It is evident that Yasser Al-Atta’s recent statements were not merely an attempt to justify the Wad Medani massacre or veiled threats to the Juba government, but also a reflection of the broader dynamics of the ongoing conflict and the balance of power in Sudan and beyond.
Al-Atta, who served as the Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), has been a member of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council since August 21, 2019. His statements can be analyzed from several angles:
First: A narrative to avoid international accountability
By portraying the victims of the massacre as “mercenaries” fighting alongside the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), with the knowledge of the Juba government, Al-Atta demonstrated a calculated strategy to divert attention from the army’s violations to accusations of South Sudan’s involvement in the conflict. This narrative aimed to preempt any international investigation that could condemn the Sudanese army, sending a message to the international community that what happened was not a war crime or ethnic cleansing, but a “legitimate self-defense”.
Second: Sending regional political messages
His threats to the Juba government and the accusations of its collaboration with RSF serve, as a tactic aimed at weakening the latter’s regional standing by portraying it as a state that supports chaos. This could limit Juba’s ability to demand accountability for the Sudanese army, or seek regional backing in the conflict.
Third: A strategy to unify Sudanese ranks
The statements were also directed at the internal Sudanese audience. By framing the events as an “external conspiracy,” Al-Atta sought to unite the military and the civilians under the pretext of “defending the homeland”. This rhetoric capitalizes on nationalistic and patriotic sentiments to divert attention from the internal divisions, especially amid the declining public support for the armed forces in certain areas.
Fourth: An attempt to control the media narrative
Al-Atta indirectly called on the Juba government to stop its media campaign and withdraw its description of the incident as a terrorist act. This reflects the Sudanese army’s concern about the impact of the South Sudan media narrative on regional and international public opinion. Controlling the media narrative has become a central tool in modern conflicts, especially with the growing reliance on the media to shape international perceptions.
Fifth: A warning against the internationalization of the crisis
The threat to label South Sudan as a “hostile state” reflects an attempt to pressure Juba to avoid taking any steps on the international forums. If the Wad Medani massacre is internationalized, it could lead to sanctions against SAF as a whole, or trigger international investigations and criminal prosecutions—something the military leadership is eager to avoid at all costs.
Sixth: A return to Cold War mentality
These statements are reminiscent of post-secession thinking, where Sudan continues to perceive South Sudan as a strategic and security threat. The use of rhetoric about “collaborating with the RSF” and “exporting fighters and weapons” reflects a continued pattern of seeing South Sudan as a perpetual adversary, regardless of bilateral agreements or political changes.
Overall, Al-Atta’s statements are not merely a reaction to the Wad Medani massacre. They are part of a broader strategy to reshape relations with South Sudan and attempt to dominate the internal and external narrative regarding South Sudan.
Mahmoud Akot is a pro-democracy activist and former spokesperson of the National Democratic Movement (NDM) South Sudan. He can be reached via mahmoudakot@gmail.com
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.