Luka speculates that the AU Commission of Inquiry report ‘is likely to be released after the next and final round of peace talks in Ethiopia.’ This is far from guaranteed. Having buried the report at the January meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, the COI report has no champions, either within the AU secretariat or from member states. There is little prospect the report will be resurrected imminently, although in time political circumstances may change and the report may surface.

Arusha is significant because it enables a false, but compelling narrative: that one family of SPLM brothers can reunite and bring to South Sudan a golden age of SPLM leadership and prosperity. Arusha also allows SPLM-Juba to frustrate the IGAD process. Both the January 21 Arusha agreement and the February 16 Arusha roadmap are examples of this. The first agreement, while lauded for its achievement to reconcile the competing factions of the SPLM, strayed well beyond the limited set of issues relevant to the party’s reform. In so doing, Arusha plays the classic role of spoiler, by offering parties the opportunity to forum shop.

By the time of the February 16 Arusha roadmap, the process had diminished to a document that talks, for example, about bank accounts and ‘redress for consequential damage and losses’, of the SPLM former detainees, collectively perhaps the richest group of South Sudanese in the world. These are hardly the sorts of commitments that will lead to meaningful action for the South Sudanese population and a broad-based peace agreement. Arusha has now narrowed, rather than widened, the possibilities of change, and the possibilities for the broader (in substance) Addis peace process.

The result, therefore, is that only worsening economic conditions, and a rational analysis that outright military victory by the government is unlikely if not impossible, offer leverage over the government to conclude peace. But the economic situation has been deteriorating for some time, and has not yet motivated a discernible change in government behaviour.

Amongst those with most influence in government, there is little concern that Riek Machar will be able to present an existential military threat at this point in the conflict.

Hence the end of the constitutional term of government, after more than a year of negotiations, presented a useful opportunity to overcome the intransigence that has plagued the process for so many months.

Of course, it would be inaccurate to suggest that intransigence has been limited to the side of the government; but, given his weaker position militarily and politically, it should have been easier to convince Riek to agree to a deal, as long as his minimum demands were met.

Luka concludes, far too optimistically, that ‘the government will certainly gain more in concluding peace agreement than any other stakeholders.’ Were the government negotiating in good faith, and genuinely interested in the plight of its people, then that indeed could be the case. But agreement requires compromise and concession. And if you define success by the amount of power you hold and the time in office you have, then to give even a fraction of that away is to lose. In offering itself an extension, the government has shown it would be comfortable not to conclude a peace agreement, at least not in the immediate future.

Photo: MPs at the tabling of the constitutional amendment, 19 February 2015 (Radio Tamazuj)

The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made are the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.