To understand the causes and events that led to the Uprising, a brief look at the situation in the Sudan, particularly Southern Sudan, both politically and administratively is necessary.
Those were as follows: Firstly, Sir Alexander Knox Helm, the British Governor General was still the supreme power in the country. Secondly, the British army was still in the Sudan, in Khartoum and Port Sudan. Thirdly, Ismail El Azhari was the Prime Minister (PM) in charge of the Self-government (Executive) but still under the Condominium Governor General. Fourthly, the National Unionist Party of PM El Azhari was the majority in the Parliament of 97 members. For Southern representation in the Parliament, there were 23 seats. Out of those 23, 11 were members of the Liberal Party while the other 12 were either Independents or members of Northern political parties, especially PM El Azhari’s National Unionist Party.
Fifthly, the Sudanization of senior posts in the administration, police, military, and prisons had been completed. But Southerners were very disappointed with the outcome because, out of about 900 such posts, only four went to the South.
Sixthly, there was the battalion size Equatoria Corps, sometimes called Southern Corps, of the Sudan Defence Force, with its headquarters at Torit It was solely composed entirely of Southerners with Northern officers, who had just replaced the British officers. The Equatoria Corps was composed of five companies deployed as follows: Headquarters and No. 2 Company in Torit; No. 3 Company in Wau; No. 4 Company in Kapoeta; and No. 5 Company in Malakal. There were platoon-size units scattered in many parts of the South, e.g. Juba and Yambio. There however were a handful of Non-Commissioned Southern Officers from the ranks, such as Reynaldo Loleya, Ali Gbatala, Mondiri Onjekye, Taffeng Lodongi, Albino Tombe, Nyang Diu, and a few others.
Seventhly, also by now, the administrators serving in the South, i.e. Governors, DCs, and Mamurs, were all Northerners, except for a handful of Southerners who were mostly Mamurs, junior administrators. The same situation goes for the police and prison forces.
Eighthly, politically in 1953, the Southerners were angry and disappointed with the connivance of the Egyptians and Northerners which excluded them from the Cairo Talks that prescribed the steps towards self-determination, Sudanization of posts, and thereafter independence. MP Benjamin Lwoki, Chairman of the Liberal Party, and Paul Logali, Chairman of the Juba Political Committee, respectively vehemently expressed that sentiment. Thus, Southerners were much against getting independence unprepared with Northerners, fearing that the Northerners would dominate and mistreat them and bring back the days of slavery. There therefore was much resentment against Northerners, especially in Equatoria, and great support for the idea of federation for the South.
Ninthly, English was the official language in Southern Sudan used in the Government offices and schools. Southerners, especially the government officials, were alarmed when in December 1948, the Minister of Education Ali Abdel Rahman announced that Arabic would be the only official language in the government offices and therefore had to be taught in schools.
Significant events leading to the Uprising
The Post Sudan Administrative Conference 1947 was first voiced by Major Wyld, the DC of Yambio, as the only solution to protect Southerners from undue Northern domination in an independent Sudan, the idea and demand for federation had grown among the Southern intelligentsia. There also was a growing feeling that something dramatic should be done to delay or prevent Sudan from getting independence. Hence, clandestine groups, contacts, and meetings began between some members of the Southern Sudan Welfare Association (SSWA), the Liberal Party, and some elements of the Equatoria Corps in Torit, as to how to realize it.
In early 1955, a plot must have been hatched between the politicians in Juba and NCO Renaldo Oleya and Private Saturnino Oboyo for the soldiers to take Juba and Torit. Also, at around this time, the Liberal Party called for an all-inclusive Southern Conference to be held in Juba in July to discuss the demand for federation for the South.
PM El Azhari and the Northerners were very much alarmed to learn that their Southern NUP members were going to attend it. That made them realize that indeed, there was a real demand for federation among all Southerners, irrespective of party affiliation. They feared that if not arrested, it could delay the independence of the Sudan and therefore they made up their minds to frustrate it.
In July 1955, in their effort to show that the demand for federation was not supported by the people and their chiefs, the DC and ADC of Yambio called the Zande chiefs and falsely obtained their signatures in a document, dissociating themselves from the demand for federation, as was being articulated by the Liberal Party as well as by the educated Southerners. That document was telegraphically sent to Khartoum and the government made a wide publicity about it. The content of the telegraph annoyed the Liberal Party, especially its member for Yambio, MP Eliya Kuze
In the same month, a telegram written in cipher arrived at the Juba post office. It was received by a Southern clerk who was on duty at that time. This man stole the key to the cipher from his Northern boss’ drawer and thereby obtained the original Arabic version. The content was translated into English by Fraser Ako. The telegram reportedly contained a directive from PM El Azhari to all Northern administrators in the South not to tolerate the childish complaint of Southerners about federation and also admonishing them to suppress/mistreat them The content of that telegram was widely circulated throughout the South by Daniel Jumi and Marko Rume, members of the Juba Secret Committee in Juba. For this, they were arrested. A crowd gathered to protest their arrest and it was dispersed by the police using tear gas.
On 6 and 7 July 1955, the Liberal Party Conference was duly held in Juba. Deliberations and resolutions of that Conference remain unknown. On 7 July, while the Liberal Party Conference was going on in Juba; MP Eliya Kuze called a meeting of 300-500 Zandes in Yambio. In the meeting, he condemned the chiefs for signing the letter that dissociated themselves from the federation, which he said was a popular demand of Southerners. He told the crowd that given that, all the chiefs who signed the letter should be removed. The chiefs reacted angrily at the suggestion of their removal, and encouraged by the DC, ordered the arrest of Eliya.
On 25 July, the chiefs tried Eliya and sentenced him to two years imprisonment. When the verdict was announced, a crowd of 700 staged a demonstration outside the court. The police had to disperse it using tear gas. (Comment: certainly, the DC knew that Eliya as an MP could not be arrested and tried by such a very low court just like that and without his parliamentary 3 immunity being removed. But he allowed it to go on. However, later the Chief Justice in Khartoum ordered a re-trial and he was released).
On 26 July 1955, the very next day, the workers at the Spinning and Weaving Factory at Nzara staged a demonstration over two main issues: the dismissal of 300 of their colleagues; and the demand for federation. They shouted anti-North slogans at their senior members of the management who were Northerners. The few policemen at Nzara could not handle the situation so the management called for help from the army unit at Yambio. The army arrived and when the crowd refused to disperse, the Northern officer in charge, Muatassim Abdel Rahman, ordered the army to open fire and 14 persons were shot dead. Those were the first Southern lives to be lost in the struggle with the North. The news of the killing of the workers traveled far and wide, especially in Equatoria, and heightened tension and resentment among Northerners. With this and by the end of July, the stage was set for a full-scale rebellion in Equatoria.
Discovery of the Plot
On 06 August in Torit, Private Saturlino Oboyo shot at a man with an arrow, who he mistook to be one of the Northern officers. He was arrested and his house was searched. In the search several documents were found, indicating the plan to kill all Northern officers and take over Torit and possibly Juba. The document indicated that Private Saturlino, who styled himself as “President of the Southern Corps”, was in contact with some Liberal Party members in Juba. Other names found in the documents were of Non-Commissioned Officers Reynaldo Loleya, Taffeng Lodongi, and others. Earlier when he was in Juba with Reynaldo, Saturlino had wanted to start the action there and then but Reynaldo dithered. The aim of the uprising was a last-ditch effort to either delay the impending independence of Sudan, which Southerners in general detested or declare outright independence of Southern Sudan.
The information (plot) found in Saturlino’s house was relayed to Khartoum and in reaction; PM El Azharis’s government took the following actions:
1. To immediately decapitate the troops in Torit: So on 08 August, Taffeng, who was reputed to be a soldier’s soldier, a good marksman, and a good leader was requested to go to Juba and to proceed to Khartoum, ostensibly for official duties. However, upon arriving at Juba, he was promptly arrested. Later, Reynaldo was also requested to go to Juba with some soldiers, and upon arrival at Juba, he was also put under some semi arrest.
2. To send Northern troops to Juba: Hence, Northern troops were ferried by the British Royal Air Force planes to Juba (first time since 1926) to protect Juba, since his government could not anymore trust the Southern soldiers to obey orders.
3. To arrest collaborators: So, Daniel Jumi and Marko Rume of the SSWA and also of the Secret Committee in Juba were arrested
4. To remove the No. 2 Company in Torit: A stratagem was worked out to the effect that the No. 2 Company should go to Khartoum to participate in the celebrations, marking the departure of the British soldiers in the Sudan. But that they were to go without their arms. The soldiers found that very strange since, they argued, that they had always traveled to Juba and Khartoum with their arms. The explanation given to them was that they would be issued their arms in Khartoum upon arrival did not satisfy them. Given the tense political situation, they felt that that was a ploy to get them away from the South and so they became very suspicious and openly expressed their unwillingness to go to Khartoum. As we shall see in the next paragraph, this stratagem, however, failed and it turned out to be the spark that started the Southern uprising and which inspired the subsequent Southern resistance to Northern domination.
The Trigger
Thursday 18 August 1955 was the date for the departure of No. 2 Company for Juba and Khartoum. With their arms in the armory, they were paraded in the morning with lorries at the ready for them to mount and move to Juba. But when they were ordered to climb the lorries, they refused and repeated their concern about being sent to Khartoum without their arms. In the ensuing altercation, the officer commanding the parade, Captain Salah Abdel Magid, shot dead his driver, one of the soldiers, because he refused the order to enter the car. Immediately the parade broke up. The soldiers ran amok broke into the armory and began to kill their Northern officers as well as Northern civilians in Torit. Officer Salah, who shot the soldier, got into his car and fled to Juba.
Mutiny becomes an Uprising
Equatoria
The news of the incident in Torit reached Juba between 9:00 -10:00 am and an attempt was also made to disarm the soldiers in Juba under NCO Ali Gbatala. They were paraded in front of the Northern troops and were ordered to put down their weapons. But they also refused and the Northern troops fired on them. NCO Ali Gbatala and his men ran and escaped with their arms and among them was NCO Ali Gbatala. Those soldiers took lorries and drove out of Juba, telling the people along the roads of Lainya-Yei and Lainya-Mundri-Maridi-Yambio that Northerners had shot and killed many people in Juba (the writer was then a pupil at Loka and saw those soldiers). In their anger, the people joined the rebellion and began to kill any Northerner they saw. Hence, Northerners were killed in Kapoeta, Katire, Torit, Loka West, Yei, Mundri Tali Amadi, Terekeka Maridi, Ibba, Yambio, and Nzara. NCO Reynaldo Loleya also escaped back to Torit. So, for a whole month or so, the government in Juba and Khartoum lost control of Equatoria.
Bahr el Ghazal
In Bahr el Ghazal, though, no shooting occurred, the Governor, Dawood Abdel Latif fled to Khartoum with many of the Northern merchants. Wau town was thus left in the hands of ADC Lewis Bey and other junior Southern administrators. With the support of NCO Nyang Diu, they succeeded in calming the No. 3 Company in Wau and the civilians from taking any action. The Northern DCs in Aweil, Tonj, and Rumbek went into hiding and left their districts in the hands of their Southern Assistants. In Yirol (Lakes), ADC Clement Mboro arranged and sent the Northern merchants in town to Shambe to proceed to Khartoum for their safety. So, in Bahr el Ghazal, though some of the Northern DCs were there the whole Province was virtually in the hands of the Southerners.
Upper Nile
In Upper Nile, though the news of the events in Equatoria caused some fears, neither the Equatoria Corps No. 4 Company nor the civilians took any action in support of what was taking place in Equatoria. Hence, the Province remained under Sudan Government control.
Government Reaction
Given these, the Government brought more soldiers from the North to ‘restore law and order’. In the meantime, PM El Azhari’s Government requested the Governor General, Sir Alexander Knox Helm to intervene, as he was still the supreme head in the Sudan. Subsequently, the Governor General got in touch with Reynaldo in Torit and put very strong pressure on him to surrender, giving him a false assurance. Reynaldo conveyed the Governor General’s message to Ali Gbatala. On 24 August, Ali strongly advised Reynaldo not to surrender. But despite the advice, on 28 August Reynaldo surrendered. He then was tasked by the Governor General to collect the soldiers and their arms. Using the Governor General’s false assurance, he convinced the ordinary soldiers and they began to surrender in droves. (Comment: as a soldier, Reynaldo should have known that a court martial usually waits for any soldier who mutinies. But Reynaldo naively trusted the Governor General, just because he was British, just as many Southerners were wont to trust the British during those days. After having been used, he paid for this with his life.
Repercussions and Reprisals
After the situation calmed down, more Northern troops were brought and deployed in all towns in Southern Sudan. The government set up a Commission of Inquiry to look into what it called the ‘Southern Sudan Disturbances’. It also set up a Court Martial to try the soldiers and a ‘Special Court’ to try the police, prison staff, and the civilians. Very briefly, below is what the courts did:
TheCourt Martials
Right away after the surrender, NCO Albino Tombe was arrested in Torit, tortured, and killed before the court-martial. After completing the task of collecting the soldiers and their arms, NCO Reynaldo was arrested court-martialed, and executed, together with reportedly 200 others. NCOs Taffeng Lodongi, Mändiri Onjekye, and others were tried and jailed in Port Sudan. While NCO Ali Gbatala escaped to the bush in Congo; and ex-policeman Lutada Hillir escaped to the Imatong Mountains and both continued to fight the government.
TheSpecial Courts
Police and Prisons Personnel
For the police and prison warders in Equatoria, all were disbanded, except for those in Juba. All those who were accused of complicity were tried and some were executed. For example, in Yambio police officers Placido Loboke and Marcelo Andal as well as prison officer Olympio Lako were tried and executed. For the rank and file, police and warders, after disarmament, screened and most were dismissed with dishonor. The disarmament process, however, did not proceed smoothly. For example, at Yei and Amadi, some of the police were shot dead on the pretext that they were running away. Those shot dead at Amadi were Aleli and Eluzai Lomo. At Maridi, policemen Ädugä, Elikia Janga, Gorobe, his son Alexander, and others were executed over the killing of the ADC. It is also worth noting here that, when Ädugä was condemned and was taken to the firing squad, as a show of defiance, he refused to be blind-folded, telling his executioners that, when he shot the ADC, the ADC was not blind-folded. His wish was granted and was shot while looking at the barrels of the guns. Thus, among the Morus and elsewhere, Ädugä was remembered for his bravery
Civilians
For the civilians, the bulk of suspicion fell on the government officials, even those who either did not do anything or even those who saved the Northerners during those very bad days. Many of them were arrested, tortured, executed, jailed, or dismissed from service A cursory summary of the treatment given to the government officials which is not exhaustive is as follows
In Equatoria, all Districts were affected. In Torit Police Officer Nicola Obwoya succeeded in saving the DC and the garrison Commanding Officer Suleiman Salim, by covertly smuggling them to Uganda. He was spared but the Executive Officer Solomon Lolori was promptly arrested when he escaped and arrived in Juba. He was later dismissed with dishonor. In Yei District, Executive Officer Michael Wata was arrested tried, and shot. Wlie in Lainya Chief Eliya Kundu was tried for the deaths of Northerners at Lainya and Loka West. He was tried and jailed. In Terekeka, Medical Assistant Natania Wajo was tried and executed for the death of a Northern merchant in the village. In Mundri, the Headmaster of the Elementary School Samuel Kajivora, Intermediate School teacher Joseph Oduho, Bookseller William Ano, and other teachers were arrested for the killing of Northern teacher Bilal by the Torit soldiers. While the others were released Samuel Kajivora, William Ano, and Joseph Oduho were sentenced to death. After the sentencing, Samuel and William were executed, while Joseph Oduho’s death sentence was commuted to a jail sentence. In Maridi, the Headmaster of the Elementary School Bullen Ngangi, and the Head Clerk Lewis Gore were arrested for the death of the ADC. Bullen was executed but Lewis Gore was jailed
In Bahr el Ghazal, After the Governor, Dawood Abdel Latif fled the town with some Northern officials and merchants. ADC Lewis Bey and NCO Nyang Diu succeeded in calming the town; and because of that, no incident took place in Wau. Yet after the Governor returned and the Northern soldiers had arrived, Lewis was arrested, detained, and later released even after his good works. In Aweil officials Lawrence Mama and Utur Fahal were arrested and were brought to Wau. They were investigated and released. In Yirol, ADC Clement Mboro protected the merchants by sending them to Shambe to go to Khartoum for their safety. Despite this good work, he was arrested tried, and was sentenced to a fifteen-month jail sentence. But later on, he appealed and was acquitted by the Chief Justice
In Upper Nile, no civilians or government officials were arrested since not much happened in the Province during the Uprising.
This, I hope has given you a brief but full picture of that historical Uprising and its consequences.
The writer is a Graduate (BSc) of the Faculty of Agriculture University of Khartoum. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) University of California Riverside. Lecturer Faculty of Agriculture University of Khartoum; Professor and Dean of the College of the College of Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, University of Juba.
He served in several United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Africa as the Chief of Humanitarian, Demobilization, Political, and Civil Affairs Sections and retired in 2006. He is retired and currently engages in reading and writing articles on the political history of South Sudan and can be reached via petertingwapeter@gmail.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.