

**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

**REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON WAU INCIDENT  
OF 24<sup>TH</sup>-26<sup>TH</sup> JUNE 2016**

**SUBMITTED TO;**

**H.E GEN. SALVA KIIR MAYARDIT,  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC**

**JUBA- 1<sup>ST</sup> AUGUST, 2016**

**REPORT ON WAU INCIDENT OF 24<sup>TH</sup>- 26<sup>TH</sup> JUNE, 2016**

**PRESENTED TO H.E GEN. SALVA KIIR MAYARDIT, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC**

**FOREWORD**

The fighting in Wau town on 24<sup>th</sup> to 26<sup>th</sup> June 2016, was unfortunate incident that caused unnecessary lost of lives and suffering of the civil population. As a country, we are not supposed to be losing lives, particularly at a time when the Peace Agreement has to be implemented. Our people have tremendously suffered and should be enjoying the fruits of their long struggle for peace, freedom and prosperity.

I would like to thank the President of the Republic, H.E Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit for his prompt response to the crisis in Wau by appointing a committee to investigate into the fighting. I am grateful to the President for his confidence in me and the rest of the Members of the Investigation Committee.

My appreciation goes to the State Governor of Wau State, H.E Andrea Mayar and his cabinet for their cooperation and in facilitating the work of the Committee. I express my gratitude to the Military Command in Wau, the National Security and Leadership of the Police and other Organized Forces for their cooperation with the Committee.

I commend Members of the Investigation Committee for their tireless efforts and commitment during the investigation process. This report would have not been possible without the professional guidance of the investigation team headed by my colleague, Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Hon. Martinson Oturomoi.

I applaud the people of Wau for their patience and cooperation with the investigation committee. The Committee would have not achieved much without their willingness to provide information and suggestions to address the challenges caused by the fighting.

My sincere thanks goes to Businessman Makiir Gai, who demonstrated the spirit of nationalism by generously donating food items to the displaced people in Wau. I appreciate the role of the Church, South Sudan Red Cross and UNMISS, UNOCHA and other humanitarian agencies for providing shelter and basic commodities for the displaced people.

The Committee is greatly indebted to the Office of the President for facilitating the investigation.

It is the Committee's sincere hope that the recommendations presented in this report shall be implemented by all the relevant Ministries and institutions.



**Dr Riek Gai Kok**

National Minister of Health, and  
Chairperson of the Investigation Committee

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
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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

- (a). This report was prepared for submission to H.E President of the Republic, Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, in accordance with Republican Order No. 15/2016. It contains the facts, findings and recommendations of the Committee.
- (b). The report contains four parts. Part one provides the introduction, part two contains the facts determined by the Committee, part three contains the findings of the Committee, and part four presents the Committee's recommendations.
- (c). The investigation was conducted by a team of lawyers under the direct guidance of the Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and secretary of the Committee.
- (d). The investigation proceedings were conducted in accordance with the Republican Order No. 15/2016 and provisions of the Investigation Committees Act, 2006.
- (e). The Committee found that the conflict in Wau is deep rooted and resulted from various factors; including political, security, economic and social factors.
- (f). The Committee found that the transfer the County Headquarters from Wau to Baggari infuriated some members of the Fertit community who saw the transfer as an attempt to deprive the Fertit of their ownership of Wau.
- (g). The Committee found that one of the root causes of the conflict relates to series of targeted killings of both soldiers and civilians on ethnic ground. These killings have resulted to revenge and counter revenge between communities, particularly the Dinka and Fertit tribes.
- (h). Another root cause to the conflict is the existence of large number of many unemployed youths living as squatters inside Wau town, coupled with the dire economic situation and the country has compelled these youths to engage in criminal activities including robbery and looting.

- (k). The Committee's findings and recommendations are based on thorough analysis of information, documents and statements provided to the Committee during the course of its investigation. The recommendations of the Committee are presented in a manner that makes them practical and implementable.
- (l). There were a number of challenges faced by the Committee including the complexity and extent of issues to be investigated, fear by some witnesses to testify and deliberate attitude by some not to tell the truth. Nonetheless, the Committee succeeded to generate sufficient information to draw up its findings and recommendations,
- (m). The Committee had 14 days to present its report to the President of the Republic. However, this was not possible due to circumstances beyond the Committee's control. However, the Committee managed to complete the investigation and compile its report within a period of one month.



**Martinson Mathew Oturomoi**

Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs; and  
Secretary of the Investigation Committee

**PART ONE**  
**INTRODUCTION**

**1.1 About Wau State**

- (1). Wau State is one of the 28 newly created states of the Republic of South Sudan. It is located in the northwest part of the country.
- (2). Wau is the capital city of Wau state and also acts as regional capital of Greater Bahr el Ghazal. It is the second largest city to Juba, which is the Capital city of the Republic of South Sudan.
- (3). Wau State is inhabited by the tribes of Fertit (Balanda, Bongo and Ndogo), Luo and Dinka (Jieng). There are also other communities, including the Fallata that have become citizens of Wau State.
- (4). The economic occupation of the people is mostly farming and cattle keeping. The Fertit and Luo are farmers while the Dinka are predominantly pastoralist.

**1.2 Background to the Conflict**

- (1) On 24<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> June 2016, fighting erupted in some parts of Wau town and resulted to loss of several lives, displacement of thousands of civilians, and destruction of public and private property. In response, H.E President of the Republic decided to appoint a Committee to investigate into the fighting.
- (2) The Investigation Committee was appointed by H.E Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic, via Republican Order No. 15/2016, dated 28<sup>th</sup> June, 2016, in accordance with Section 5(1) of the Investigation Committees Act 2006.
- (3) The Committee held its first meeting in Juba on 29<sup>th</sup> June 2016, to prepare its budget and agree on the methodology to guide the investigation.
- (4) The Committee co-opted additional members and support staff to assist in taking minutes of meetings, conduct interviews, and perform other important tasks relevant to the investigation.
- (5) The Committee departed for Wau on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2016, just two days after being notified of the Republican Order.
- (6) Upon arrival in Wau, the Committee proceeded to pay a courtesy call to the newly appointed State Governor, H.E Andrea Mayar and briefed him and his



Cabinet on the mandate and terms of reference of the Investigation Committee.

- (7) The same day, the Committee visited centers of displacement at the Catholic Church of Nazareth and Cathedral. The Committee also visited the scene of the fighting to get first hand information of the crisis.

### 1.3 Mandate and Composition

- (1). In accordance with Republican Order No 15/2016, the mandate of the Committee was to investigate into the fighting that happened in Wau on 24<sup>th</sup> -26<sup>th</sup> June, 2016.

- (2). The Committee composed of eight (8) members, as follows:

1. Hon. Dr Riek Gai Kok	National Minister of Health	Chairperson
2. Hon. Martinson Mathew Oturomoi	National Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs	Secretary
3. Lt. Gen. Mangar Buong Aluenge	SPLA Deputy Chief of General Staff for Operations	Member
4. Lt. Gen James Biel Ruot	Deputy Inspector General of Police	Member
5. Maj. Gen. Bor Philip Wutchok	Director of Political Affairs (Internal Security Bureau-National Security Service	Member
6. Maj. Gen Kulang Mayen Kulang	Deputy Director of Military Intelligence	Member
7. Amb. John Andruga	Ambassador in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation	Spokesperson
8. Mr. Akuoch Ajang Nyanhom	South Sudan Civil Society Alliance	Member

- (3). The Committee co-opted additional Members and Support staffs in accordance with the powers provided to it by Republican Order No. 15/2016.

#### **1.4 The Committee's Terms of Reference**

- (1). The Committee's terms of reference are stipulated in Para 3 of Republican Order No. 15/2016, as follows:
  - (a) to determine what transpired out in Wau State and assess the extent of damage caused thereto;
  - (b) to assess the humanitarian situation of the affected population; and
  - (c) to come up with recommendations to alleviate the suffering of the population and the prevention of occurrences of such incidences from recurring again.
- (2). The powers of the Committee are provided under Section 12 of the Investigation Committees Act, 2006; as follows:
  - (a) conduct hearings;
  - (b) interview witnesses who may have relevant information regarding the investigation;
  - (c) issue summons to any person to appear before it, if the Investigation Committee deems that there is reasonable cause for summoning such a person to give evidence under oath;
  - (d) require the production of any document from anywhere; and
  - (e) issue warrants of arrest for any person who refuses to appear before the Investigation Committee without a valid reason;

provided that, all powers set forth above are exercised in good faith with the belief that they are necessary to the investigation.

#### **1.5 Matters to be determined by the Committee**

- (1). In order to gather information and determine the facts in accordance with the terms of reference provided under Para 3 of Republican Order No. 15/2016, the Committee formulated a questionnaire for generating information and facts related to the investigation.

- (2). The Committee used various strategies outlined in the methodology section of this report to gather information and facts related to the investigation.

#### **1.5.1 The Root causes of the Fighting**

In determining what actually happened in Wau on 24<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> June 2016, the Committee intended to know the root-causes of the fighting by establishing the following facts:

- (a). What actually happened in Wau on 24<sup>th</sup> to 26<sup>th</sup> June 2016?
- (b). Who were actually the attackers?
- (c). How did the attackers infiltrate the town?
- (d). Who could have been behind the attack?
- (e). What could have been the motive of the attackers?
- (f). How did the security organs respond to the attack?

#### **1.5.2 The Extent of Casualties and Damages**

In determining the extent of casualties and damages, the Committee intended to establish the following facts-

- (a). The number of people killed and by who;
- (b). The number of people wounded;
- (c). The number of people unaccounted for;
- (d). The breakdown of the casualties in terms of gender, profession and occupation;
- (e). What was the extent of property damaged and/or looted?
- (f). Who were responsible for the killings, destruction and looting of property?

#### **1.5.3 Assessment of the Humanitarian Situation of the Affected Population**

In assessing the humanitarian situation, the Committee intended to establish the following facts-

- (a). How many people were displaced?
- (b). Where were the areas of displacement?
- (c). What was the condition of the displaced persons?
- (d). What support did they receive or need to receive?
- (e). Who provided the support?
- (f). What were the gaps?
- (g). What can government do?

## **1.6 Methodology for the Investigation**

In order to ensure the gathering of credible evidence, the Committee designed a comprehensive methodology to guide its investigation process, as follows:

### **1.6.1 Meetings**

The use of meetings was crucial in gathering information relevant to the investigation. In addition, these meetings were to enable the Committee obtain statements from state government officials, security organs and other parties of interest to the investigation. Furthermore, it enabled the Committee to obtain suggestions to address the security concerns, humanitarian needs of the displaced people, and how to prevent recurrence of the incident.

### **1.6.2 Interviews**

Interviews were used by the Committee to establish facts about the incident, including by questioning government officials, security personnel, victims and witness of the incident, and any other person the Committee considered was in possession of information relevant to the investigation.

### **1.6.3 Documentation**

The use of documentation was necessary to gather information and facts relevant to the investigation. The documents obtained by the Committee included reports presented by the state government, security organs, business community, humanitarian agencies, civil society and members of the public.

### **1.6.4 Field Visits**

Visit to areas where the incident took place and to centers of displacement enabled the Committee to acquire first hand information and to assess the general impact of the crisis.

**PART TWO**  
**FACTS DETERMINED BY THE COMMITTEE**

**2.1 Investigation Proceedings**

- (1). The information and facts presented in this report are based on the meetings, interviews and field visits conducted by the Investigation Committee. In addition, the Committee had an opportunity to obtain written reports from key stakeholders, and was able to peruse findings of previous investigations.
- (2). The Investigation Committee used different strategies to obtain information and establish facts pertaining to the fighting in Wau, on 24<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> June, 2016, determine the extent of casualties and damages, and to assess the humanitarian situation of the affected population.
- (3). In order to gather reliable information, the Committee, in addition to statements obtained through meetings and written statements, made a random selection of a representative sample of people to be interviewed. Those interviewed included victims and witnesses of the attack and people from different communities in Wau. The people interviewed were also selected from different residential areas of Wau and from the various centers of displacement.
- (4). During the course of the investigation, the Committee held meetings with the State Governor, State Government, State Security Committee, State Legislature, SPLA Commander of Sector 1, SPLA Division 5 Command, National Security, Leadership of the Police and Other Organized Forces (Wildlife, Prisons, Fire Brigade).
- (5). The Committee held several meetings with the civil society including with chiefs, women, youths, intellectuals, religious leaders, community groups and representatives of different communities. The Committee also met with the administration and student leaders of University of Bahr el Ghazal.
- (6). The Committee met with international and national organizations, and NGO's including UNOCHA (United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance), ICRC (International Committee of Red Cross), SSRC (South Sudan Red Cross), UNMISS (United Nations Mission in South Sudan), IOM (International Organization of Migration), UNICEF (United Nations International Children Education Fund), to discuss the humanitarian needs of the displaced people.
- (7). The Committee visited areas of displacement to assess the humanitarian conditions of those affected by the conflict and listened to victims of the

incident. The visits enabled the Committee to obtain first hand information on the condition of the displaced people and the support provided to them by humanitarian agencies.

- (8). The Committee recorded several statements from members of the State Government, State Legislature, Security Organs, civil society, religious leaders, humanitarian agencies, business community, victims and witnesses of the attack and other stakeholders.
- (9). The Committee, in addition to the recorded statements, obtained written statements and reports from various sources with a view of getting a clear picture and determining facts on what actually took place in Wau on 24<sup>th</sup> to 26<sup>th</sup> June 2016.
- (10). The statements, testimonies and reports provided to the Committee are enclosed as annexes to this report.
- (11). The Committee assured those who made statements pertaining to the investigation that no one shall be victimized for providing any facts, evidence or testimony on matters relevant to the investigation.

## **2.2 Root Causes of the Conflict in Wau**

- (1). According to statements provided and documentary evidence obtained by the Investigation Committee, the conflict in Wau has been contributed by several factors. These include political, security, economic, and social factors.
- (2). While it is not within the scope of this report to provide an exhaustive background to the root causes of the conflict, the objective of this report is to shed light on the main root-causes of the Wau conflict.
- (3). Previous investigations have traced the root causes of the conflict to the period when the Fertit were fighting the SPLM/A alongside the Khartoum regime as a militia group known Guat Salam (Peace Forces). According to sources, this militia was blamed for most of the atrocities committed against the Dinka community which was predominantly sympathetic to the SPLM/A. It is believed that these historical sentiments resurfaced after the signing of the CPA in 2005. There were claims that some elements within the Dinka community have decided to revenge against the Fertit for the atrocities committed against their communities during the liberation struggle.
- (4). Another root cause of the conflict, according to information gathered by the Committee, goes as far as 2012, when the defunct State Governor of Western Bahr el Ghazal, H.E Brig. Riziq Zakaria Hassan transferred the headquarters of Wau County to Baggari. According to findings of previous investigations

into Wau Conflict, the transfer was not received well by the indigenous of the county who perceived the transfer as a calculated move for their land to be taken over by the Dinka.

- (5). According to various sources, this decision infuriated many politicians, youth groups and community leaders of Balanda, Bongo and Ndogo. On the other hand the Dinkas and Jur contest that Wau town belongs to all communities in the state. Speaking to the Committee constituted by the President to probe into the Wau conflict of February, 2016 Chief Akec Mel, affirmed that Wau is the land of Dinka Marial Bai, Luo and Fertit.
- (6). Security sources have attributed the current rebellion in the State on some members of the Fertit community who have decided to use violent means to address their grievances. Following the December 15<sup>th</sup> 2013 conflict, rebel activities started appearing in the State. Personalities from the State including Tingo Peter, Dhahiya Jarbadar and Opindi Ndima officially declared their support for Riek Machar. Their rebel activities have been characterized by terror against the civil population in the form of unknown gunmen. On 10<sup>th</sup> May 2015, the group killed Paramount Chief Angelo Baggari and his wife on ground that he supports government policies.
- (7). Tribalism has caused mistrust and intensified tensions between communities. This was clearly visible during the Committee's meetings with the security organs, state government, state parliament, civil society and displaced persons. Mel Aleu told the Committee that in Wau people are separated because of tribalism. South west of the town is inhabited by the tribes of Fertit and the east by the tribes of Dinka and Jurchol.
- (8). Another root cause of the conflict is the increasing number of jobless youths migrating in large numbers into Wau town from neighboring States. Due to the economic condition and challenges of livelihood, most of these youths resort to criminal activities including robbery, intimidation and harassment of the civil population.
- (9). The conflict has also been attributed to the behavior of some politicians who use their communities to advance their personal interests including by instigating hatred between communities.
- (10). Another factor attributed to the conflict is the clash in lifestyles between the cattle herders and farmers. The alleged destruction of crops in the farms by cattle belonging to the Dinka and the reported reaction of the killing of cows by the Fertit pastoralists has exacerbated the tensions between the two communities. This root cause was vividly explained in the report of a Committee appointed to investigate the fighting in Wau in February 2016.

- (11). However, the most probable root-cause to the 24<sup>th</sup> June 2016 could be attributed to the series of killings that happened in the State since 2013 and by the need to revenge these killings.

### **2.3 What actually happened on 24<sup>th</sup> -26<sup>th</sup> June, 2016?**

#### **2.3.1 Immediate Causes of the Fighting**

- (1). According to statements from the military, police, other organized forces, state government, victims and witnesses of the fighting the immediate cause of the 24<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> fighting originated from a series of killings of both soldiers and civilians. The Committee received consistent statements and testimonies regarding the killings that happened in Wau prior to the fighting. The details of the killings and their circumstances are explained in the annexes pertaining to recorded statements and interviews.
- (2). According to the statement of the Commander of Sector 1 of the SPLA, Lt. Gen. Jok Riak, the incidents in Wau are so many and they started from 28/12/2015 and went on until the month of May 2016. Gen. Jok narrated the killings as follows:
- (a). On 22/12/2015, rebels attacked and killed the Paramount chief of Bongo tribe in Basilia area.
  - (b). On 04/1/2016, rebels attacked Busshery SPLA outpost killing one soldier and wounding three others.
  - (c). On 21/1/2016, rebels killed one soldier and another one was injured between Moimoi and Jebel Rabbah,
  - (d). On 30/1/2016, rebels attacked Ngisa SPLA outpost killing two soldiers.
  - (e). On 13/2/2016, rebels killed five SPLA soldiers in an ambush laid between Abushaka and Basilia and injured five others.
  - (f). On 27/2/2016, rebels ambushed SPLA forces on their way to Bazia area killing one soldier and wounding two others.
  - (g). On 18/2/2016, two civilians from Luany-Jang community were killed by rebels at vegetable garden in the suburb of Wau town.
  - (h). On 19/5/2016, civilians supporting insurgents at Kosti neighborhood stoned one SPLA soldier to death. The deceased penis was cut off and put on his mouth.
  - (i). Between 13-16<sup>th</sup> June 2016 rebels laid an ambush between Bazia and Wau Killing six SPLA soldiers and wounding fourteen others.
  - (j). On 22/6/2016, rebels laid another ambush near Jebel Rabah, killing two SPLA soldiers.
  - (k). On 15/6/2016, rebels attacked Raja town killing eight SPLA soldiers and wounding eight others.



- (l). On 11/6/2016, rebels laid an ambush between Basalia and Khorgana and killed two SPLA soldiers.
- (m). On 14/6/2016, one SPLA soldier was killed and nine others were wounded between Wau and Bazia.
- (n). On 21/6/2016, two SPLA soldiers were killed between Moimoi and Jebel Rabah. At 7:00 pm of same day rebels had infiltrated the town and killed a policeman and a teacher.
- (o). On 23/6/2016, a Wildlife Captain was killed by a policeman.

(3). The State Deputy Police Commissioner Maj. Gen Chol Thuc also narrated a series of killings preceding the 24<sup>th</sup> June, 2016 incident in a chronological order, as follows:

- (a). On 18<sup>th</sup> April 2016, SPLA soldier Cpl. Simon Awan was killed and Pvt. Andrea Paulino wounded by rebels in Hai Jezeera and residents of that area were involved according to sources. In the same day and same area two brothers by names (1) Peter Seferino Sabun (2) Nelson Seferino Sabun were killed by soldiers in army uniform and their sister Juleta Seferino was wounded.
- (b). On 5<sup>th</sup> May 2016 Police R/SM Nicola Karar was killed with a lady by rebels identified to be Oliver and Maki Sultan, in Hai Motemedia. It was alleged that he had a problem with Maki el Sultan.
- (c). On 18/5/2016, SPLA soldier Pvt. Ayii Mangok was killed after being chased by the killers from Moimoi and killed near Nazareth by people later identified to be from Hai Ngofu. When the police sent a force to the crime scene, they found that the deceased penis had been cut and his gun taken.
- (d). On 21<sup>st</sup> June 2016, two SPLA soldiers (1) Tong Madut and (2) Manyang Maker were killed by rebels while they were on their way back to their Camp at Mamoi (*Moimoi*). Their guns and motorbike were taken. On the same day a Police Cpl. John Alfred Saleh with civilian George Dominic were shot dead by unknown gunmen near Hai Mayo (Bazia Jedid).
- (e). On 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2016, Police Captain Gabriel Chol Mayen was killed by Wild Life Sgt. Peter Mbale. The killing occurred after the captain shot an armed person who was wearing army uniform at the time.

(4). The Committee also received similar claims on series of killings that occurred in Wau town, from victims and witnesses. Meetings with the civil society and other stakeholders also provided sufficient information to the Committee. There are several claims and counterclaims regarding killings,

narrated to the Committee by members of the Dinka and Fertit communities. These are contained in the record of statements and interviews enclosed to this report as annexes.

- (5). It is abundantly clear from the narrative that the fighting of 24<sup>th</sup> June 2016 was motivated by the need to revenge and counter revenge for the above mentioned series of killings. The rebel participation in the fighting was probably to exploit the confusion caused by the initial attack.

### **2.3.2 Who were responsible for the attack?**

- (a). Evidence provided to the Committee indicate that the initial attack on Wau on 24/6/2016, at 5.00 pm, was carried out by a group of armed civilians believed to be relatives of the SPLA soldiers killed earlier, and the Wildlife Captain killed on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2016. However, the rebels who infiltrated the town are believed to have exploited the situation to attack security organs, particularly on 25<sup>th</sup> June 2016.
- (b). According to various sources, the group that attacked Wau had earlier gathered at Bahr Shergi before crossing the Jur River and launching a revenge attack on the civilians in areas predominantly inhabited by the Fertit tribes. Some of the people interviewed identified the attackers to be of Dinka origin reportedly from the Luany Jang.
- (c). The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Maj. Gen. Chol Thuc, told the Committee that on 24<sup>th</sup> June 2016, the police received information that about 40 people armed with sticks, machetes and 6 guns had entered Nazareth. The police responded by sending a platoon of about 12 policemen to contain the situation. When the police saw that the situation was tense, they came back and thereafter the army was sent. When the army arrived, the rebels started shooting at the army. After that, the shooting started in other places.
- (d). In his recorded statement and contained in the annex to this report, the Mayor of Wau County, His Worship Akol Akol Ajith, narrated that the people who gathered at Bahr Shergi were civilians and had no guns. Their intention, he said, was to revenge and loot.
- (e). The claim that the attackers crossed from Bahr Shergi is reinforced by reports submitted to the Committee by both the army and police which all confirmed that a group of civilians crossed into Wau South from Bahr el Shergi.

- (f). The State Minister of Local Government and who was acting Governor at the time of the incident, Hon. Angelina Anthony testified that the attackers were Dinka from Bahr el Shergi. She claimed that these were Gelweng from Tonj.
- (g). According to statement of Lt. Gen. Jok Riak, the SPLA Commander of Sector 1, the fighting on 24<sup>th</sup> June 2016 was started by people coming from the eastern side of the river. According to him those who came from the eastern side of the river were coming to revenge. When the army got to the scene the attackers ran to the eastern side of the river.
- (h). The Committee also received various statements attributing the attack to rebels and the Fertit. Lt Gen Jok informed the Committee that, in the night of 24<sup>th</sup> June 2016, the rebels attacked the town and fighting stopped at 11.00 hrs when rebels went back to Bringi. Deputy Police Commissioner Maj. Gen Chol informed the Committee that when the army arrived to the scene on 24<sup>th</sup> June 2016, the rebels started shooting at the army. After that the shooting started in other places.
- (i). Apart from official sources, the Committee also received statements from the victims and witnesses of the attack. Julia Langa from Nazareth told the Committee that on 24<sup>th</sup> June 2016, the people who were attacking the market were attacking with sticks. She further stated that on 26<sup>th</sup> June 2016 the attackers killed her husband, son and son of her uncle. She did not tell who the killers were.
- (j). Wum Juma told the Committee that on 25<sup>th</sup> June 2016, she heard shooting in the morning and that three soldiers came to her house and were asking her boy; where is the motor? They sat him down and killed him. They were Dinkas. She did not elaborate whether these were civilians or soldiers.
- (k). Daniel Awet Doro stated that on 24 June 2016, the attack came at 4.30 pm. Yaba was killed by Gelweng. He heard them talking 'dom moc'; meaning catch him and shoot him. On 26<sup>th</sup> June 2016 the army came with Gelweng and one of the Zandes was killed that day. According to the statement, he was talking with them in Dinka.
- (l). However, other people provided different account as to who the attackers were. Orlia Acur told the Committee that on 24<sup>th</sup> June, she heard shooting and that fighting continued up to 26<sup>th</sup> June 2016. According to her, the people who came were rebels and that they were fighting the government. She stated that the war was not between the Dinka and Fertit.

- (m). Akec Mel from Block 3 told the investigators that rebels are in the bush and Gelweng are there in Dinka land. Here in Wau people say... 'X' is killed by the Dinkas, and 'Y' is killed by the Fertit. All these are rumours. Rebels are from Riek Machar, when they go to Juba, they will be asked, tell us which town you have captured since you came to IO. Soldiers said, 'rebels entered the town (Wau), people must differentiate between the rebels and ordinary people.
- (n). Mr. John Lual Atak, who is a Chief from Nazareth, testified that what happened in Wau was between the government and rebels. As to who were the attackers, he replied, 'I don't know'.
- (o). Chief William Kamilo Mboro narrated that according to information received, rebels had entered Wau town and they were many. They were telling people to get out of the town because they were going to capture the town, and that any person who failed to get out would be killed, irrespective of whether he or she was big person or child. He claimed that people were asked to go out of the town, go to the Church or UNMISS. The attackers know themselves as 'sons of Wau', from tribes of Balanda, Bayi, Ndogo, Kereish, Luo and even Dinkas. They came from the North (Sudan) in addition to the people who have joined them locally here and some who defected from the armed forces in Wau.

### **2.3.3 What was the motive of the attackers?**

- (a). The main motive of the attack, according to the facts contained in the statements and reports provided to the committee, was revenge by relatives of the killed soldiers and civilians.
- (b). According to the report submitted to the Committee by the SPLA Division 5 Command, a group of armed men, believed to be relatives of the wildlife captain killed by a Policeman, crossed Jur-river and launched a revenge attack on innocent civilians in a residential area where the officer was killed.
- (c). Chief William Kamilo stated in his statement that the motive of the attack was Dinka. According to him the rebels want to chase away the Dinkas from Wau.

### **2.3.4 Response to the Attack by Security Organs**

- (a). According to security organs, the police were dispatched to the scene to disperse the civilians who attacked Wau South. The number of the police force dispatched was one platoon (12 policemen). The police told the

Committee that the police were overwhelmed by the attackers, and that they invited the army to handle the matter.

- (b). It was reported to the Committee that after the situation deteriorated, the Acting Governor called in the army to subdue the attackers. As SPLA moved in to protect civilians and their properties in the area, they claimed that rebels attacked them and fighting continued until 7.00 pm.
- (c). Although the initial attack on Wau South on 24<sup>th</sup> June could be blamed on civilians who crossed from Bahr el Shergi, security sources blamed the escalation of the fighting particularly on 25/6/2016 on rebels who had infiltrated the town. Security sources have stated that the rebels launched sporadic attacks on the town on 25<sup>th</sup> June 2016, and fighting continued up to 11.00 hrs of same day.

### **2.3.5 The Casualties**

- (a). The Committee found disturbing reports in regard to the impact of the attack. In particular, the Committee deplored the untold suffering and destruction of property caused by the fighting.
- (b). Both oral and written statements obtained by the Committee have given names of persons killed, including circumstances in which these killings occurred. The reports provided by the SPLA and Police have given details of the soldiers killed. On the other hand, civilians interviewed by the Committee have also provided details of civilians killed.
- (c). According to official statements provided to the Committee, the number of people killed ranges from 39 to 53. However, the Committee has gathered credible evidence from different sources to indicate that the number of people killed could be higher than the official numbers provided by the army, police and state authorities.
- (d). According to records of a report submitted by the State Deputy Commissioner of Police, the medical personnel of the police were instructed to collect the dead bodies. 39 dead bodies were collected from different residential areas of Aweil jedid, Hai Kresh, Kuburi Sita and Mahad Mayo. 14 Darfurians were killed by rebels after they were caught and taken to forest. Their bodies were taken by relatives. The total number of bodies collected and recorded by the police was 53 in number.
- (e). According to the National Security in the State, the total number of casualties was 76 and categorized as follows:-

- i. 42 deaths (8 from Darfur, 4 Policemen, 30 civilians); and
  - ii. 34 wounded.
- (f). The Police reported that the number of bodies collected by the police was 53 out of which 14 of them were from Darfur. On the same day, 5 bodies of police personnel who were shot dead during the fighting were also collected. The personnel are: (1) R/SM Tindil Karama Sabir (2) Sgt. Among Sebit Anyang, (3) Cpl. Khamis Musa Bringi (4) Pvt. Luis Erneo Barnaba and (5) Uchalla Madut.
- (d). The Committee visited the Catholic Cathedral and was shown 15 graves, out of which 13 of them were direct victims of the attack. According to the Military, 11 of these were rebels. However, this claim was seriously refuted by the Parish Priest of the Catholic Church.
- (g). The Committee could not rely on the number of dead bodies provided by victims and witnesses of the attack for fear that the numbers could be deliberately exaggerated or distorted.

### **2.3.6 Property Damage and Losses**

- (a). The Committee received consistent information from different sources that some indiscipline soldiers and civilians took advantage of the situation and carried out acts of looting in the abandoned residential areas and the periphery of Suuk-Juo (market); where kiosks and shops were ransacked.
- (b). The Committee also received sufficient evidence of widespread looting of civilian homes. The Committee took serious note of allegations that the looting was widespread with apparent participation of some indiscipline soldiers.
- (c). The Police report submitted to the Committee stated that the situation was terribly bad in the morning of 25<sup>th</sup> June, 2016. Shooting was everywhere in the residential areas of Wau South and West. 58 shops in Jou Market, 27 shops in Hajer Market and 7 other shops in different residential areas were subjected to looting.
- (d). According to information submitted to the Committee by the Chamber of Commerce in the State, about 111 shops and other business premises were looted at different locations of the town. The total value of losses related to business is over SSP 20 Million. However, the Committee could not draw conclusion on the definite value of the damages and losses because it felt that this was beyond the scope of the investigation.

- (e). Lt. Gen. Jok Riak informed the Committee that, on 24/6/2016, there was a fight from the people who were coming from Eastern Side of the river. On the arrival of the army those people ran to eastern side of the river.
- (f). The Committee received lists from some individuals in regard to looted property from their homes. The Police have also provided 15 names of individuals who have opened cases against specific suspects who looted their homes.
- (g). Allah el-Dein told the Committee that his shop was looted. The contents of his shop were shoes, bags, plastic sheets, cups, tables and documentation of four shops. The value of looted property is worth SSP 1,400,000.
- (h). The Committee could not quantify the losses but noted that given the extent of the looting the value could be in several Millions of SSP.
- (i). The Committee received reports that some of the looters have been apprehended, and urge both the military and police commands to apprehend those implicated in the looting. In addition, the military and police need to trace the looted properties and return it to the rightful owners.

### 2.3.7 The Humanitarian Impact

- (a). According to information gathered by the Committee, the number of people displaced by the conflict is **70,000** with most of them in rural areas outside Wau town.
- (b). The number of people who ran to UNMISS POC is **19,711**. Those taking shelter at the Cathedral are **13,123**, while another **952** have taken shelter at a church compound at Nazareth. The South Sudan Red Cross is sheltering **3,023** people.
- (c). The breakdown of the displaced persons inside Wau, as provided by UNOCHA on 5<sup>th</sup> July 2016, are as follows:-

#### ➤ POC (Protection of Civilians)

Location	Ind.	HHs	Men	%	Women	%	Children	%
Quadrant 1	4830	953	1076	22%	1297	27%	2456	51%
Quadrant 2	3824	754	894	23%	996	26%	1934	51%
Quadrant 3	5490	1,083	1076	20%	1242	23%	3172	58%
Quadrant 4	5567	1,098	1096	20%	1430	26%	3040	55%

<b>Total</b>	<b>19,711</b>	<b>3,888</b>	<b>4,142</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>4,966</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>10,603</b>	<b>54%</b>
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➤ **Cathedral**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Ind.</b>	<b>HHs</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Children</b>	<b>%</b>
Zone 1 (Palaka)	5,748	1,045	913	16%	1,456	25%	3,379	59%
Zone 2 (School)	3,350	609	1,122	33%	1,299	39%	1,605	48%
Zone 3 (Theatre)	4,026	732	828	21%	890	22%	2,116	53%
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,123</b>	<b>2,588</b>	<b>2,864</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>3,644</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>7,100</b>	<b>54%</b>

➤ **SSRC**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Ind.</b>	<b>HHs</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Children</b>	<b>%</b>
SSRC	3023	648	524	17%	860	28%	2456	54%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3023</b>	<b>648</b>	<b>524</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>860</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>10,603</b>	<b>54%</b>

➤ **Nazareth**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Ind.</b>	<b>HHs</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Children</b>	<b>%</b>
Zone 1 (Accommodation)	259	74	30	11%	54	27%	2456	51%
Zone 2 (Green Building)	343	754	94	27%	114	26%	1934	51%
Zone 3 (Main Church)	350	100	67	19%	94	23%	3172	58%
<b>Total</b>	<b>952</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>263</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>565</b>	<b>59%</b>



## **PART THREE**

### **COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

The findings and conclusions in this report are based on thorough analysis of the facts and evidence determined by the Committee through different sources including statements, interviews, documents and field visits.

#### **3.1 General Observations**

- (1). Wau state is extremely polarized on tribal lines and tribalism has reached a level whereby the social fabric of society has been affected. Tribalism has deeply penetrated public institutions and society in general. Only sustainable efforts from the government, politicians, intellectuals and community leaders can reverse this worrying trend.
- (2). There is a tendency of generalizing certain communities as either being part of the SPLA, or being supporters of the rebellion. This results to collective targeting and punishment of people on the basis of these perceived generalizations.
- (3). There is serious mistrust among the different organs of government, and between them and civilians. Peaceful co-existence and communication between different communities; and between communities and state organs is low.
- (4). The Committee observed that evidence provided by the communities tended to be deliberately exaggerated or distorted in order to suit the interest of particular groups. It was strongly observed that when a Fertit testified, he or she would say the fighting was triggered by the Dinkas from Bahr el Shergi with no rebel participation, and that all those responsible for the killings and lootings were Dinka. And when you ask a Dinka to testify, he or she would say the attackers were from Fertit and that rebels participated and were responsible for the killing of both soldiers and civilians.

#### **3.2 The Root Causes**

The investigation has unveiled the main root-causes to the conflict in Wau, and other areas of former Western Bahr el-Ghazal State including Raja. The root-causes are complex in nature and include political, security, economic and social factors.

## **(1). Political Factors**

- (a). The transfer of the Headquarters of Wau County to Baggari by former Governor of Western Bahr el-Ghazal Brig Gen. Riziq Zakaria Hassan, resulted to deep rooted grievances between the different communities in Wau.
- (b). Some politicians from the three communities (Fertit, Luo, Dinka) have reportedly used the polarization among their communities to advance their political interests, including by mobilizing their followers against the State Government and with each other.
- (c). There was total mistrust between the security organs and former State Governor, Maj. Gen. Elias Waya. This poor relation resulted to the ineffectiveness of the state security committee. This created a security gap which provided an opportunity for both rebels and criminals to undermine the security of the state including by infiltrating the town and terrorizing civilians.
- (d). There was apparent lack of harmony among the Members of the State Assembly and within the former Cabinet of Governor Elias Waya.

## **(2). Security Factors**

- (a). The widespread targeted killing of soldiers and revenge killing in the state are responsible for the deteriorating security situation and breakdown in relations between the army and civilians and between communities.
- (b). The perception by some members of the security organs that the Fertit community is sympathetic to the rebels, and the perception by the Fertit that the SPLA is biased against their community, is responsible for the poor relations between security organs and civilians, and between the communities.
- (c). The deep penetration of rebel propaganda to southern and western parts of Wau town is to be blamed for the growing mistrust between the community and security organs. There are certainly areas of Wau Town in which rebels have infiltrated with the likely complicity of some elements within the community who are believed to be harboring rebel infiltrators from the security organs, and facilitating the killing of soldiers and civilians perceived to be government loyalist.
- (d). The issue of cantonments and promises of military ranks by SPLA-IO has encouraged many youths to join rebellion and the pressure on them to

legitimize their presence in former Western Bahr el Ghazal State through military attacks on government targets and garrisons.

- (e). There are elements including Ali Tamim Fartak, Abdelbagi Ayii and Col. Musa Karangelo that are behind the rebellion in former State of Western Bahr el Ghazal, with likely support from a foreign country.

### **(3). Economic Factors**

- (a). Many youths from other states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal have migrated to Wau due to hunger gap, unemployment and the dire economic conditions in the country. As a result, these youths have resorted to criminal activities including robbery and looting. This category of youths took part in looting during the 24<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> June conflict.
- (b). The conflict in the lifestyles of farmers and cattle keepers is one of the major contributing factors to the deteriorating relations between the communities. The grazing of cattle in areas inhabited by farmers has resulted to violent conflict between herders and farmers.

### **(4). Tribalism**

- (a). There is polarization on tribal lines in the state and this has contributed to current tensions between the different communities in the State. Tribalism has been exacerbated by the current rebellion and the rampant ethnic related killings in the State.
- (b). Tribalism has penetrated government institutions and this has affected the effective performance of government institutions in the state. The church, mosques and civil society are no exception to this ethnic polarization.

### **3.3 Who were the Attackers?**

- (a). According to evidence obtained by the Committee from multiple sources in the course of the investigation, it is abundantly that the fighting of 24<sup>th</sup> June 2016 was triggered by a group of civilians who were motivated by the need to revenge for the killing of their loved ones. However, the rebels who had earlier infiltrated the town exploited the situation by attacking security forces that went to the area with intention to contain the situation.
- (b). The Committee took note of allegations that those civilians who allegedly gathered at Bahr el Shergi were responsible for triggering the fighting of 24<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> June 2016. However, the Committee did not find sufficient

evidence to conclude that the attackers included civilians mobilized from Tonj and other neighboring states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal.

### **3.4 Deaths and Injuries**

- (a). The state has witnessed widespread killings of both soldiers and civilians, some of which are targeted killings on ethnic grounds. These killings are criminal related, rebel activities, community hatred, revenge killings by the relatives of the victims, or by indiscipline members of the security organs.
- (b). The Committee could not establish the definite figure of people killed due to contradictory evidence provided by different sources. However, the Committee is of the view that the number of casualties could be higher.

### **3.5 Property Damage and Looting**

- (a). The Committee found sufficient evidence to indicate that looting took place during the incident of 24<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> June 2016. This conclusion is supported by statements, testimonies and reports presented to the Committee, and through field visits conducted by the Committee.
- (b). According to reports submitted to the Committee by the business representatives in the state, the total loss related to business is valued at SSP 20 Million. However, the Committee could not draw conclusion on the definite value of the losses because it felt that this was beyond the scope of its investigation.
- (c). There is evidence to conclude that the looting was carried out by criminal elements and some indiscipline elements of the security organs.
- (d). Looting was further exacerbated by economic hardship and joblessness experienced by the population, particularly among the youths and street boys in Wau town.
- (e). The Committee has not found sufficient evidence to suggest that the looting was sanctioned by the leadership of the military or other organized forces. This conclusion is supported by the fact that both the Military and Police have managed to apprehend some indiscipline soldiers.

### **3.6 Humanitarian Situation**

- (a). The Committee found that the humanitarian impact of the conflict is serious and requires timely intervention by the relevant authorities to prevent it reaching catastrophic level.

- (b). The humanitarian situation in the State has been worsened by the widespread looting of civilian homes and activities of the rebels. The insecurity created by rebel activities, poor relations between communities, and persistent conflict between farmers and pastoralists have a combined effect to limit the ability of the civil population to effectively engage in farming activities.
- (c). The current economic crisis, exacerbated by the rarity of dollars coupled with poor roads has caused difficulty for traders to import food items from neighboring countries. Consequently, the rocketing of prices in the market has affected the ability of most citizens to provide food for their families.
- (d). The presence of civilians at POC and other centers of displacement, and their reluctance to voluntarily return to their homes, is mainly if not wholly attributed to the desire to gain access to free food supplies and other basic needs.
- (e). The Committee found that the figure of 200,000 affected persons as provided by humanitarian organizations could be extremely higher than the actual number of those affected by the crisis. This observation also applies to the 70,000 figure of displaced persons provided to the Committee by humanitarian agencies.
- (f). Following the security measures recommended by the Investigation Committee and implemented by the state government in collaboration with the security organs in order to secure the return of the displaced people to their homes, it has been observed that the number of people seeking protection at the Churches, UNMISS and other areas of displacement have reduced dramatically.

## **PART FOUR**

### **RECOMMENDATIONS AND STEPS TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE**

#### **4.1 Recommendations**

The recommendations in this report are based on thorough analysis of the findings of the Committee. In order to make these recommendations practical and implementable, the Committee decided to identify the offices and institutions that are required to implement the recommendations in this report.

##### **(1). H.E President of the Republic**

- (a). Direct State Governors and Security organs in the states of Wau and Lol to establish direct contacts through community leaders with those who have taken arms against the State with a view to initiating dialogue in order to address their grievances through peaceful means. This model could be used all over the country to comprehensively resolve all rebellious activities through dialogue.
- (b). Grant amnesty to the rebels willing to lay down their arms and pardon those detained for alleged subversive acts against the State, in order to encourage them return and contribute in peace and nation building.
- (c). Order the SPLA Command to take immediate steps aimed at improving relations with civilians, including by apprehending and presenting to military justice those soldiers accused of committing atrocities against civilians, or looting of property.

##### **(2). SPLA General HQRS**

- (a). Redeploy the army outside the town to combat the rebels and/or bandits, in order to prevent them from infiltrating the town.
- (b). Apprehend soldiers who are accused of committing atrocities against civilians or took part in looting and present them to military justice.
- (c). Rebuild trust between SPLA soldiers and civilians by taking practical steps to restore confidence between the Military and the civil population.
- (d). Sensitize SPLA soldiers of their duty and responsibility to respect and protect civilians.
- (e). Take immediate steps to effect regular transfers of commanders, officers and men in order to avoid longer stay in particular locations. This is to avoid them becoming embedded into the local politics in areas of deployment.

- (f). Provide regular supplies of food rations and adequate mobility facilities (vehicles and trucks) to enhance the capacity and capability to discharge their assigned duties.

**(3). National Security Service**

- (a). Increase its presence in the state with the aim to enhance information gathering for appropriate decision making.
- (b). Provide adequate mobility facilities (vehicles and trucks) to enhance the capacity and capability to discharge their assigned duties.
- (c). Provide protection of civilians and government installations in collaboration with other organized forces.

**(4). Wau State Government**

- (a). Form an inclusive state government that is representative of the various communities and influential leaders of the state.
- (b). Address the security concerns and economic hardship faced by the population, in order to enable the displaced persons return to their homes, and for people to return to their farms and produce food for their families.
- (c). Facilitate free movement for humanitarian agencies to enable them assess and respond to the humanitarian needs of the affected population.
- (d). Take practical measures to operationalise the work of the area security committees including effecting joint patrols to residential areas by the Military Police, National Security and other Organized Forces in collaboration with UNMISS.
- (e). Promote dialogue and reconciliation among the different communities in the State.
- (f). Empower local chiefs to maintain law and order and promote peaceful coexistence between communities.

**(5). South Sudan National Police Service and Other Organized Forces**

- (a). Inspector General of Police to deploy more police force in Wau, in order to restore confidence on the police and enhance its capacity to keep law and order, particularly in areas most affected by the conflict.
- (b). The Police to immediately investigate and apprehend those implicated in the killing of soldiers and civilians, or participated in looting of property, and to present them before the law.

- (c). The Leaderships of the Police and Other Organized Forces (Prison, Wildlife, Fire Brigade) to provide the necessary supplies and equipment to their respective units in the State.

**(6). National Ministry of Health**

- (a). Address the immediate health needs of the displaced persons, so as to mitigate killer diseases such as malaria, diarrhea and cholera.
- (b). Deploy more medical personnel to the state in order to enhance the capacity of the state in addressing the health needs of the population.

**(7). National Ministry of General Education**

National Ministry of General Education in collaboration with State Ministry of Education and Developmental Partners (UNICEF) to launch 'Go Back to School' programme.

**(8). National Peace and Reconciliation Commission**

- (a). Mobilize resources to facilitate the holding of peace and reconciliation conferences in the state.
- (b). Facilitate the chiefs comprising all communities in the State to lead inter-communal dialogue, peace and reconciliation efforts.
- (c). Encourage community leaders and intellectuals in the State to urge their sons and relatives in the rebellion to respond to the amnesty granted by the President of the Republic, by embracing peace and engaging in dialogue with the Government.

**(9). Relief and Rehabilitation Commission**

- (a). Mobilize humanitarian organizations to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to the most affected victims of the crisis.
- (b). Support the State Government to facilitate the resettlement of those whose houses have been vandalized and property looted.
- (c). Undertake a comprehensive assessment in collaboration with other humanitarian agencies, on the humanitarian needs of the displaced persons.
- (d). Work with relevant authorities in the State to ensure free movements of humanitarian agencies.
- (e). Strengthens its presence in the State by deploying capable senior officials to oversee the assessment and delivery of humanitarian supplies.



**(10). Humanitarian Organizations, UNMISS and other UN Agencies**

- (a). Undertake immediate and long-term humanitarian intervention to alleviate the suffering of the displaced and other affected persons in the State.
- (b). Continue the supply of food and non-food items to displaced persons and other affected persons.
- (c). UNMISS to undertake joint patrols with Police and other organized forces in order to ensure security for the displaced people to return home.
- (d). Provide funding to the state authorities and the civil societies to enable them organize peace and reconciliation conferences in the state.

**(11). Political Parties and Intellectuals**

- (a). Politicians and intellectuals hailing from Wau state to work for peace, harmony and unity of their people.
- (b). MPs from the area to make joint trips to Wau in order to sensitize their communities about the importance of unity and peaceful co-existence.
- (c). Politicians and intellectuals to seek ways of initiating dialogue and peaceful settlement of the conflict in Wau.

**(12). University of Bahr el Ghazal**

- (a). Conduct research into the root-causes of the conflict between communities in Greater Bahr el Ghazal and recommending viable long term solutions for peaceful co-existence among communities in the region.
- (b). Participate as resource persons in a conference to be organized by the Government to discuss the economic hardship affecting the livelihood of the people of Greater Bahr el Ghazal; and to propose practical solutions to address the economic challenges.

**4.2 Immediate Measures Taken by the Committee**

In order to address the immediate security and humanitarian needs of the displaced persons and to create conducive environment for people to return to their homes, the Committee took the below measures:-

- (1). Paid visits to centers of displacement and the affected residential areas and spoke to the people, assessed their humanitarian needs, and appealed for the displaced population to return to their homes.
- (2). Conducted joint visits to residential areas with state authorities and security organs, as a way of rebuilding confidence between government organs and civilians.
- (3). Worked in collaboration with the Military and other security organs to address the immediate security concerns of the displaced people. These included the redeployment of the army outside Wau town and deploying the police and other organized forces to provide security in residential areas, so as to enable people return to their homes.
- (4). Facilitated the formation of area popular committees to participate in community policing of their respective residential areas.
- (5). Facilitated the formation of a joint security sector forum (SPLA Div. 5, National Security Service, National Police Service, and UNMISS) to enhance coordination on security matters.
- (6). Facilitated the formation of a joint humanitarian sector forum (State Government, RRC, UNOCHA, International Organizations and NGO's working in the State) to enhance coordination on humanitarian matters.
- (7). Met and urged UNMISS to take part in joint patrols established by the State Security Committee, in order to stabilize security in residential areas.
- (8). Distributed over 4000 bags of maize flour donated to the Committee by Businessman Makiir Gai to the displaced people and other persons in need.
- (9). Provided 1000 bags of maize flour, 4 bulls, fuel, tents, solar panels, solar torches, and mosquito nets to the Military in order to facilitate their immediate redeployment outside the town.
- (10). Facilitated the drilling of water wells for the Military in their new areas of deployment.

Signed:-

Name	Position	Signature
1. Hon. Dr Riek Gai Kok	Chairperson	
2. Hon. Martinson Mathew Oturomoi	Secretary	
3. Lt. Gen. Mangar Buong Aluenge	Member	
4. Lt. Gen James Biel Ruot	Member	
5. Maj. Gen. Bor Wutchok Bor	Member	
6. Maj. Gen Kulang Mayen Kulang	Member	
7. Amb. John Andruga Duku	Spokesperson	
8. Mr. Akuoch Ajang Nyanhom	Member	

**Annexes:-**

- (i) - Record of Statements and Interviews
- (ii) - Republican Order No. 15/2016
- (iii)- Committee's Work Methods and Methodology
- (iv)- Reports from Stakeholders
- (v) - Reports of Property Damage and Losses