The United Nations Mission in South Sudan has released a report on the findings of an investigation into the attack on its base in Bor in April in which at least 53 people died. The following is an excerpt from the report, which is available in full for download below.
In the morning hours of 17 April 2014, a group of youth gathered and marched through Bor, ostensibly to protest against the presence of IDPs staying in the UNMISS Bor PoC site and demand their evacuation. The group first marched to Government offices, but the Governor was not present to receive them. The youth then proceeded toward the UNMISS compound, approximately five kilometres outside of town, directly down a single road. Witnesses reported that while the crowd was moving through town, gunshots could be heard. According to Government officials, the SSNPS attempted to stop the youth from advancing, but were unsuccessful.
According to one witness, dozens of youth on motorbikes were at the front of the crowd, followed by a large truck filled with nearly 100 people, followed by more individuals on foot. The people in the group were in civilian clothing, and were almost all men between the age of 20 and 40 years old. The witness saw a few signs in the crowd, but could only make out the words on one: “We don’t want White Army in Bor”, written in English. The witness further noted that the crowd was angry and armed, with AK-47s, machetes, and long wooden sticks, leading the witness to conclude that it was a violent mob.
After the crowd passed the Bor airport, about 500 metres from the UNMISS compound, witnesses reported seeing between 100 and 300 individuals in civilian clothing, mostly men, walking rapidly. No vehicles were observed at this point. Many individuals in the mob were carrying long sticks and poles, which they raised in a threatening manner. Two witnesses saw a few individuals carrying guns, but reported that there were very few.
UNMISS had been alerted by individuals in Bor town about the impending arrival of a demonstration, first receiving the information around 09.30. Expecting demonstrators to approach the UNMISS main gate, UNMISS security stopped traffic in and out of the gate and physically closed the vehicular gate.
After passing the airport, the crowd reached a junction in the road. The UNMISS compound is located at the southeast corner of the junction. The main gate of the UNMISS compound is located on the west perimeter of the compound while, at that time, the PoC site was located at the back, with its gate on the eastern perimeter, directly opposite from the main gate. As such, had the crowd turned right at the junction, it would have arrived at the main gate to the compound.
Instead, the crowd proceeded directly ahead, towards the PoC site. Several witnesses reported that around 20 SSNPS, SPLA, and Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) personnel, along with one or two vehicles, were at the junction at the time. According to two witnesses, the security forces directed the crowd to continue straight through the junction. Other witnesses reported that the security forces did nothing to stop the advance.
As the crowd proceeded, a lone motorbike approached the UNMISS main gate. Two young men wearing civilian clothing drove up to the gate at high speed and stopped abruptly. Seeming agitated, they asked the security officer present, “Are you UN?” When he replied affirmatively, one of the young men handed him a letter.
The security officer asked the men, “Who are you?” to which they replied, “Fuck you! You will see!” The men immediately drove off. Within three minutes, shots were fired by the attackers at the PoC site.
The crowd proceeded along the northern perimeter of the UNMISS compound, reaching the eastern corner. While some individuals stayed along the northern perimeter, the majority rounded the corner, positioning along the eastern perimeter where the PoC gate is located. One UNMISS military source with an elevated view, as well as one IDP looking over the berm wall, reported that 50 to 60 individuals arrived from the east and joined the crowd. UNMISS military officers saw 15 to 20 uniformed SPLA and SSNPS personnel standing in the vicinity, observing.
Upon their arrival, while jeering and yelling, individuals in the crowd began throwing projectiles such as rocks, bottles, and sticks over the berm walls into the PoC site. Members of the crowd then began pounding on the PoC gate. Two IDPs reported hearing a whistle, as if to signal the attack should begin.
Shooting started almost immediately, at approximately 10.55. Several witnesses reported seeing armed men standing outside the PoC site on elevated surfaces, firing downwards directly into the PoC site. Nearly simultaneously, some of the attackers breached the perimeter of the PoC site. At first, 20 to 30 men climbed over the berm wall at vulnerable gaps. These men met UNMISS military personnel, whom they overpowered, and then proceeded to open the PoC gate from the inside, allowing scores of attackers to enter.
Shooting continued, now both from inside and outside the perimeter walls. Several individuals maintained positions outside the PoC site, along both the northern and eastern perimeters, shooting into the site from different directions. UNMISS military and IDPs told Human Rights Officers that in addition to AK-47s, which were predominantly used, some attackers used machine guns. At least four IDPs reported seeing a single shooter up a tree along the northern perimeter who was allegedly acting as a sniper, targeting individuals inside. Many injured victims and those who saw people getting shot did not see a shooter, suggesting the shots came from a distance.
Once the shooting began, IDPs fled en masse southwest, toward the interior of the UNMISS compound, in an effort to escape the attack. This required most to scale dirt berm walls and climb over barbed wire separating the PoC site from the rest of the UNMISS compound.
Countless IDPs were injured in the process, including many who were trampled in the stampede to escape. As IDPs fled the violence, they took refuge in UNMISS offices and accommodation, though most headed directly for the UNMISS Korean and Nepalese contingent camps.
UNMISS military officers reported that shots were fired toward the PoC site from the southern perimeter while IDPs were fleeing in that direction. One witness reported that five or six men in civilian clothing armed with AK-47s were moving west, along the outside of the southern perimeter of the compound – indicating that attackers had positioned along three sides of the UNMISS compound.
In addition to the broad spray of fire from outside the PoC site, attackers targeted victims at close range. Attackers went from tent to tent, pulling IDPs out. In some cases, the attackers did not carry firearms but sticks, machetes, or other weapons. Upon entering the tents, they would harass, threaten, and beat the occupants. In many cases they would also demand money and mobile phones. Those who resisted or refused were shot by other men waiting outside with guns.
Many IDPs recognised individual attackers, either as someone they knew by name or only as someone familiar. Several reported the involvement of one specific individual, a Dinka youth, who had previously stayed in the PoC site.
Some IDPs were abducted during the attack. Several witnesses, including survivors of abductions and attempted abductions, reported that they saw armed attackers forcing women and girls to leave the PoC site. According to relatives of one woman taken out of the PoC site, the abductors had a long argument over who should have the woman as his “wife.” After the attackers failed to agree, the woman was forcefully taken to Bor. In another case, a young girl, along with several female relatives, were threatened and forced to the PoC gate by several attackers. When the attackers began to beat her relatives, the young girl managed to escape, running back into the PoC site. Her relatives were forcefully taken away.
Once inside, attackers began to ransack and loot the PoC site, including the market, located near the PoC gate that had been breached. Looters took large items such as motorbikes, bicycles, and solar panels. They ransacked shops and residential tents, taking suitcases full of goods, as well as money, certificates, mobile phones, and other items. After the attack, Human Rights Officers observed household goods, including everyday items ranging from onions to diapers, strewn about inside and outside the PoC site.
Witnesses reported that throughout the attack, it was evident that the intent was to target and kill Nuer IDPs. According to witnesses, the attackers were targeting IDPs based on their Nuer facial markings, six lines cut across the forehead. If IDPs had no markings, the attackers asked them in the Dinka language which tribe they were from, and if the IDPs could not respond in Dinka, they were killed or beaten.
This intent was also evident from the threatening language many attackers used, as reported by witnesses and survivors: “These are bad people. Nuer are bad people.” “We are coming to kill Nuer here. Whether they run to Korea or India [areas of the Bor camp where peacekeepers stay], we will kill them.” Several Dinka IDPs, most of whom are in mixed marriages or are otherwise related to Nuer IDPs, told Human Rights Officers that the attackers questioned and harassed them for staying in the PoC site: “If you are Dinka, go out, why are you here with these people?” “Why are you here if you are Dinka? Have you joined with the Nuer?” “You are Nuer, you are just pretending to be Dinka.”
Information indicates that individual static UNMISS military personnel engaged the attackers from various sentry posts along the northern and eastern perimeters. A quick reaction force (QRF) was deployed 20 minutes into the firing, reaching the PoC site approximately 30 minutes after shooting began. One QRF had to move into the PoC site using the same route as thousands of IDPs fleeing in the opposite direction, likely causing delay. Another QRF, intending to move around the perimeter of the UNMISS compound to the north and east, flanking the attackers, was reportedly stopped by the SPLA on the road and told to return to the UNMISS compound.
Once inside the PoC site, the QRF opened fire on the attackers, with rifles, machine guns, and rounds from an armoured personnel carrier (APC). Information suggests firing was directed outward, as firing inside the PoC site would have endangered IDPs and UNMISS personnel. This use of force killed and injured several attackers; 10 to 15 minutes after the QRF’s arrival, the attack subsided.
Once the main thrust of the attack had ended, UNMISS senior military personnel met a UPDF commander as well as SPLA officers at the UNMISS main gate. The UPDF stated that they were cordoning off the UNMISS compound and securing the Bor airport for air operations and medical evacuations. The SPLA stated that they were beginning to collect bodies outside the UNMISS compound.
By this stage, almost all IDPs had relocated to the UNMISS South Korean contingent camp next to the PoC site. For at least two hours after the attack, as the humanitarian response was underway, single rounds of gunfire continued to be heard, though sporadically, predominantly from north of the UNMISS compound. Around 12.55, a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launched from the west, near the Bor airport, flew over the UNMISS compound and landed east of the PoC site without exploding. Simultaneously, but unrelated, a fire broke out in the PoC site, burning one tent.
Conclusion
At least 53 individuals died as a result of the attack on the Bor PoC site. There are reasonable grounds to believe that 47 of those killed were IDPs and three were perpetrators, while the identities of three other deceased remain unknown. The vast majority of those killed sustained gunshot wounds. There are reasonable grounds to believe that civilians were targeted based on their ethnicity.
Of the 47 IDP victims, 19 were adult males; 17 adult females; four male children (aged eight, seven, three, and two); and seven female children (aged 17, 15, 14, 11, 10, five years, and eight months). At least two of the victims were pregnant at the time they were killed. The three perpetrators were all adult males. The unknown deceased were two adult males and one adult/adolescent female.
Of the 53 confirmed deaths, 46 bodies were found inside the UNMISS compound, while three were found just outside the perimeter on the day of the attack. Four more succumbed to their injuries in subsequent days. Human Rights Officers have verified the identities of 47 of the deceased.
Figures provided by community leaders, including to the media and to the Human Rights Division, have differed on the number of individuals killed in the PoC site. Community members have indicated that 146 persons were killed within the PoC site, but provided a list of 55 persons. Human Rights Officers have determined that several listed individuals were not deceased, but were wounded or missing, with information suggesting some had been abducted.
Multiple IDPs were also injured, as well as two United Nations peacekeepers. On 17 April 2014, UNMISS military clinics in Bor reportedly treated 98 patients, with the majority suffering from gunshot wounds. Others were treated for blunt injuries and fractures, reportedly resulting from beatings with sticks, rifle butts, and other objects, as well as lacerations, reportedly resulting from machete slashes. According to survivors, not all victims sought medical treatment for their injuries, thus the number of injured is likely higher. Human Rights Officers have also verified that at least nine young males were medically evacuated by the Government to the Juba Teaching Hospital on the afternoon of 17 April 2014.
The Human Rights Division has determined that at least five women and six children (five girls and one boy) were abducted from the PoC site during the attack. Of these 11 individuals, eight have likely since been released, while the fate of at least three individuals remains unknown. Several other witnesses and sources told Human Rights Officers of attempted abductions they suffered or witnessed during the attack.
In addition, numerous children were orphaned following the attack. In one case, two children, ages three and four, lost both parents in the attack. Protection actors working in the PoC site identified multiple cases of unaccompanied children after the attack. Other families were separated when IDPs who suffered serious injuries were medically evacuated from Bor.
Survivors’ testimonies and Human Rights Officers’ own observations indicate that the attack has had deleterious effects on the IDPs’ psychological well-being. Even months later, many survivors expressed fear of future attacks, and some told Human Rights Officers that they believed their children were still traumatized by what they experienced on 17 April, easily frightened by loud noise or sudden changes. Teachers at schools in the PoC site have reported low attendance; mothers in the PoC site have explained to Human Rights Officers that they keep their children close so that they will not be separated in the event of another attack. As of the date of writing, IDPs still expressed fear of threats outside of the PoC site. This has led to significant additional restrictions on the movement of IDPs outside the site.
There are reasonable grounds to believe that between 100 and 300 people participated in the attack on 17 April 2014. Of these, some may only have been involved in the looting, or remained outside of the PoC periphery as part of the mob. Those who committed acts of violence were male adults; reports of women involved in the attack describe participation in looting property. The majority of attackers were wearing civilian clothing.
There are reasonable grounds to believe that many attackers were civilian Dinka youth. The Bor Community Youth Association has publicly claimed responsibility for organizing the demonstration in its signed, stamped letter to UNMISS, as well as in subsequent remarks by its representatives in the media.
The group also issued a press release two days after the attack, acknowledging that civilians gathered and marched through Bor toward the UNMISS compound. However, they denied responsibility for any civilian deaths and blamed the United Nations for provoking the violence and killing “peaceful demonstrators”.
While witness testimony is inconsistent regarding the direct involvement of uniformed Government personnel in the attack, credible and consistent testimony indicates that men in SSNPS uniforms participated in both the violence and the looting. Notably, a male individual, dressed in an SSNPS uniform, with Dinka facial markings, was found dead in the PoC area. It remains unclear, however, whether any members of the security forces were involved in their official capacities. The weapons used in the attack, small arms and machetes, proliferate in South Sudan. There is ample information suggesting that Government security forces were present before and during the attack and failed to stop the violence. Public officials, including the Governor, told the Human Rights Division that the Government had no advance knowledge of the incident.
There are reasonable grounds to believe that the attack was planned in advance. For instance, the fact that the attack began almost the instant that the crowd reached the PoC site, in conjunction with the timing of the delivery of the letter to UNMISS immediately before the shooting started, suggests that the attack was not spontaneous. Notably, sources indicate that, in addition to youth from Bor, other youth arrived from payams and bomas through Bor South, Twic East, and Duk Counties to participate. This would have required advance notice.
Multiple factors indicate that the perpetrators had knowledge of the layout of the UNMISS compound and PoC site and organized their method of attack accordingly. The crowd proceeded directly to the PoC site, bypassing the front gate of the UNMISS compound, with most proceeding directly around the compound to arrive at the gate to the PoC site. Escape routes were targeted, in particular the attack from the southern perimeter directly aimed at IDPs fleeing south from the PoC site. Several attackers were positioned at elevated points along the perimeters, with at least one acting as a sniper on the northern perimeter. These tactics enabled the perpetrators to inflict significant damage efficiently, as only a small number of them were armed with guns. The alleged involvement of at least one individual who had previously stayed in the PoC site supports the notion that the perpetrators were informed in advance of the layout of the compound and of the vulnerabilities of the perimeter.